The article examines the growing role of the bioeconomy within the agendas of major international institutions and explores how global governance mechanisms shape its development. The study analyses conceptual approaches to the bioeconomy – biotechnological, bioresource and bioecological – and highlights the ongoing shift toward an integrated, cross-sectoral transformation model linking innovation, sustainability and circular economy principles. Particular attention is paid to the activities of key organisations such as the Food and Agriculture Organisation, the International Energy Agency, the International Renewable Energy Agency, UNCTAD and the World Trade Organisation, as well as specialized international platforms and partnerships that facilitate policy coordination and knowledge exchange. The review demonstrates that institutional priorities differ depending on mandates: FAO focuses on sustainability, food security and inclusive growth; energy agencies emphasize technological development and the expansion of bioenergy; while UNCTAD and the WTO address trade rules, market access and regulatory frameworks for bioproducts. International forums serve primarily as spaces for dialogue and policy convergence rather than formal rule-making. The article concludes that the bioeconomy is increasingly framed as a key pathway to achieving climate and sustainable development goals, though tensions remain regarding resource competition, environmental impacts and trade regulation. Overall, the expansion of international cooperation and the convergence of bioeconomy and circular economy agendas signal a deepening mainstreaming of the concept across sectors and policy arenas.
The article examines the faith-based organisationsʼ (FBOs) projects aimed at addressing the shortage of clean drinking water in Africa in the context of achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). The author focuses on the role of religion in achieving relevant SDGs and the geographical alignment of these projects with the countries most affected by water scarcity. The study draws on a wide range of sources, including (a) statistical data that allows an assessment of the severity of water shortages in Africa, (b) regulatory documents governing water strategies in African states, (c) news and reports from major FBOs involved in water projects, (d) field-study materials collected in Ethiopia in 2024. It has been established that water scarcity is a major problem in 21 African countries: Somalia, Sudan, Equatorial Guinea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Mauritania, Tanzania, Madagascar, Niger, Mozambique, Angola, Chad, DRC, South Sudan, Togo, Sierra Leone, Zambia, Nigeria and the Republic of the Congo. The analysis of regulatory documents of these countries revealed an active involvement of international and FBOs in developing and implementing national water strategies. The major FBOs that lead the largest water projects in Africa include World Vision, Catholic Relief Services, Caritas Internationalis, and the Islamic Development Bank. The advantage of FBOs can be due to the high mobilisation potential provided by the moral authority of spiritual leaders and their wide presence in African countries. The comparative geographical analysis revealed the spatial discrepancy between the countries with the greatest water scarcity and the beneficiaries of FBOs projects. The largest initiatives in this field are implemented by FBOs in Ethiopia, DRC, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Burkina Faso and Zimbabwe. Meanwhile, in several other countries where water scarcity is a more pressing issue, water projects tend to be significantly smaller in scale. This disparity is explained by both the inherent difficulties of operating in some of the water-scarcest countries, such as bureaucratic obstacles, security concerns, and the priorities of funding donors, predominantly Western states, transnational corporations, and international institutions.
Tax sovereignty, traditionally understood as a state’s authority to impose taxes, has been increasingly challenged by globalisation, resulting in the adaptation of domestic tax regulations under international influence. At present, the OECD and G20 play a significant role in shaping domestic tax policy through soft law frameworks that guide reform. This article analyses the baseline standards of the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) initiative as tailored for developing countries and examines the associated enforcement challenges. It further highlights how states have adjusted their domestic tax structures to align with OECD/G20 guidelines, reinforced by continuous monitoring and peer review mechanisms. Since 2015, the BEPS initiative – particularly its four Minimum Standards – has been stringently enforced. Despite differing national interests and the complexities involved, the OECD’s peer-review process has steered national policy adjustments, fostering a shift toward a more unified global tax framework, which has, in turn, diminished national tax sovereignty.
