
We must keep our family justice system aligned with contemporary legal needs and act urgently to address family law reform in accordance with constitutional principles. This article focuses on envisioning the family law rules of court as more complex than reorganizing words on the page and instead considers family law reform as a dynamic process aimed at improving accessibility of programs and services, and ultimately, benefitting the well-being of people. This article presents the results of a qualitative research study. It weaves the narratives of thirty-four family justice participants from across Canada with the literature concerning the family law rules. Seven themes emerge from the interviewees that reflect broad value-based tensions. We must consider more than legal steps and evaluate the social and human impacts on those who are seeking access to family law justice. We conclude with a discussion of ways to move forward toward a more holistic family justice system that honours the needs of children and families.
The most controversial of the recent amendments to Ontario’s Class Proceedings Act is the addition of two requirements to the certification test: to meet the preferable procedure criterion, s. 5(1.1) requires that common issues in the litigation must now “predominate” over individual issues, and a class action must be “superior” to all other forms of resolution. The importance of the interpretation of Ontario’s new certification test to the continued viability of class actions in the province merits a thorough and rigorous analysis of s. 5(1.1). The language of predominance and superiority is strikingly similar to requirements that have long applied to US class actions for monetary damages. As courts in Ontario begin to grapple with the new predominance and superiority requirements, however, the authors caution against turning to American jurisprudence for guidance. Several important structural differences between the Ontario and American class action regimes, as well as different constitutional considerations and a variety of approaches within US case law diminish its utility. Instead, the authors examine the history and language of the amendments to propose an interpretation of the predominance and superiority requirements that is informed by Canada’s own procedural and constitutional framework and that avoids the pitfalls of legal transplants.
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s [TRC] mandate to law schools is multi-faceted in its pedagogical substance and process. The mandate entails rejecting terra nullius and its associated colonial assumptions within Canadian law as taught and a new valorization of Indigenous legal orders. This change is challenging because it can implicate law school community members’ sense of individual personal and professional identities. Understanding the depth of these potential implications can help to explain TRC implementation as a long-term project, involving growth at both individual and institutional levels. To fulfill the TRC mandate, one law school changed the requirements for a law degree, including adding a class into the first year program. This addition was reviewed internally in 2023. The internal review identified several challenges; in particular, the course attempted to cover too many diverse topics and objectives within a single class. The course was also placing significant demands on instructors (and students) due to occurrences of interpersonal conflict and racism, as well as students’ disparate levels of background knowledge. Curriculum proposals were made that aimed to manage learner defensiveness, reduce instances of racism in communications, and decouple distinct topics and learner objectives from one another, allowing for more effective instruction, scheduling, and learning. By using a settler harm reduction approach to legal education, as well as the goals of decolonization and Indigenization, we explain the challenges identified in the internal review and responses proposed. We discuss change as a multilevel process and consider how individuals’ experiences can inform broader curriculum and institutional choices.
Intimate partner violence [IPV] causes myriad and gendered harms, but Canadian law has inconsistently provided avenues of economic redress. Although tort law has evolved to allow IPV survivors to seek compensation, tort-based remedies are sought rarely and largely limited to intentional torts such as assault, battery, and the intentional infliction of emotional distress. These torts do not always encompass the harms sustained by IPV survivors, particularly those caused by economic abuse and coercive control. In Ahluwalia v Ahluwalia, a 2022 family law case, Justice Renu Mandhane responded to this gap in the law by recognizing a new tort of family violence, but her decision was overturned by the Ontario Court of Appeal in 2023, and the case is now before the Supreme Court of Canada. Our paper provides a feminist analysis of the role of tort law in providing compensatory remedies for survivors of IPV. We situate tort remedies and Ahluwalia within the wider context of Canadian laws addressing IPV and feminist critiques of tort law and theory. This wider context raises issues about access to justice and socio-economic responses to IPV for members of marginalized groups in particular. We also examine how myths and stereotypes have influenced this area of law and the role of lawyers and judges in this respect, including in Ahluwalia. We conclude that recognition of the tort of family violence is an important but limited step forward in compensating the harms of IPV, and we urge governments to do more to systemically remediate these harms.
This article outlines the concept of “critical race equality” in Canadian constitutional law and critiques the Supreme Court of Canada’s jurisprudential silence on systemic racism under section 15 of the Charter. First, the article discusses the theory of critical race equality. It describes six principles that animate a critical race perspective, which understands equality as ambitious, contextual, ideological, comparative, systemic, and positive. Second, the article discusses the practice of critical race equality. It traces a genealogy from the Supreme Court’s first equality decision (Andrews) to its latest (Fraser), both of which reflect the principles of critical race equality. This genealogy demonstrates that critical race equality has been consistently affirmed by the Supreme Court, yet has never been applied by the Court to ubiquitous systemic inequality confronting Black and Indigenous communities in Canada. This article concludes that systemic racial justice advocacy under section 15 of the Charter is doctrinally viable. Consequently, it calls upon a coalition of scholars, lawyers, and organizers to recognize that viability as one of many tools for challenging unconstitutional state neglect and advancing systemic racial justice.