This paper examines the relationship between criminal governance and the internationalization of organized crime, using the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) expansion towards Europe as a case study. It argues that governance can facilitate the transnational expansion of criminal organizations by fostering internal cohesion, regulating illicit markets, and enabling civilian control. Drawing on the PCC’s trajectory from a prison-based organization in Brazil to a transnational actor, the analysis identifies a multi stage causal mechanism that started with internal governance—based on the imposition of rules and the dissemination of a shared ideological framework— which enabled PCC to maintain cohesion and coordinate members across geographically dispersed settings. Second, governance within the criminal market provided greater predictability to illicit transactions, strengthened the group’s legitimacy among criminal actors, and facilitated alliances with Bolivian cocaine producers and European mafias. Finally, although to a lesser extent, the PCC’s involvement in civilian governance—particularly in strategic territories like the Baixada Santista—played a critical role in consolidating its presence and projecting influence into European markets. Using the PCC as a theory-building case, the study contributes to the broader literature on criminal governance by providing an analytical framework whose applicability to other criminal organizations that can be examined in future comparative research.
This paper examines the concept of legitimate power through the leadership dynamics between Christopher “Dudus” Coke, a drug cartel leader, and the Tivoli Gardens community in Jamaica. Drawing on French and Raven’s framework of social power, it examines how legitimate power was constructed and sustained within the Coke-Tivoli context. The analysis identifies a necessity-driven legitimacy, whereby Coke addressed “wicked problems” of poverty, unemployment, and insecurity through service provision, reciprocal trust, and a survival-based social contract that fostered loyalty and a level of voluntary compliance. His shared identity with Tivoli Gardens further generated representational-symbolic legitimacy, reinforcing mutuality and extending his influence beyond material provision. The paper also explores the moral and operational dimensions of his authority as both protector and enforcer. Situating the Coke–Tivoli relationship within broader debates on transnational criminal organisations, communities, and the state, the analysis conceptualises legitimate power as relational and contextual, calling for a rethinking of legitimacy as a fluid, co-constructed process in contexts where state functions are challenge.
Transnational drug markets require coordination among functionally interdependent activities that often cross organizational and jurisdictional boundaries. Existing research has documented criminal networks, professional facilitators, and illicit supply chains, but provides less systematic guidance for separating the architecture of these chains from the governance of individual interfaces and the distribution of power across the overall configuration. This article develops the concept of criminal global value chains (CGVCs) by adapting Global Value Chain governance theory to transnational illicit activity. Drawing on a qualitative, purposive analysis of judicial, law-enforcement, regulatory, and sanctions materials, we examine the Mexico-China nexus linking Mexican drug trafficking organizations to China-linked financial intermediaries and chemical suppliers. The evidence shows the clearest form of external specialized service provision at the financial interface, where professional laundering networks connect U.S. drug cash with underground banking, trade-based settlement, and cryptocurrency. Separate procurement cases document China-based suppliers and brokers providing precursor chemicals and, in some cases, technical and concealment expertise. The resulting value chain is characterized by heterogeneous governance rather than a single market or hierarchical model. External provision does not by itself establish market governance, and the available evidence does not permit a definitive classification of chain-level power. Because the evidence is drawn predominantly from U.S. enforcement sources, the analysis establishes observable mechanisms rather than their prevalence. The CGVC framework provides a basis for comparative analysis of how illicit functions are coordinated across organizational boundaries.
This article presents the results of a qualitative descriptive study aimed at analysing the various forms of criminal mobility of Tren de Aragua in the Andean region, based on the cases of Colombia, Peru, and Chile. We identified cases of successful transplantation characterized by notable levels of criminal governance, as well as cases of infiltration in which only limited features and characteristics of the organization were present in the new area. At the same time, we also found instances of hybridization, imitation, and separation that reveal the limits and challenges of the franchise model used by the Venezuelan organization, as part of its transnationalization process. As a result of these challenges, the franchising system tends to weaken the organization’s ability to monitor its agents over time. On the other hand, extensive media coverage of its brutal actions and the unauthorized use of the Tren de Aragua trademark by copycats may have contributed to the stigmatization of Venezuelan migrants, leading to rising levels of xenophobia and an exaggerated perception of the threat posed by the criminal organization in the selected countries.
