
Abstract The principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence are widely viewed as integral to humanitarian assistance. Yet, despite shaping the work of many humanitarians, the international legal status of these principles is unclear. This article revisits recent scholarship that presents the bindingness of these humanitarian principles as “relative.” Through a close reading of the British Columbia Court of Appeal case of R v Rajaratnam , a decision that, to date, has received only limited scholarly attention, this article points to the role of national court decisions in the development of these humanitarian principles in international law. It explores how such decisions can help elaborate the legal meaning of the humanitarian principles and be integral to the crystallization of the humanitarian principles in customary international law. Far from merely theoretical, and with diverse humanitarian crises ongoing worldwide, this article’s inquiry into the Rajaratnam decision underlines the wide-ranging implications of national decisions on humanitarian practice in public international law.
Résumé Ce commentaire s’intéresse à la façon dont les traités relatifs aux changements climatiques ont été interprétés par la Cour internationale de Justice dans son avis consultatif du 23 juillet 2025 sur les obligations des États en matière de changement climatique. Il examine plus spécifiquement comment la Cour a exercé son office lorsqu’elle a dû interpréter des dispositions particulièrement ambigües de l’ Accord de Paris et met en lumière les interrogations que certains passages de l’avis consultatif soulèvent à cet égard. Ce commentaire suggère que, dans le cadre de son interprétation, la Cour semble parfois avoir simplifié — peut-être même sans en avoir véritablement conscience — le sens que les rédacteurs de l’ Accord de Paris avaient entendu attribuer à certaines dispositions de ce traité.
Abstract This article analyzes the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ 2025 advisory opinion on the climate emergency from the perspective of its implications for Canada. The authors identify key legal developments: “climate emergency” as a decisive interpretive element; the peremptory ( jus cogens ) obligation not to generate irreversible harm to the common planetary ecosystem; a new right to a healthy climate; and states’ “enhanced” due diligence obligation. They then discuss the implications of the advisory opinion for Canada, describing the binding nature of its content and identifying its applicability to Mathur v Ontario , La Rose , and Lho’imggin v Canada and the recognition of Mutehekau Shipu/Magpie River’s legal personality.
Abstract This article examines the justiciability of climate litigation invoking the Paris Agreement before domestic courts from a comparative law perspective. Although conceived as an instrument of intergovernmental cooperation, the Paris Agreement is increasingly relied upon by claimants — notably, on the grounds that alleged governmental inaction or insufficient climate policies result in human rights violations. The article documents indirect barriers to invoking this treaty, primarily stemming from constitutional rules that limit judicial competence over issues perceived as political. It further analyzes how courts, by adjusting the intensity of their review, condition their intervention on the existence of clear legal standards and the nature of the contested acts.