Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy Volume 4(2021)
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摘要
Chapter 7 argues that people have a mentalistic view of objects. This is due to the interdependence of folk psychology and folk physics. Folk psychology and folk physics are interconnected by what the author calls Teleological Commingling. When considering events that don’t involve agents, it is natural to default to tracking intentions, goal-directed processes, despite the fact that agents aren’t involved. People have a deep-seated intentionality bias which is the result of the pervasive detection of agency cues, such as order or non-randomness. And this gives rise to the Agentive Worldview: people view nature as a whole as being infused with agency and purpose. Teleological Commingling and the Agentive Worldview it gives rise to are at the core of people’s conception of objects. Chapter 7 maintains that the ordinary view of material objects is rooted in an implicit, false theory. It should be given no weight in metaphysical debates about the nature of material objects. And this problematizes the central methodological assumption that metaphysical theories of material objects should be beholden to common sense.