Abstract This paper engages with the question of how to understand prioritarianism when people are differently well off at different times. In this context, it introduces a new version of prioritarianism, periodic equity prioritarianism , which is inspired by how focusing on equally distributed equivalents can dissolve tensions in social evaluations that involve risk. The paper shows that periodic equity prioritarianism avoids both certain problems that timeslice prioritarianism faces and some problems that lifetime prioritarianism faces.
Abstract Chapter 2 of On Liberty , titled ‘Of the Liberty of Thought and Discussion’, develops a well-known epistemic argument for free speech. While it makes a plausible case for open-mindedness and diversity of opinion, it also appears to encapsulate some of the flaws that critics attribute to ‘free speech ideology’. This paper defends On Liberty against this criticism and proposes a new interpretation of the chapter’s objectives and its contemporary relevance, the power-critical account. While I conclude that chapter 2 fails to show that it is always epistemically harmful to silence opinions, I defend the Millian idea that a robust principle of speaker immunity is required for the transition to an ideal, reflectively stable society.
Abstract This paper reconstructs Adam Smith’s theory of human behavior à la rational choice theory. The reconstruction shows how the emotions and morality are different phases of rationality. The reconstruction is based on two sets of distinctions. The first distinguishes between two moments of rationality : (i) the rationality of making the best decisions; and (ii) the rationality of commanding those decisions. The second set includes four genera of satisfaction : (1) substantive satisfaction arises upon consuming pecuniary goods, e.g., food and clothes; (2) transcendent satisfaction takes place when the decision maker bonds with loved ones and aspires great goals; (3) self-possession satisfaction is the “warm glow” that emerges as a by-product of keeping promises, which occasions integrity, and avoiding excessive bonding and attachments, which occasion dignity; and (4) worthiness satisfaction emerges as a by-product of choosing worthy acts, i.e., acts free of toxic preferences (self-aggrandizement and malevolence).
Abstract Egalitarianism and prioritarianism are competing views about the ethics of distribution. Both views have wide scopes of concern. But, writing in this journal, Michael Otsuka has discovered a case that seems to show an interesting asymmetry between the limits of egalitarian and prioritarian concern. In that case, intuitively one outcome is better than another (in a respect relevant to the ethics of distribution); prioritarianism can recover that intuitive judgment; but egalitarianism seems unable to recover it. I show, however, that egalitarianism can recover the intuitive judgment in question on a well-motivated basis. That result is of interest because it shows the possibility and prima facie plausibility of a version of egalitarianism with a surprisingly wide scope of concern – one according to which it matters that some are worse off than those who (merely) could have existed.
