The species-specific acidic nuclear phosphoprotein 32 kDa members (ANP32A/B) play a key role in restricting the function of avian influenza virus polymerase in mammalian host. Avian influenza viruses, upon replicating in humans, may acquire critical amino acid substitutions in the polymerase basic 2 (PB2) protein (e.g. E627 K and D701N) that enhance the viral polymerase's functional compatibility with human ANP32A and ANP32B proteins, thereby augmenting viral replication efficiency and increasing pathogenic potential in humans. However, certain H5N1 avian influenza viruses have demonstrated the capacity to establish productive human infections in the absence of the canonical PB2-627 K or PB2-701N adaptive mutations; the underlying molecular mechanism remains incompletely characterized. In this study, we found that the two H5N1 viruses, namely A/chicken/LN/SD035/2018 (LN35) and A/duck/JL/S1261/2019 (JL261), were genetically similar, but their pathogenicity for mice was different. By evaluating a series of single-gene reassortant viruses and mutants in mice, we confirmed that the PB2-384L/443R/460M characteristics are crucial for LN35 to maintain high lethality in mice. We further revealed that the polymerase of H5N1 avian virus bearing PB2-384L/443R/460M signature could efficiently utilize human ANP32A/B. Moreover, we found that this PB2-384L/443R/460M signature positively regulates H5N1 vRNP-human ANP32A/B interaction and vRNP assembly. Our findings indicate that key amino acid substitutions in the PB2 gene of the H5N1 virus may emerge in avian host and then augment its capacity to interact with human ANP32A/B protein, underscoring the substantial zoonotic and public health risks associated with continued circulation and evolution of H5N1 in avian populations.

The current seasonal influenza vaccine is only 20%-60% effective on average, and its protective effect lasts only 6-8 months. Additionally, some viruses are prone to antigenic drift, which prevents the vaccine from being fully effective. Furthermore, due to antigenic drift, they are unable to effectively address the threat of pandemics, continuing to pose a threat to global health. There is an urgent need to develop vaccine strategies that go beyond traditional vaccines. The human adenovirus type 5 (Ad5) vector is biologically safe and capable of inducing strong systemic and mucosal immune responses. Currently, the Ad5 vector is widely utilized in vaccine development against various pathogens. Here, we developed and evaluated an adenovirus-based influenza vaccine (rAd5-GFP-RBS). This vaccine focuses on the receptor-binding site (RBS) of hemagglutinin. The vaccine was delivered intranasally to C57BL/6J mice and induced robust systemic and mucosal immune responses, evidenced by significantly higher IgG levels in serum and bronchoalveolar lavage fluid. Notably, the IgG antibody titer in the alveolar lavage fluid of the rAd5-GFP-RBS group was significantly higher than that in the PBS group (∗∗∗p < 0.001). Following H1N1 PR8 challenge, vaccinated mice exhibited significantly enhanced survival, significantly reduced weight loss, and decreased lung pathology compared to controls. Histopathology and immunohistochemistry confirmed lower viral antigen levels in vaccinated mice. Measured influenza-specific antibodies demonstrated strong immune response, highlighting the vaccine's potential for excellent protective immunity. These findings support rAd5-GFP-RBS as promising candidate for influenza protection, providing a platform for rapid vaccine development against emerging strains. Further optimization could improve vaccine durability and efficacy.

The global dissemination of H5 avian influenza viruses represents a significant threat to both human and animal health. In this study, we conducted a genome-wide siRNA library screening against the highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza virus, leading us to the identification of 457 cellular cofactors (441 proviral factors and 16 antiviral factors) involved in the virus replication cycle. Gene Ontology term enrichment analysis revealed that the candidate gene data sets were enriched in gene categories associated with mRNA splicing via spliceosome in the biological process, integral component of membrane in the cellular component, and protein binding in the molecular function. Reactome pathway analysis showed that the immune system (up to 63 genes) was the highest enriched pathway. Subsequent comparisons with four previous siRNA library screenings revealed that the overlapping rates of the involved pathways were 8.53%-62.61%, which were significantly higher than those of the common genes (1.85%-6.24%). Together, our genome-wide siRNA library screening unveiled a panorama of host cellular networks engaged in the regulation of highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza virus replication, which may provide potential targets and strategies for developing novel antiviral countermeasures.

