Every year, investigative reporters uncover stories of waste, fraud, and corruption, alerting the government to taxpayer ripoffs that had previously gone undiscovered or ignored. For decades, non-journalists have been reaping windfall rewards-sometimes in the millions-by using false-claims statutes to bring whistleblower actions on the government's behalf. With news organizations struggling for their economic survival, and efforts to secure alternative financial support through government bailouts faltering, is it time for journalists to seek a share of the money they recoup for taxpayers by becoming plaintiffs? This Article explores the possibilities, and downside risks, of using the federal False Claims Act, and its state and municipal counterpart laws, to infuse money into financially strapped newsrooms. It traces the history and evolution of the FCA, from a Civil War-era attempt to crack down on shoddy weapons suppliers to a juggernaut that today recovers $3 billion a year for the federal treasury, with private ("qui tam") plaintiffs collecting $400 million in bounties for helping litigate the claims. The Article examines how Congress and the courts have recalibrated the FCA incentive structure repeatedly over nearly two centuries, based on whether policymakers believe there is too much false-claims litigation or not enough. It critiques the rigidity of case law interpreting the FCA that forecloses recovery if any portion of the claim is based on publicly disclosed information-a standard courts have applied unforgivingly to dismiss even seemingly strong fraud cases. Given journalists' ethical reluctance to accept anything that looks like a government handout, the Article considers the potential ethical implications of suing to claim a reward for investigative reporting that uncovers fraud. It concludes that there should be no absolute ethical prohibition against journalistic use of qui tam litigation, given that the potential of receiving a bounty does nothing to distort newsrooms' ample preexisting incentives to pursue high-value stories exposing fraud on the taxpayers. The Article concludes that the primary obstacle to qui tam as an effective tool for journalists-or for any outsider who is not an internal company whistleblower-is the Supreme Court's errant 2011 decision in Schindler Elevator, which bars any claim derived from records obtained from the government. The author recommends that lawmakers should override the Schindler rule and recognize the validity of claims based on documents and data to which plaintiffs-including journalists-add their expert analysis.
Since 2012, individual states have passed laws prohibiting state-licensed mental health professionals from engaging in conversion therapy with minor clients. Despite the breadth of research undermining its efficacy and documenting harms, the practice of conversion therapy persists. State regulation of conversion therapy-and thereby licensed professionals' conduct with their clients-has emerged as a contentious issue for the judiciary. Most significantly, the U.S. Supreme Court weighed in on the matter for the first time in 2026. In Chiles v. Salazar, the Court addressed a challenge to Colorado's conversion therapy ban, confronting fundamental questions about this unsettled area of First Amendment law. With the Court's ruling in Chiles now issued, the timeliness of this issue cannot be overstated. Although the Court has now spoken on the prior circuit disagreement, the stakes identified in this litigation persist and the decision carries significant implications for LGBTQ+ minors. This Comment argues that the laws restricting mental health practitioners from practicing conversion therapy constitute content-neutral, incidental burdens on speech that are subject to-and survive-rational basis review. States have an important interest in safeguarding public health and protecting LGBTQ+ minors from harmful life-altering practices. This Comment concludes by reflecting on the urgency of this issue, contemplating how these cases and conversion therapy law litigation more broadly exhibit more broadly exhibit a recent resurgence of political and legal anti-LGBTQ+ efforts in the United States.
In 2023, the United States Supreme Court denied decades of precedent, agency action, and the proper use of canons of interpretation in its decision in Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency ( (Sackett (Sackett). This case adopted the "continuous surface connection" test, which requires an indistinguishable surface water connection between a wetland and a navigable water to assert Clean Water Act jurisdiction over the wetland. This limitation on agency authority under the Clean Water Act was created through a statutory analysis that failed to apply the "Plain Meaning" and "Whole Act" canons of statutory interpretation. The Court narrowly applied the meaning of the word "adjacent" to exclude that which is "near," in its belief that such an interpretation would properly limit the jurisdictional reach of the Clean Water Act. In doing so, the Court found "adjacent" could only mean "contiguous" in the context of the Clean Water Act, without a clear statement from Congress otherwise. This holding was reached without acknowledgment of the clear text or the purpose of the Clean Water Act. This Comment criticizes the Court's failure to apply the "Plain Meaning" and "Whole Act" canons of interpretation in Sackett. While the canons of interpretation are nonbinding tools used at the Court's discretion, this Comment argues for their proper application to provide stability and reliability within the law. In Sackett, the Court used a clear statement rule that undermined the purpose of the Clean Water Act. A proper application of the "Plain Meaning" and "Whole Act" canons of interpretation would have allowed for the intended exercise of Clean Water Act jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent to protected navigable waters. This Comment further proposes a legislative solution to limit the harmful impact of the Court's failure to use these important interpretive canons in Sackett.
In 2023, the Washington State legislature repealed the state's advisory vote system, which allowed taxpayers to express their opinions on enacted tax measures. This system was the first of its kind in the United States, a novel concept that no other state had implemented. Although the advisory votes were non-binding, they provided a platform for public input on tax policy decisions. The repeal of this system raises important questions about voter participation in tax policy, particularly in a state already known for its regressive tax structure. This presents an opportunity to consider whether Washington voters should have input on tax decisions, and if so, what that involvement should look like. This Comment examines how other states involve voters in tax policy and explores what Washington might learn from those practices. By evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of advisory votes and alternative systems used elsewhere, it considers different approaches to taxpayer participation that balance public engagement with legislative oversight. Given the lack of legal scholarship on Washington's advisory vote system, this paper also provides an analysis of the state's approach and its potential for reform.
