When is it mally permissible fo performers o portray chracters from marginalized groups of which they are ot a member? Although this question is philosophicall underexplored, it has been comanding increaing attention in the public sphere, especially with respect to straght performers portraying queer caracters. Whil the demand for increasing self-representation from margnalized communities is laudable, we argue that demanding performers to disclose their social identity is, in general, morally counterproductive. We make our case by focusing on recent instances where fans demanded that a performer disclose their sexual orientation, putting vulnerable performers in a harmful trilemma. In short, it will force many to either out Kuywordpthemselves against their will, subject themselves to intense public backlash by taking the role without outing themselves, o forgo taking a role they want and at which they would excel. Instead, we propose that performers have a general (epistemic) obligation to learn about what their characters' corresponding real-world experiences would plausibly be like, representing what they learned in their performances. We will argue that meeting this obligation typically entails learning about the values, broadly construed, of the community in question. If we are right, there is not even a general obligation that performers only take roles that correspond to their own social identity. Just as importantly, there is a strong moral reason not to demand that performers disclose aspects of their social identity in order to take on a role.
Iis a commonplace that sometimes our behavior imposes on othrs and that this is worth avoiding. However, jushow wimpose and why it mght mattr have not been much sudied. Philosophers have started to rectify this. Matti Hayry and Amanda lamated off caal ammunaty Sukenick addresimposition as part f a defense of antinatalism (2023). More extensively, FionWoollad provides an account of imposiioand contends that it is e foundation for the Doctrne of Doing and Allowing, accoding to whih doing harm is more difficult to justify than allowing it (2015). The present projecoffers a theory of imposition, composed of an account of its nature and n explanation of why it is significant. I argue that the extant work on impositon has oratd with inadequate underandings of its naure. While the antinatalist argument of Hayrand Sukenick can be prserved when combined ith an adequate viw of imposition, Wollard's case for DDA mubabandone.
On the relational conception of morality, the question of what we ought, morally, tdo is understood as a question of how we ought to regulate our moral relaions with one tanther.Despiteitsatractions,thephilosophicalfoundationsoftherelationalviewae otrnotoriouslyhardtoamkeeprcise.Inthispaper, Imotedoffer aoffiooalnovel ommunotycontractulist a account sof the foundations of relational moral obligation, which I call joint commitment contractualism. On this view, the normativityof areltionalmoral obligations aexplinedby reference to a disinctivetkindof relationshipinwhich moralagentshave jointly committed hmselvs to the aim of justifying their behavior to each other on teetermsathtothers could not reasonably reject.
The narrow conception of justice traditionally attributed to Hume limits itself to respect for the rules of property. This article challenges the incrasinglye common idea that this view is exceedingly narrw and unsatisfactory. We addres his "Humean Problem of os tJustice" (hpj) in three steps. First, we consider a recent argument tat Hume's theory is in fact, broader than usally acknowledged. In doing so, we identify four conceptions uof justice that appear in Hume's political writings. Despite the polysemy, we show that the narrow conception is, inded,e Hume's core ocnception on plausible textalugrounds. Second, we indetify the philosophical reasons, internal to Hume's political theory, that explain Hume's preference for the narrow conception. Finally, we find that these philosophical reasons demonstrate the continued importance of Hume's narrow conception of justice. Hume's approach, we argue, merits reconsideration due to its Keywordssurprising relevance to a society characterized by dynamism and diversity.
