
Dans ce texte, l’auteur propose une analyse approfondie de l’existence et de la validité des obligations contractées par un système d’IA. Constatant l’impossibilité d’une rencontre de volontés en raison de l’intervention d’un système informatique autonome au moment de la formation du contrat, l’auteur procède à l’analyse d’autres pistes de solution visant à rendre responsable l’utilisateur du système d’IA à l’égard de l’opération économique réalisée en son nom. L’examen critique des principales solutions permet de mettre en exergue les mérites et les limites des réponses transitoires ou définitives à ce problème en droit québécois des contrats
This article examines the use of private placements as defensive tactics in the context of unsolicited takeover bids in Canada. While poison pills have traditionally been the main focus of regulatory scrutiny and academic debate, private placements have received little attention. Through a critical analysis of two key decisions involving private placements, the article argues that securities commissions have improperly deferred to target boards by assessing private placements through the lens of business judgment and fiduciary duties. This approach strays from the core tenet of National Policy 62-202 (NP 62-202), which prioritizes shareholder choice and seeks to prevent tactics that undermine a fair and open bid process. The article contends that the proper focus of regulatory inquiry should be the effect of a measure on shareholders’ ability to respond to a bid, rather than the board’s stated intentions. It proposes a narrower and more precise framework: once it is established that the target company does not require financing to remain a going concern, securities commissions should assess whether a private placement was adopted during or in anticipation of a bid and whether its dilutive impact impairs shareholder choice. This effect-based standard aligns more closely with NP 62-202 and avoids entangling securities regulators in fiduciary duty inquiries more appropriately left to the courts. Reframing regulatory oversight in this manner would restore focus on the public interest, strengthen shareholder protections, and ensure that private placements do not serve as covert entrenchment tools in Canada’s takeover bid regime.
This paper explores how human rights laws in Canada could address inequities arising from climate change. While climate change is increasingly recognized as a pressing human rights issue, no case brought under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms has yet succeeded on its merits. This paper examines whether human rights statutes—which aim to prevent discrimination in areas such as employment, housing, and services—could offer a more effective legal recourse. It proposes four potential human rights complaints related to climate change: (1) failing to implement adaptation measures for vulnerable groups, (2) providing accommodation for climate conscious individuals, (3) recognizing government climate mitigation efforts as a “service,” and (4) holding greenhouse gas–emitting corporations accountable. The paper concludes that while these complaints are supported by existing case law, legislative amendments would provide clearer guidance and enhance certainty in applying human rights laws to climate-related disparities.
Le présent texte évalue l’action constitutionnelle de la Cour suprême du Canada à la lumière de la théorie positiviste du droit de Hans Kelsen. Par son travail d’interprétation et de sanction, la Cour suprême outrepasse le rôle de législateur négatif que Kelsen assigne aux cours constitutionnelles. L’usage que la Cour fait des principes sous-jacents à la Constitution et l’inversion des droits en valeurs constituent également des dépassements de la conception kelsénienne de la justice constitutionnelle. Ce faisant, la Cour suprême du Canada peut, selon la théorie positiviste du droit de Kelsen, être qualifiée de tribunal législatif et philosophique. Par sa jurisprudence constitutionnelle, la Cour suprême du Canada contribue à donner un contenu à la norme fondamentale, notamment lorsqu’elle l’explicite à l’aide des principes sous-jacents à la Constitution et des valeurs qui sous-tendent les droits de la Charte.
Around half of First Nations in Canada regulated by the Indian Act select their “chief and council” through what is known as “custom” according to section 2 of the act. Whether they entail traditional elements or more contemporary practices, custom selection codes stand apart from the Indian Act’s provisions on elections and can embody the recognition of Indigenous self-government. When disputes about these custom processes arise, however, the Federal Court may be called on to interpret and apply them; and the federal government, despite eschewing any jurisdiction to interfere in custom governance disputes, has a number of levers that it can, and does, pull to shape the elaboration of custom codes or other key factors contributing to the dispute. Our study falls into two parts: (1) an analysis of Federal Court decisions that illustrates some of the contradictions between the objective of respecting the culture and traditions of Aboriginal peoples and the anxiety felt in relation to ensuring that First Nations communities comply with Western notions of responsible government and (2) a review of Canadian policy with respect to custom elections. Two case studies on instances of intervention, with respect to the Lubicon Cree and the Algonquins of Barriere Lake, help support the argument that this policy, and the legislative structure itself, is a form of colonial entanglement that must be understood in the larger context of claims to land and resources, and arrangements over funding and infrastructure.