
This article discusses government action with regard to Russian Church reform at the turn of the 17th-18th centuries (the beginning of Petrine church reform). Its particular foci are church land ownership, the financial and administrative institutions of the Russian Church and its upper management systems. The research is based upon more than a dozen inventories of church buildings and property, various bishopric's census books (perepis'nye knigi of the Patriarchate; of the Velikii Ustiug, Vologda, Kolomna, Tobol'sk bishoprics and others), as well as records that arose out of the organization of descriptions of church possessions in 1701-1703. Many of the documents used have recently appeared in print for the first time. Analyzing such an extensive group of sources allows us to demonstrate the scale of government activities at the beginning of the 18th century; this was when the secular authorities began updating socio-economic information about the Russian Church in order to obtain a new source of income in connection with the outbreak of the Northern War. A second issue broached here is an analysis not only of Peter is decrees about the church but also of internal church documents (in particular, the texts of the episcopal oath, ordination promises); these illustrate changes to church administration that took place simultaneously with the beginning of the Revision of church possessions. The authorities quickly abandoned the idea of appointing a new patriarch and replaced his canonical authority with an appeal to the eastern patriarchs; Russian Church matters on the territory of the Moscow Patriarchate were transferred to the locum tenens on the patriarchal throne. For the first time in Russian history, the head of the Russian Church (albeit a locum tenens) was thus deprived of financial and judicial opportunities. These functions were transferred to the Monastery Chancellery, and the patriarchal chancelleries were effectively eliminated. For several years, government imposed its control over the previously independent economic, judicial and administrative activities of all ecclesiastical jurisdictions in the country, including the Patriarchate. Describing patriarchal possessions and reforming patriarchal chancelleries, as shown here, represented innovations in church-state relations.
This article examines the 1783 annexation of Crimea by the Russian Empire as a critical inflection point in the development of Russian imperial strategy and foreign policy. Moving beyond interpretations that situate the annexation primarily within the bilateral logic of Russo-Ottoman rivalry, this article argues that it was shaped by the American Revolution, shifting European alliances, and the evolving norms of international law. Drawing on Russian, American, and British diplomatic correspondence as well as recent scholarship in imperial and diplomatic history, the article argues that the methods employed in Crimea - installing client rulers, invoking legal treaties, framing expansion as humanitarian protection - became templates for subsequent Russian imperial practice. It further contends that the Crimean annexation inaugurated a durable geopolitical logic that reverberates into the present, whose resonance has been reactivated by Russia's 2014 annexation of the peninsula. By tracing the continuities between eighteenth-century statecraft and contemporary geopolitical crises, this study contributes to current debates on empire, sovereignty, and the longue dur & eacute;e of Russian foreign policy.
Peter's the Great's replacement of the patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church with the Holy Synod is only part of story of religion in his reign. He also sponsored changes in religious practice, particularly the increased emphasis on preaching and the deemphasis on monasteries as centers of devotion. These changes began in the reign of his father Tsar Aleksei, but he radically accelerated them. To cany them out he promoted the Ukrainian clergy, Stefan Iavorskii and Feofan Prokopovich. Peter himself had views on religion: he thought that Russians put too much emphasis on liturgy, fasts, and the construction of churches, not enough on the teachings of the faith and on love. Peter himself attended church services more or less weekly and took communion several times during Easter Week and on other occasions. In all this an important but largely unstudied role was played by his spiritual fathers, also mostly Ukrainians, who even accompanied him on his travels. Historians need to distinguish between his own views and practices and those of the bishops that found useful to run the church. There were many features in common, but they were not identical.
In academic monographs, textbooks, reference works, and popularizing historical literature in Russian and other languages, it is widely claimed that in 1723, an important event took place in Russia, which historians refer to as the "abolition of kholopstvo," "the abolition of slavery," or "l'abolition de l'esclavage." According to specialist opinion, Peter Is military and tax reforms resulted in a conflation of kholopy's legal status with that of serfs (privately-owned peasants, krestiane), which effectively led to the disappearance of the institution of kholopstvo as defined in the Law Code (Ulozhenie) of 1649. The first part of this article traces the history of the thesis of the "abolition of kholopstvo." The second part reconstructs the evolution of legal categories, as the concept of kholop was progressively replaced by that of dvorovyi chelovek (household servant) in the course of Tsar Feodor Alekseevich's and Peter's reforms. The final part examines some aspects of the legal status of household servants (dvorovye liudi) in the decade following the supposed abolition of kholopstvo on the basis of new archival materials. The authors conclude that Peter I's reforms eliminated kholopstvo only from the legal relations between the state and the subjects; in legal relations between masters and servants, however, the institution of kholopstvo remained very much alive at least until the second half of the 1730s. Its subsequent evolution needs further investigation.
How did Peter I, guided by imperial dreams of Russian domination in Northern Germany and Europe, destroy Russia's developing alliance with King George I, who had come to power in England, accusing him of all kinds of sins? The trigger for the conflict was Peter's intention to strengthen his position in Mecklenburg; this provoked opposition from George I, the Elector of Hanover. Peter's refusal to seek a compromise, his personal resentment, and unwillingness to compromise on imperial principles - all this led to a break with England, the collapse of the Northern Union, and the diplomatic isolation of Russia, which was repaired after Peter's death.