This article is devoted to a comprehensive analysis of international experience in organising academic mobility programmes with the aim of adapting it for the Russian Federation in the context of global changes in international scientific and technological cooperation. In the context of the reorientation of Russiaʼs scientific cooperation from West to East, the relevance of developing international academic mobility with partners from Asia and Eurasia is increasing. And the sanctions pressure and related restrictions on access to various technologies make academic mobility currently one of the key elements of Russiaʼs scientific and technological system at the moment. Academic mobility programmes in countries in Asia and Eurasia are considered, as the associations in these states are proving promising scientific partners for Russia – associations where Russia already has a contractual framework for the development of scientific and technical cooperation. In the course of the study, information about 68 academic mobility programmes was systematised, including details of key models of mobility organisation, their goals, target audiences, funding volumes, and support measures for participants. The results of the analysis showed that international practice of academic mobility includes both long-term programmes focused on attracting foreign researchers to compensate for the shortage of personnel in the countryʼs scientific system, and short-term internships that promote the exchange of knowledge and technologies between countries. An important element of support is not only financial payments (grants, scholarships), but also additional measures – such as assistance in obtaining visas, medical insurance, reimbursement of housing expenses, and assistance in the relocation of participantsʼ families. In the conclusion of the article, recommendations are formulated for creating an effective Russian academic mobility system, which will not only attract foreign researchers, but also ensure the integration of Russian scientists into the international scientific community, which is critically important for maintaining and developing the countryʼs scientific potential in todayʼs conditions. In addition, based on the results of the analysis, specific partner states were proposed with which Russia could create joint academic mobility programmes.
The article analyses the key factors that can have a significant impact on the dynamics of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in the near future. The year 2025 has seen a remarkable transformation of the international configuration that has developed over the past few years. This coincides with D. Trump’s second term in office, which began in February 2025. The Russian-American dialogue on the normalisation of bilateral relations, which culminated in the August meeting of the two heads of state in Anchorage, has raised serious concerns among Western elites about the preservation of transatlantic unity. The possible prospects for a change in the nature of Russian-American relations have cast some doubt on the implementation of NATOʼs priority areas of activity, formulated within the framework of their new Strategic Concept in 2022, as well as in the decisions of the allianceʼs summits in recent years. The methodology of this study is based on a systematic approach that allows consideration of the complex of factors determining the development trends of the NATO, as well as key challenges to intra-bloc unity. As part of the study of the processes currently taking place within the framework of the alliance, both general scientific and special methods of scientific research were used. Among them, the comparative was used to compare the strategies of key members of the block, as well as the structural and functional method, which made it possible to identify certain changes in the nature of intra-block relations. The analysis, based on the application of a set of interdisciplinary methods of humanitarian research, seems to be fundamentally significant both in the context of assessing the possible prospects for the further evolution of modern international architecture, and in terms of predicting the prospects for the development of relations between the North Atlantic Bloc and the Russian Federation and other key international actors. Based on the results of the study, conclusions are drawn about the emergence in 2025 of certain challenges to maintaining intra-bloc unity and further effective implementation of the strategic priorities of NATOʼs activities outlined in recent years. The noticeable skepticism shown by D. Trumpʼs position on the current system of American obligations to ensure European security, complemented by disagreements between the new US administration and a number of European allies over a possible settlement of the Special Military Operation in Ukraine, can become a factor in a significant change in the nature of relations within the NATO.
The article explores the peculiarities of the activities of the United Nations (UN) in Afghanistan in connection with the changing situation in the country and the priorities in the work of its Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) after the 15th of August 2021. Due to the growing humanitarian crisis, the main task of the UN in the country has become the provision of basic needs of the local population. The author endeavours to show the complexities of the UNAMA’s co-operation with both the new authorities and donor countries, which has variable success. The paper substantiates as important the decision to unite within the UNAMA all strategic goals of the UNʼs continued political presence in Afghanistan. The author emphasises that in order to reliably address all the pressing problems of the Afghan people in both the medium and long term, in addition to humanitarian assistance, it is necessary to create conditions for the development of the countryʼs economic opportunities. The prospects for the effectiveness of the UN Strategic Framework for Afghanistan for the period from 2023 to 2025 are critically analysed. The article also compares the UNAMAʼs achievements and failures during the period of work with the new Afghan authorities. The article identifies the hard-to-implement demands of the UN and the international community to adjust the Talibanʼs domestic policies. A comparative analysis of the positions of the permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC) on the issue of international recognition of the new regime and development assistance is given. Conclusions are drawn that national development and global sustainable development goals are interdependent, that the international community should seek co-operation with the Taliban authorities on economic development, and that the UNSC should play a more active role in addressing the Afghan crisis.