Given the intimate relationship between humans and dogs, the H3N2 canine influenza viruses (CIVs) pose a threat to public health. In our study, we isolated four H3N2 CIVs from 3,758 dog nasal swabs in China between 2018 and 2020, followed by genetic and biological analysis. Phylogenetic analysis revealed 15 genotypes among all available H3N2 CIVs, with genotype 15 prevailing among dogs since around 2017, indicating the establishment of a stable virus lineage in dogs. Molecular characterization identified many mammalian adaptive substitutions, including HA-G146S, HA-N188D, PB2-I292T, PB2-G590S, PB2-S714I, PB1-D154G, and NP-R293K, present across the four isolates. Notably, analysis of HA sequences uncovered a newly emerged adaptive mutation, HA-V223I, which is predominantly found in human and swine H3N2 viruses, suggesting its role in mammalian adaptation. Receptor-binding analysis revealed that the four H3N2 viruses bind both avian and human-type receptors. However, HA-V223I decreases the H3N2 virus’s affinity for human-type receptors but enhances its thermal stability. Furthermore, attachment analysis confirmed the H3N2 virus binding to human tracheal tissues, albeit with reduced affinity when the virus carries HA-V223I. Antigenic analysis indicated that the current human H3N2 vaccines do not confer protection against H3N2 CIVs. Collectively, these findings underscore that the potential threat posed by H3N2 CIVs to human health still exists, emphasizing the necessity of close surveillance and monitoring of H3N2 CIVs in dogs.

ABSTRACT Reassortant Eurasian avian-like H1N1 (rEA H1N1) viruses carrying the internal genes of H1N1/2009 virus have been circulating in pigs for more than 10 years and have caused sporadic human infections. The enhanced virulence phenotype of the rEA H1N1 viruses highlights potential risks to public health. However, the molecular mechanism underlying the viral pathogenicity of the currently circulating rEA H1N1 viruses remains unclear. In this study, we found that two naturally isolated rEA H1N1 swine influenza viruses, A/swine/Liaoning/FX38/2017 (FX38) and A/swine/Liaoning/SY72/2018 (SY72), possessed similar genetic characteristics but exhibited significantly different pathogenicity in a mouse model. Using reverse genetics, we demonstrated that amino acid mutations at positions 100 and 122 in the polymerase acidic (PA) protein had individual and synergistic effects on the polymerase activity and viral replication capacity in vitro , as well as the viral pathogenicity in mice. Furthermore, we revealed that amino acid residue 100 in PA influenced the transcription of viral RNA (vRNA) by altering the endonuclease activity, and amino acid residue 122 affected the synthesis of complementary RNA and messenger RNA by altering the RNA-binding ability and endonuclease activity of the PA protein. Taken together, we identified that two naturally occurring amino acid mutations in PA derived from H1N1/2009 virus are crucial determinants of the virulence of rEA H1N1 viruses and revealed the differential mechanism by which these two mutations affect the transcription and replication of vRNA. These findings will extend our understanding of the roles of PA in the virulence of influenza A viruses. IMPORTANCE Multiple genetic determinants are involved in the virulence of influenza A viruses. In this study, we identified two naturally occurring amino acid mutations, located at residues 100 and 122 in the polymerase acidic (PA) protein, which are associated with viral polymerase activity, replication competence, and pathogenicity in mice. In particular, we clarified the specific mechanism by which the two residues play an important role in viral transcription and replication. These findings will help to improve understanding the functions of amino acid residues in the N-terminal region of the PA protein involved in the pathogenicity of influenza A viruses.

In this paper,we designed a protein immunoassay using microfluidic technology to quantitatively detect procalcitonin(PCT).The experiment involved various steps such as solution preparation,microfluidic chip assembly,standard curve drawing,testing of unknown liquid samples,and other experimental processes.By conducting these experiments,students can gain a deeper understanding of the emerging scientific research field of microfluidics.Furthermore,this training helps to foster their scientific thinking,ability to innovate,and integrate knowledge.

