
In 2016, its economy in shambles and looking to defer payment on its debts, the Venezuelan government of Nicolas Maduro proposed a multi-billion dollar debt swap to holders of bonds issued by the government’s crown jewel, state-owned oil company Petroleos de Venezuela S.A. (“PDVSA”). A new government now challenges that bond issuance, arguing it was unlawful under Venezuelan law. Bondholders counter that this does not matter—that PDVSA freed itself of any borrowing limits by agreeing to a choice-of-law clause designating New York law. The dispute over the PDVSA 2020 bonds implicates a common problem. Sovereign nations borrow under constraints imposed by their own laws. Loans that violate these constraints may be deemed invalid. Does an international bond—i.e., one expressly made subject to the law of a different jurisdiction—protect investors against that risk? The answer depends on the text of the loan’s choice-of-law clause, as interpreted against the backdrop of the forum’s rules for resolving conflict of laws problems. We show that the choice-of-law clauses in many international sovereign bonds—especially when issued under New York law—use language that may expose investors to greater risk. We document the frequent use of “carve outs” that could be interpreted to require the application of the sovereign’s local law to a wide range of issues. If interpreted in this way, these clauses materially reduce the protection ostensibly offered by an international bond. We explain why we think a narrower interpretation is more appropriate.
This article uses history to explore how prominent international lawyers explain seemingly transgressive state behavior. It begins with the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. This seizure of another state’s territory by force of arms seems to violate everything that the UN Charter and the post-1991 settlement of the Cold War stood for. Surprisingly, the various steps employed by the Russians to give their actions a veneer of legality follow almost exactly the playbook used by the United States in 1903 to seize the Panama Canal Zone. In both instances, leading professors of international law ‒ Rein Mullerson, the Anglo-Estonian scholar, publicist, and stateman in the case of Crimea, John Bassett Moore, the most prominent U.S. international lawyer of the day, in the case of Panama ‒ sought to justify these acts in the face of what they both acknowledged was a general ban on wars of conquest. The details of these transgressions and the justifications offered by their prominent defenders shed light on the work that international law does. These events provide an opportunity to use the tools of comparative international law to uncover and assess claims about the validity of otherwise repugnant state behavior. This emerging field downplays the judgmental, project-oriented focus of contemporary international law in favor of striving for a better understanding of systematic differences in the way significant actors use international law. In a world riven with entrenched and unbridgeable differences, counting on states to agree to an extensive body of deep rules to govern their international behavior is utopian, but expecting them to understand their adversaries’ perceptions of their international interests and the ways they will explain themselves is not. The bipolar world of the Cold War required a tradeoff between consensus and comprehension. The contemporary multipolar world, with its challenges and conflicts, may do the same.
After World War II, states recognizing that “the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being” and “the health of all peoples is fundamental to the attainment of peace and security”, decided to establish the World Health Organization (WHO), with the aim of promoting and protecting health for all. Mindful of the fact that disease neither recognizes nor respects borders, the revised International Health Regulations (IHR) in 2005 reiterates the goal of the universal application “for the protection of all people of the world from the international spread of disease.” The WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), similarly, stands as an “evidence-based treaty that reaffirms the right of all people to the highest standard of health.” Such statements indicate an aspiration that the WHO’s normative work not just be about “a collection of nation states”, given the inherently global nature of public health affairs. Such aspiration embedded in global health governance introduces a paradox vis-a-vis the WHO’s state-centric institutional design, as evidenced and amplified by the COVID-19 crisis. The exclusion of Taiwan—which alerted the WHO of potential human-to-human transmission at the early stage and successfully guarded its people against the pandemic—is heatedly debated. Taiwan’s WHO participation presents a sharp contrast between its goal of health for all peoples, on one hand, and its outdated state-centric design and power politics, on the other. While scholars proposed the concept of “global health law” to reflect the erosion of sovereignty and encroachment of state powers due to globalization, the WHO continues to rest its institutional design on the assumption of states being the dominant actors of international (health) law, envisaging international health governance rather than global health governance. This state-centric view inevitably goes hand in hand with power struggles that undermine global health. Against this background, this paper aims to demonstrate how and why state-centric international health governance neither delivers its goal to “promote and protect the health of all peoples” nor accommodates the complexity of international politics, and to explore new venues allowing a pluralist membership structure that better serves the WHO’s promise. We proceed as follows. Part II analyzes challenges and constraints facing Taiwan’s participation in the WHO as a full member and as an observer under the existing institutional framework. Part III proposes an amendment to the WHO Constitution and maps a new contour of global health governance through the lens of the trans-governmental network. Part IV concludes.
In the midst of dramatic corruption scandals, South American countries have passed some of the most noteworthy anticorruption legislation in the region’s history. This Article examines the wave of anticorruption reforms and how international law, and in particular anticorruption treaties, has had an important influence on the content of these reforms. Specifically, this Article argues that that the OECD Anti-Bribery Working Group has acted as a political entrepreneur, advocating for specific and meaningful reforms. The influence of international law was critical in ensuring that the reforms adopted during these corruption scandals were robust and that the opportunity presented by these scandals was not lost. This Article also makes several important contributions to the growing field of anticorruption law. First, it applies a theory of government decision-making during crises to the South American corruption crisis. Drawing on theories of reform during financial crises, this Article explains how corruption crises present unique opportunities for popular reforms to take hold. Second, this Article discusses how political entrepreneurs, including the international bodies responsible for implementing anticorruption treaties, can use international law and global standards to promote meaningful reforms. Third, this Article traces recent anticorruption reforms in multiple South American countries to illustrate these processes in action. This Article illustrates how countries that were members of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention responded systematically differently to corruption crises than non-member countries. Finally, this Article demonstrates how interwoven international and national law have become in the anticorruption field. International law not only has influence by providing global rules, but also by offering credible policy recommendations in times of national crisis.