BRICS is a relatively new and rapidly developing association. The article examines the foundations that ensure intensive cooperation between the cities of the BRICS countries. In the late XX and early XXI centuries, Russia, China, India, Brazil, and South Africa have undergone significant economic and social reforms, which have led, among other things, to the development of cities and an increase in their numbers. Apart from the reforms, the cities of the BRICS countries have a number of other common points. Thus, they are located in countries with vast territories, diverse natural resources, and diverse ethnic composition. The presence of common characteristics creates common challenges, which encourages cities to cooperate and share experiences. BRICS pays great attention to the development of relations at the city and municipal levels. To this end, the Association of Cities and Municipalities of the BRICS+ countries was established at the International Forum in Kazan in 2024, taking into account the large-scale expansion of the BRICS. The article analyses the issues of interaction between the cities of the BRICS countries in a number of areas, including questions of sustainable development, higher education and digitalisation.
The Arctic region, which has occupied a special position in the discourse of international political science for more than ten years, has gradually acquired various and often diametrically opposed images on the pages of both English- and Russianlanguage studies. For a long time, the central intergovernmental forum, the Arctic Council, designed de jure to promote international cooperation and maintain peace in the region, served as a kind of “barometer” of the state of “exceptionalism” of transnational relations in the region. There is no generally accepted consensus regarding the role and state of the Arctic Council after 2022 either among researchers of international relations or among official representatives of the member states and observers of the Council. In the context of the unprecedented crisis that has been occurring in the Arctic region since the Cold War, it is especially important to study the role of the Arctic Council as a key format for international cooperation in the Arctic throughout all stages of its functioning, as well as an overview of other formats of regional cooperation that have emerged since the events of 2022, which made it possible to identify the main trends in the development of a complex structure of regional interaction at the current stage of its functioning
The purpose of this work is to assess the impact of economic sanctions on the socio-economic development of the country. Regression control method based on Lasso is used in this study to construct a "synthetic Russia" as a benchmark to capture the difference between Russia's actual economic performance and the predicted economic performance of "synthetic Russia". Empirical results show that the economic sanctions imposed by the United States and Europe on Russia since 2022 have a negative impact in the short term for the first four seasons right after sanction, the deviation of Russia's economic growth from the potential growth rate is relatively large. Russian economy was able to achieve significant growth in the year 2023 after a recession in 2022, the national economy has shown resilience against the economic sanctions. In the long run, the Russian economy has been attempting a broad-based recovery by implementing a set of counter-sanction measures.
The strategic hedging approach is a policy adopted by weaker states in response to more powerful states, particularly hegemonic powers, during periods of geopolitical order transition. Such countries select their strategies to minimise risks and challenges in the event of any shifts in the global power system. Given the current state of the global order, it appears that the structure of the global system is changing, and Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy, which has historically been based on close relations with the United States, is now being redefined with other global powers like China and Russia. The Saudi Kingdom, anticipating a potential shift in the global structure, has organised its internal and external components to minimise challenges should the global order change. Therefore, it has adopted a foreign policy approach referred to as strategic hedging. This study uses neoclassical realism to examine Saudi Arabia's strategic hedging approach in its foreign policy towards the United States and China. The research is applied in nature and employs a qualitative methodology with a descriptive and analytical approach. Utilising library resources and documentary analysis, the study aims to answer the question: "What is Saudi Arabia's foreign policy approach within the framework of strategic hedging against the United States and China?" It appears that while Saudi Arabia maintains its cooperation with the United States, it has expanded its relations with China to mitigate risks associated with changes in the global order. The Kingdom has sought to engage economically, militarily, and politically with both global powers in a way that minimises risks to Saudi Arabia in the event of a potential hegemonic shift.