H5N1 avian influenza viruses bearing the clade 2.3.2.1 hemagglutinin (HA) gene have been widely detected in birds and poultry in several countries. During our routine surveillance, we isolated 28 H5N1 viruses between January 2017 and October 2020. To investigate the genetic relationship of the globally circulating H5N1 viruses and the biological properties of those detected in China, we performed a detailed phylogenic analysis of 274 representative H5N1 strains and analyzed the antigenic properties, receptor-binding preference, and virulence in mice of the H5N1 viruses isolated in China. The phylogenic analysis indicated that the HA genes of the 274 viruses belonged to six subclades, namely clades 2.3.2.1a to 2.3.2.1f; these viruses acquired gene mutations and underwent complicated reassortment to form 58 genotypes, with G43 being the dominant genotype detected in eight Asian and African countries. The 28 H5N1 viruses detected in this study carried the HA of clade 2.3.2.1c (two strains), 2.3.2.1d (three strains), or 2.3.2.1f (23 strains), and formed eight genotypes. These viruses were antigenically well-matched with the H5-Re12 vaccine strain used in China. Animal studies showed that the pathogenicity of the H5N1 viruses ranged from non-lethal to highly lethal in mice. Moreover, the viruses exclusively bound to avian-type receptors and have not acquired the ability to bind to human-type receptors. Our study reveals the overall picture of the evolution of clade 2.3.2.1 H5N1 viruses and provides insights into the control of these viruses.

During the routine surveillance, we isolated nine H4N6 subtype avian influenza viruses (AIVs) in Jiangsu Province, China, in March 2023. Phylogenetic analysis revealed that nine H4N6 viruses belonged to the Eurasian lineage and underwent complex genetic recombination among Asian countries during their evolution. It is particularly noteworthy that the PB2 and PB1 genes of our representative virus were descended from clade 2.3.4.4b H5 high-pathogenic AIVs in Japan. Mutations of D3V and D622G in PB1, N66S in PB1-F2, N30D, I43M, and T215A in M1, and P42S and I106M in NS1 were observed in nine isolates, which may increase the pathogenicity of the viruses in mice. The receptor binding analysis showed that the tested H4N6 virus could bind to both avian-type and human-type receptors. Vitro infection kinetics revealed that the representative virus could efficiently replicate in mammalian cells, including MDCK and 293T cells. Pathogenicity tests in mice indicated that the representative virus could replicate in nasal turbinates and lungs without prior adaptation. Our data reveal the potential public health issues represented by H4N6 viruses from wild birds and highlight the need to strengthen routine surveillance of wild birds.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) subtype H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b virus has spread globally, causing unprecedented large-scale avian influenza outbreaks since 2020. In 2021, we isolated 17 highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 viruses from wild birds in China. To determine virus origin, we genetically analyzed 1,529 clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 viruses reported globally since October 2020 and found that they formed 35 genotypes. The 17 viruses belonged to genotypes G07, which originated from eastern Asia, and G10, which originated from Russia. The viruses were moderately pathogenic in mice but were highly lethal in ducks. The viruses were in the same antigenic cluster as the current vaccine strain (H5-Re14) used in China. In chickens, the H5/H7 trivalent vaccine provided complete protection against clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 virus challenge. Our data indicate that vaccination is an effective strategy for preventing and controlling the globally prevalent clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 virus.

BackgroundTwo human cases of avian influenza A (H3N8) virus infection were reported in China in 2022.AimTo characterise H3N8 viruses circulating in China in September 2021-May 2022.MethodsWe sampled poultry and poultry-related environments in 25 Chinese provinces. After isolating H3N8 viruses, whole genome sequences were obtained for molecular and phylogenetic analyses. The specificity of H3N8 viruses towards human or avian receptors was assessed in vitro. Their ability to replicate in chicken and mice, and to transmit between guinea pigs was also investigated.ResultsIn total, 98 H3N8 avian influenza virus isolates were retrieved from 38,639 samples; genetic analysis of 31 representative isolates revealed 17 genotypes. Viruses belonging to 10 of these genotypes had six internal genes originating from influenza A (H9N2) viruses. These reassorted viruses could be found in live poultry markets and comprised the strains responsible for the two human infections. A subset of nine H3N8 viruses (including six reassorted) that replicated efficiently in mice bound to both avian-type and human-type receptors in vitro. Three reassorted viruses were shed by chickens for up to 9 days, replicating efficiently in their upper respiratory tract. Five reassorted viruses tested on guinea pigs were transmissible among these by respiratory droplets.ConclusionAvian H3N8 viruses with H9N2 virus internal genes, causing two human infections, occurred in live poultry markets in China. The low pathogenicity of H3N8 viruses in poultry allows their continuous circulation with potential for reassortment. Careful monitoring of spill-over infections in humans is important to strengthen early-warning systems and maintain influenza pandemic preparedness.

