According to the textbook definition of a customs union, member states of such a union liberalize mutual trade while they adopt a common external tariff or, more broadly, a common trade policy towards third countries. Likewise, art. XXIV of the GATT stipulates that “substantially the same duties and other regulations of commerce are applied by each of the members of the union to the trade of territories not included in the union”. It is – at first sight - surprising to see then that the EU and Turkey negotiate and sign FTAs separately, while being bound by a customs union at the same time. This is the puzzle which is addressed in this short article. We illustrate the actual divergence in FTA policies, show the reasons behind it, and point to the sub-optimality of the current arrangement. We also show the relevance of this case for the post-Brexit EU-UK trade relations.
This article discusses the issue of applying trade defense measures in oligopolized or monopolized markets, addressing the recent integration of the trade defense investigation body with the public interest area in Brazil. By analyzing two recent cases of plasterboard and grinding bodies, I raise the possibility of complementing antitrust analysis with trade defense. I conclude that it is necessary to have greater convergence between investigations of unfair trade practices and concerns about maintaining a competitively healthy market. I also argue for the importance of institutional restructuring of the new system of trade defense and public interest by separating damage investigation and causal link analysis, thus creating an exempt court that allows further discussion regarding antitrust and anti-dumping cases.