The article traces evolution of peacekeeping in Africa and takes DRC as a case-study of the UN activity from 1960 deployment of ONUC to the latest deployment of MONUSCO. The article aims to establish the impact of the evolution of the UN in peacekeeping efforts in the DRC. It will determine how the mandate has fared in enhancing peacekeeping efforts in DRC and establish why FIB has failed to neutralize the M23 after its resurgence. The article asserts that the evolution of peacekeeping operations in Africa, particularly the FIB case, highlights the changing nature of peacekeeping efforts on the continent. The FIB's establishment in 2013 as apart of MONUSCO represents a shift towards more robust and proactive peacekeeping strategies. The authors found that although the evolution of peacekeeping in DRC is viewed as a positive development towards the attainment of positive peace, it is not without its challenges. The lack of resources and continued interference offoreign players in African politics will always challenge the principle of African solutions to African problems. It is argued that some of the problems faced in DRC are not African, but very much foreign or western due to the West's insatiable desire for African resources. The holistic approach to addressing DRC problems, or any other armed African conflicts should involve the P5 members of the UN Security Council since some of them should be held accountable for their double standards. Based on an interdisciplinary, historical and structural-functional approach, an interview method with AUexperts, diplomats in the DRC and former MONUSCO staff, and a critical analysis of secondary sources and statistical data from the UN, AU, TNCs, this study examines the evolution of peacekeeping in Africa, with a particularfocus on MONUSCO and its FIB.
The study examines the dynamics of Chinese exports by industrial product groups in the context ofglobal trade from 2001 to 2024. Three periods are identified, reflecting differences in the dynamics of world exports, in particular, higher growth rates in the third period (2020-2024) compared to the second period (2012-2019), which is attributed to the declining share of energy in global exports as a result offalling prices after 2010-2012. Given the uniqueness and rapid evolution of China's foreign economic policy, several international trade theories can explain the country's experience. The study employs the indicator "world market capacity," defined as world imports excluding China's imports, to assess potential demand for Chinese industrial exports. An analysis of the ratio of China's exports to & laquo;world market capacity & raquo; confirms that the country's industrial sector has consistently responded to global market signals over the decades. This is evidenced by the growth or stability of China's export share in "global market capacity" across most product categories. The paper also analyzes key directions of China's industrial policy and its impact on production competitiveness relative to major trade partners, particularly the EUand the U.S., which actively impose tariff restrictions on Chinese goods. Additionally, the role of Chinese exports to the U.S. by industrial product groups is examined, along with the potential sector-specific consequences of the tariffs imposed by President Donald Trump in 2025.
The debate on the social ontology of the "international" has gained momentum in the field of International Relations (IR). This article expands the discussion by demonstrating that the "international" is not confined to a single ontology but can be conceptualised through three distinct ontological paradigms, corresponding to the political ontologies outlined by Roberto Esposito: the post-Heideggerian paradigm of negation, the Deleuzian paradigm of constitution, and the neo-Machiavellian paradigm of institution. The primary focus is placed on the paradigms of constitution and institution, as they offer broader opportunities for IR theory to influence adjacent disciplines. Within Gilles Deleuze's ontology, the "international" aligns most closely with "smooth spaces" shaped byglobalflows and movements, which are not necessarily political in nature. The capitalist production of smooth space extends across all social domains, making IR-a discipline specialising in relations within smooth space-an important conceptual resource for enriching neighboring fields of study. Meanwhile, the neo-Machiavellian paradigm ofpolitical ontology, particularly as articulated in the works of Claude Lefort, provides a foundation for understanding the "international" as multi-level governance. This perspective is exemplified by Putnam's two-level games and the theory of multi-level governance. Crucially, multi-level structures are not limited to international relations; they manifest across various social domains, suggesting that IR theory grounded in the neo-Machiavellian paradigm holds explanatory value beyond its traditional scope. For instance, multi-level dynamics can be observed in economics (e.g., Ronald Coase's theory of the firm) and psychology (e.g., Eric Berne's transactional analysis). This study demonstrates that embracing a multiple ontology of the "international" can help overcome the disciplinary crisis in IR by opening new conceptual avenues for understanding global processes through the synthesis of diverse theoretical and practical perspectives.