Influenza A virus (IAV) commandeers numerous host cellular factors for successful replication. However, very few host factors have been revealed to be involved in the fusion of viral envelope and late endosomal membranes. In this study, we identified cation-dependent mannose-6-phosphate receptor (M6PR) as a crucial host factor for the replication of IAV. We found that siRNA knockdown of M6PR expression significantly reduced the growth titers of different subtypes of IAV, and that the inhibitory effect of M6PR siRNA treatment on IAV growth was overcome by the complement of exogenously expressed M6PR. When A549 cells were treated with siRNA targeting M6PR, the nuclear accumulation of viral nucleoprotein (NP) was dramatically inhibited at early timepoints post-infection, indicating that M6PR engages in the early stage of the IAV replication cycle. By investigating the role of M6PR in the individual entry and post-entry steps of IAV replication, we found that the downregulation of M6PR expression had no effect on attachment, internalization, early endosome trafficking, or late endosome acidification. However, we found that M6PR expression was critical for the fusion of viral envelope and late endosomal membranes. Of note, M6PR interacted with the hemagglutinin (HA) protein of IAV, and further studies showed that the lumenal domain of M6PR and the ectodomain of HA2 mediated the interaction and directly promoted the fusion of the viral and late endosomal membranes, thereby facilitating IAV replication. Together, our findings highlight the importance of the M6PR–HA interaction in the fusion of viral and late endosomal membranes during IAV replication.

Host defense systems employ posttranslational modifications to protect against invading pathogens. Here, we found that protein inhibitor of activated STAT 1 (PIAS1) interacts with the nucleoprotein (NP), polymerase basic protein 1 (PB1), and polymerase basic protein 2 (PB2) of influenza A virus (IAV). Lentiviral-mediated stable overexpression of PIAS1 dramatically suppressed the replication of IAV, whereas siRNA knockdown or CRISPR/Cas9 knockout of PIAS1 expression significantly increased virus growth. The expression of PIAS1 was significantly induced upon IAV infection in both cell culture and mice, and PIAS1 was involved in the overall increase in cellular SUMOylation induced by IAV infection. We found that PIAS1 inhibited the activity of the viral RNP complex, whereas the C351S or W372A mutant of PIAS1, which lacks the SUMO E3 ligase activity, lost the ability to suppress the activity of the viral RNP complex. Notably, the SUMO E3 ligase activity of PIAS1 catalyzed robust SUMOylation of PB2, but had no role in PB1 SUMOylation and a minimal role in NP SUMOylation. Moreover, PIAS1-mediated SUMOylation remarkably reduced the stability of IAV PB2. When tested in vivo, we found that the downregulation of Pias1 expression in mice enhanced the growth and virulence of IAV. Together, our findings define PIAS1 as a restriction factor for the replication and pathogenesis of IAV.

The H10 subtypes of avian influenza viruses pose a continual threat to the poultry industry and human health. The sporadic spillover of H10 subtypes viruses from poultry to humans is represented by the H10N8 human cases in 2013 and the recent H10N3 human infection in 2021. However, the genesis and characteristics of the recent reassortment H10N3 viruses have not been systemically investigated. In this study, we characterized 20 H10N3 viruses isolated in live poultry markets during routine nationwide surveillance in China from 2014 to 2021. The viruses in the recent reassortant genotype acquired their hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) genes from the duck H10 viruses and H7N3 viruses, respectively, whereas the internal genes were derived from chicken H9N2 viruses as early as 2019. Receptor‐binding analysis indicated that two of the tested H10N3 viruses had a higher affinity for human‐type receptors than for avian‐type receptors, highlighting the potential risk of avian‐to‐human transmission. Animal studies showed that only viruses belonging to the recent reassortant genotype were pathogenic in mice; two tested viruses transmitted via direct contact and one virus transmitted by respiratory droplets in guinea pigs, though with limited efficiency. These findings emphasize the need for enhanced surveillance of H10N3 viruses.

H3N2 influenza viruses not only cause seasonal epidemics in humans but also circulate widely in animals, posing a threat to both animal and human health. Our previous studies indicate that H3N2 avian influenza viruses (AIVs) are readily detected in live poultry markets (LPMs); however, the evolution and biological characteristics of the H3N2 viruses in poultry farms in China are unclear. In this study, we performed active surveillance and collected 49,135 samples from poultry farms. In total, 21 H3N2 AIVs were isolated and their genetics, receptor-binding properties, and replication in mice were evaluated. Phylogenetic analysis indicated that H3N2 AIVs harbor complicated gene constellations and have undergone extensive reassortment; the viruses derived their genes from 12 different hemagglutinin subtypes of duck viruses, including H1, H2, H4, H5, H6, H7, H8, H9, H10, H11, H12, and H14. The complicated gene constellations indicated that H3N2 viruses may have been introduced into poultry farms from different sources, but none have become dominant in poultry farms. Although the H3N2 AIVs possessed avian-type receptor-binding preference, most of the isolates could replicate without preadaptation and some of H3N2 viruses caused weight loss in mice. Notably, two H3N2 viruses acquired the PB2 627K mutation after a single round of replication in mice, suggesting similar mutations could occur if they replicated in humans. Overall, our study demonstrates that the H3N2 AIVs pose a potential threat to the public health and emphasizes the need for continued surveillance of H3N2 viruses in the both LPMs and poultry farms.

Animal influenza viruses continue to pose a threat to human public health. The Eurasian avian-like H1N1 (EA H1N1) viruses are widespread in pigs throughout Europe and China and have caused human infections in several countries, indicating their pandemic potential. To carefully monitor the evolution of the EA H1N1 viruses in nature, we collected nasal swabs from 103,110 pigs in 22 provinces in China between October 2013 and December 2019, and isolated 855 EA H1N1 viruses. Genomic analysis of 319 representative viruses revealed that these EA H1N1 viruses formed eight different genotypes through reassortment with viruses of other lineages circulating in humans and pigs, and two of these genotypes (G4 and G5) were widely distributed in pigs. Animal studies indicated that some strains have become highly pathogenic in mice and highly transmissible in ferrets via respiratory droplets. Moreover, two-thirds of the EA H1N1 viruses reacted poorly with ferret serum antibodies induced by the currently used H1N1 human influenza vaccine, suggesting that existing immunity may not prevent the transmission of the EA H1N1 viruses in humans. Our study reveals the evolution and pandemic potential of EA H1N1 viruses and provides important insights for future pandemic preparedness.

鸭疫里默氏杆菌(RA)为一种可引起鸭、鹅、鸡、火鸡等禽类急性或慢性败血症的革兰氏阴性菌,是鸭场重要病原菌之一.本研究利用鸭疫里默氏杆菌三重PCR鉴定方法,从养殖场病鸭的脏器中分离、鉴定出一株鸭疫里默氏杆菌,将其命名为RA-WH9;通过血清型鉴定实验和Kirby-Bauer药敏实验,确定了其血清型和药敏性;利用细菌基因组三代测序技术和生物信息学平台,我们构建并分析了RA-WH9基因组完成图.结果表明,RA-WH9为1型血清型鸭疫里默氏杆菌,对氨苄西林、多粘菌素B和利福平等抗生素耐药,其对利福平最小抑菌浓度达到50μg/mL.全基因组序列分析表明,RA-WH9染色体总长度为2488018 bp,GC含量34.58％,编码2563个基因,其中包含88个耐药基因,其耐药基因型与耐药表型一致.此外,RA-WH9携带一个全长10736 bp的质粒.本研究丰富了鸭疫里默氏杆菌的基因库,为鸭疫里默氏杆菌病的防控提供了依据.

The matrix protein (M1) of influenza A virus plays an important role in replication, assembly, and budding. A previous study found that aspartic acid (D) at position 30 and alanine (A) at position 215 of M1 contribute to the high pathogenicity of H5N1 viruses in mice, and double mutations of D to asparagine (N) at position 30 (D30N) and A to threonine (T) at position 215 (A215T) in M1 dramatically attenuate H5N1 viruses in mice. However, the underlying mechanisms by which these M1 mutations attenuate the virulence of H5N1 viruses are unknown. Here, we found that the amino acid mutation A215T eliminates the SUMOylation of M1 by reducing its interaction with the host SUMO1 protein, significantly reducing the stability of M1, slowing the export of the M1-vRNP complex from the nucleus to the cytoplasm, and reducing viral replication in MDCK cells. We further found that the D30N mutation in M1 alters the shape of progeny viruses from filamentous to spherical virions. Our findings reveal an essential role for M1 215A SUMOylation and M1 30D-related filamentous morphology in the pathogenesis of avian influenza viruses, which could be targeted in novel antiviral drug designs. IMPORTANCE Identification of the pathogenic mechanism of highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses in mammals is helpful to develop novel anti-influenza virus strategies. Two amino acid mutations (D30N and A215T) in M1 were found to collectively attenuate H5N1 influenza viruses in mice, but the underlying mechanism remained unknown. This study found that the A215T mutation significantly decreases the SUMOylation of M1, which in turn attenuates the replication of H5N1 virus in mammalian cells. The D30N mutation in M1 was found to change the virion shape from filamentous to spherical. These findings are important for understanding the molecular mechanism of virulence of highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses in mammals.