To defend Russian interests when the world order is changing, it is necessary to understand alternative approaches, especially that are aimed at maintaining Western centricity. In this regard it is important to evaluate the growth and usage of NATO`s power. The article examines the dynamics of the Alliance’s actions to ensure its presence outside the area of responsibility since the mid-1990s. The author presentsthe typology and the periodisation of this process. Methodically the theory of alliances and the theory of armed forces` building are used. The article explores NATO`s functioning taking into account the dialectic of relations between the United States and the largest European member states on NATO`s usage outside the Euro-Atlantic community. As indicators of practical priorities change in NATO`s activities the article explores the evolutions of Alliance`s groups outside its zone of responsibility (dominance and then disappearance of the combat use of air force, non-forceful use of ground forces in favour of military instructors, advisers and creation of the network of political offices). From trying to become a security provider for the countries of origin of an armed conflict, the Alliance began to return to the traditional task to “deter” opponents (Russia, also China and Iran). The key forms of NATO`s presence outside the zone of responsibility in the mid 1990s to the early 2010s were the air force operations and large-scale non-combat peacekeeping missions (in the Balkans and Afghanistan). The article explores their features. Special attention is paid to the de-facto “strategic shock” for the USA from its inability to involve NATO in the land campaign in Iraq (2003), the air force operation in Syria (2013), and the consequences of this. In the 2010s NATO has revealed the focus on the participation in the reform of security sector. By the mid 2020s the clear has become the tendency of the politisation of presence forms. The author thinks how the trend is related to the confrontation with Russia and NATO`s difficulties in conflict settlement. The paper explores contemporary and perspective forms of the Alliance`s presence both near its area of responsibility (in the Arctic, post-Soviet space, Western Balkans) and far from it, (including the Near East). It is important to determine the group of states and regional structures which have been key partners for NATO in its involvement in “containment” of the PRC. In the 2020s NATO has been using its political capabilities more actively, geographically sharply, is setting the conditions for the use of military tools in modernised forms.
Population migration due to climate change is one of the most negative consequences ofglobal climate change (GCC). Natural disasters, environmental changes and related economic and social losses force people to change their place of residence. The number of people displaced by natural disasters exceeds the number of people migrating due to armed conflicts. The increase in the number of "climate migrants" affects the socio-economic and political situation of the countries of emigration, transit and immigration, and requires immediate solutions from the world community. The purpose of the study is to analyze the evolution of the discourse of "climate" migration within the framework of global climate policy, determine the stages of its development and institutionalization, characterize the spatial features of climate migration and strategies for counteracting forced displacement at the global, regional and national levels. In the evolution of the discourse of "climate migration, 4 periods of development can be distinguished. The expansion and deepening of the climate migration topic, its semantic transformation and diffusion from the plane of scientific discussion to the segment of international, regional and national policy are chronologically traced. The process of institutionalization of the phenomenon of climate migration in world politics is not complete. The majority of climate migrants are noted in the least developed countries (LDCs). Strategies for adaptation and strengthening the climate resilience of LDCs are designed to minimize climate migration. Political tensions and conflicts are the main barriers to the implementation of climate policy goals as a tool for counteracting forced migration.
Since the early 1960s, international peacekeeping operations implemented under the UN mandate are thought to be one of the main instruments of international conflict management. Peacekeeping is presented as multidimensional, multistakeholder, and multilevel mechanism, which, evolving, is currently expected to deliver not only fundamental physical protection of civilian population in conflict zones, but also elements of peace-and state-building, including reconciliatory and reform-related activities. However, peacekeeping is often distorted by geopolitical contestations, which move back its modern purpose of supporting reconciliation towards more traditional, negative forms of peacekeeping. This allows one to formulate what can be named as realistic expectations from peacekeeping. The latter, as introduced in the first section of the work, contrary to the formally proclaimed objectives of operations, do not go further than the negative forms of peace. The second section further elaborates on the notion, explaining that geopolitics behind peacekeeping broadens the gap between promised and actual outcomes of peace, and suggesting that peacekeeping is rather utilised to construct and maintain control over more loyal local actors and to neglect or leave others behind. The second part also shows how sensitising and stigmatising can impact local ownership and the way it fits into the peacekeeping frameworks. The conclusion summarises the main arguments of the paper, suggesting a particular set of policies for contemporary peacekeeping practice based on the standpoints discussed.
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and Paris Climate Agreement, adopted in 2015, set new global strategies for the development of humanity. However, the turbulent global environment and increasing trends of deglobalisation hinder the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and require a critical analysis of the tasks and indicators, particularly within the institutional SDGs 16and 17. For Russia, transitioning to sustainable and low-carbon development is highly relevant, as evidenced by the adoption of several legal acts and other documents. However, the 2022 crisis has altered the country's cooperation directions, including those within the framework of national strategies, and deepened ties with BRICS countries. In this context, a comparative assessment of the achievement of institutional SDGs by BRICS countries is of particular importance, as it may help to adjust cooperation mechanisms in the future. This study employs a systematic approach to developing sustainable development indicators using special metrics based on the SDGs, as well as an integrated approach to these indicators. The article analyses the progress made in achieving the SDGs at the global level, focusing on SDGs 16 and 17. A quantitative assessment of Russia's performance in these SDGs based on national data is conducted, using two methodologies: the UN approach and the approach proposed by D. Sachs and colleagues, with the advantages and disadvantages of each highlighted in the study. Based on Rosstat's UN indicators, adjusted for data availability in BRICS countries, the study provides a comparative assessment of the progress of BRICS nations in achieving SDGs 16 and 17. Furthermore, the authors conduct a more in-depth comparative evaluation of BRICS countries by expanding the assessment framework with indicators from the Sachs methodology. Finally, the average achievement level of institutional goals by BRICS countries is calculated. The results revealed moderate and minimal progress, respectively, in Russia's attainment of SDGs 16 and 17, reflecting the impact of sanctions and the overall global instability. The comparative evaluation of BRICS countries' progress on SDGs 16 and 17, using the UN and Sachs methodologies, yielded comparable yet slightly different results. Overall, Brazil, India, Russia, and China demonstrate approximately the same level of achievement of institutional SDGs, with South Africa showing the lowest scores.
Since 2024, two new African states, Ethiopia and Egypt, have become full BRICS members, marking the advent of a new phase in the evolution of the association’s African dimension. The expansion of the African continent within the club demonstrates BRICS’ dedication to the South-South dialogue and the growing importance of Africa and also reflects broader shifts in the global power dynamics. However, it also underscores a transition towards a polycentric world order in which the African continent is assuming an autonomous role in global affairs. At the same time, there is a disproportionate representation of the continent in BRICS, as none of the states of Western and Central Africa has so far been a full member of the association. This article examines the process of transformation of the BRICS African track, from its initial BRICS Plus and BRICS Outreach formats to the partial representation of the continent at the sub-regional level by the recently-appointed permanent and partner members of the association. It has been suggested, however, that the informalized nature of the association, which has long been attractive due to the special dialogue format of the BRICS, will not be able to meet the growing demand for the inclusion of new actors. The more states that join the grouping, the greater the procedural and organisational clutter that awaits it. The African continent is home to 54 UN member states, the accession of each of which is unthinkable. The latest wave of expansion in 2025 with the introduction of a new category of “partner country”, despite the inclusion of Nigeria and Uganda, still does not make Africa equally represented in BRICS. In this regard, it remains relevant to study the prospects for the development of the African vector of BRICS and the search for new non-state formats of cooperation. The article discusses the problem of the continent’s further integration into BRICS, in particular the extent to which potential expansion could challenge the established dialogical format and lack of institutional overload that have been responsible for BRICS’ success. The authors analyse the prospect of inviting the African Union (AU) as a continent-wide representative to address the above issue. Based on the analysis of the key documents of the AU and BRICS, the authors examine the proximity of the two organisations both politically and ideologically (compliance with the so-called “spirit of BRICS”) and practically (coincidence of agendas and projects). The paper analyses the internal architecture of the AU and the BRICS to identify possible obstacles and difficulties on the way to the integration of the two organisations.