H5N1 avian influenza viruses bearing the clade 2.3.4.4b hemagglutinin gene have been widely circulating in wild birds and are responsible for the loss of over 70 million domestic poultry in Europe, Africa, Asia, and North America since October 2020. During our routine surveillance, 13 H5N1 viruses were isolated from 26,767 wild bird and poultry samples that were collected between September 2021 and March 2022 in China. To investigate the origin of these Chinese isolates and understand their genetic relationship with the globally circulating H5N1 viruses, we performed a detailed phylogenic analysis of 233 representative H5N1 strains that were isolated from 28 countries. We found that, after they emerged in the Netherlands, the H5N1 viruses encountered complicated gene exchange with different viruses circulating in wild birds and formed 16 genotypes. Genotype one (G1) was predominant, being detected in 22 countries, whereas all other genotypes were only detected in one or two continents. H5N1 viruses of four genotypes (G1, G7, G9, and G10) were detected in China; three of these genotypes have been previously reported in other countries. The H5N1 viruses detected in China replicated in mice, with pathogenicity varying among strains; the G1 virus was highly lethal in mice. Moreover, we found that these viruses were antigenically similar to and well matched with the H5-Re14 vaccine strain currently used in China. Our study reveals the overall picture of H5N1 virus evolution and provides insights for the control of these viruses.

The globally circulating H5N8 avian influenza viruses bearing the clade 2.3.4.4b hemagglutinin (HA) gene are responsible for the loss of more than 33 million domestic poultry since January 2020. Moreover, the H5N8 viruses have reassorted with other avian influenza viruses and formed H5N1, H5N2, H5N3, H5N4, and H5N5 viruses in Europe, Africa, and North America. In this study, we analyzed 15 H5N6 viruses isolated from poultry and seven H5N6 viruses isolated from humans, and found these viruses formed seven different genotypes by deriving the clade 2.3.4.4b HA gene of H5N8 viruses, the neuraminidase of domestic duck H5N6 viruses, and internal genes of different viruses that previously circulated in domestic ducks and wild birds in China. Two of these genotypes (genotype 3 and genotype 6) have caused human infections in multiple provinces. The H5N6 viruses isolated from poultry have distinct pathotypes in mice; some of them replicate systemically and are highly lethal in mice. Although these viruses exclusively bind to avian-type receptors, it is worrisome that they may obtain key mutations that would increase their affinity for human-type receptors during replication in humans. Our study indicates that the novel H5N6 reassortants bearing the clade 2.3.4.4b HA gene of H5N8 viruses were generated through reassortment in domestic ducks and may have spread across a wide area of China, thereby posing a new challenge to the poultry industry and human health. Our findings emphasize the importance of careful monitoring, evaluation, and control of the H5N6 viruses circulating in nature.

In the past decade, there has been extensive global surveillance for highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) infection in both animals and humans, however, few studies on epidemiology of avian influenza in Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) were published. During the period 2013–2014, HPAI H5N1 viruses were detected with outbreaks in domestic poultry in DPRK. Phylogenetic analysis revealed that the hemagglutinin gene of all samples belonged to clade 2.3.2.1c with high homology. The HPAI H5N1 virus found in ducks at the Tudan Duck Farm in 2013 was might introduced by migratory birds and then led to the outbreaks on neighboring chicken farms in 2014. These data provide direct evidence for the transmission of avian influenza viruses from wild birds to waterfowl to terrestrial birds. Therefore, the monitoring and control of influenza virus in ducks must be given top priority, which are essential components to prevent and control HPAI.