The article scrutinises the evolution of the AUKUS trilateral format announced by the leaders of Australia, United Kingdom and United States on September 15th, 2021, within the framework of a conceptual dichotomic model “continuity vs. discontinuity”. A review of Russian and international literature makes it possible to single out the major approaches to defining the gist of the agreement and interpreting its content, including from the standpoints of various international relations theories. The methodology of the study is represented by comparative analysis utilised diachronically while adhering to historicism as a principle. Apart from that, the application of discourse analysis reveals the particularities of the relevant terminology (e.g. the transition of the “pillar” metaphor as applied to AUKUS from the scholarly discourse into the official one), as well as the factors both favouring and impeding the implementation of the format. Addressing the intricacies of the Cold War period makes it possible to identify several levels of continuity. In the long-term, the continued cooperation within the blocs is notable, beginning with the 1947 UKUSA Agreement followed by the 1951 ANZUS pact. More recently, in the short-term perspective, there is AUKUS’ succession and complementarity with other minilateral initiatives in the Asia-Pacific (notably the informal quadrilateral security dialogue of the USA, Australia, India, and Japan – “Quad”). In the spatial dimension, the continuity manifests itself in the involvement of Canberra’s traditional allies in Europe and America (UK and US), similar to ANZUC. At the same time, the paper identifies the parameters determining the relative novelty of the agreement compared to the previous minilaterals in the Asia-Pacific. The most important of these is the nuclear component, creating a precedent of transferring nuclear propulsion technology involving highly enriched uranium (HEU) to a non-nuclear-weapon state (NNWS).
The article is devoted to forecasting the possible evolution of the International Monetary Fund due to the change in the position of the United States. The purpose of the article is a comparative analysis of the approaches used by the most influential American political and ideological groups involved in decision-making on the nature of the IMFʼs activities. This question has not been considered by modern historiography. The research of such Western economic theorists as M. Friedman, P. Volker, P. Krugman, etc. is chosen as the scientific and theoretical basis of the article. In the context of the American «industrial policy», the differences in the views of the leading political and ideological groups in the United States on the place of the fund in modern and future global processes are shown. Special attention is paid to the study of assessments and perceptions of American experts and politicians regarding the effectiveness of the IMF in the previous stages of globalization, the potential of using the fund to implement anti-Chinese policies, attract countries of the global South to their side, mitigate financial crises, stabilise the economic situation, and transition to a post-global economy. While agreeing with the inevitability of fragmentation, most groups of the American elite (except Trumpists) agree that the IMF should be preserved as the most important tool for global financial and economic stabilisation of the transition period. On the issue of the IMFʼs mandate, all groups of Democrats have more or less supported the policy of its “expansionˮ, including climate, health and social issues, while Republicans demand to focus on traditional functions. As for using the potential of the IMF in the antiChinese policy of the West, some of the participants in the discussion (neoliberals, conservative Democrats and moderate Republicans) believe that this can be done through a revision of quotas and a more equitable distribution of SDRs in favor of the countries of the South. Other groups (conservatives and neoconservatives) believe that such concessions could lead to the loss of U.S. control over the fundʼs decisions and resources. It is concluded that, given the relative balance of power in the framework of the discussion on the fate of the fund, one can hardly expect sharp movements towards reforming the IMF, even after D. Trump came to power.
