We evaluate the performance of expected return proxies during extreme credit market conditions and extreme phases of business cycles when realized returns on banks stocks are large in absolute value. We construct three sets of expected return proxies for individual bank stocks: (i) characteristic-based proxies; (ii) standard risk-factor-based proxies; and (iii) risk-factor-based proxies in which betas depend on firm characteristics. Based on the newly developed minimum error variance (MEV) criterion (Lee et al., 2020), the best performing expected return proxy is the risk-factor-based model that allows betas to vary with firm characteristics. We also examine whether these three expected return proxies can capture actual returns during either extreme credit market or extreme business-cycle conditions. We find that both risk-factor-based proxies explain returns better than characteristic-based proxies during these periods.

We study the relationship between mutual fund management's direct experience with extreme environment events and the fund's voting behavior on environmental issues. We find that higher air pollution in a fund's home county increases its propensity to vote in support of shareholders' environmental proposals. The effect is weakened by fund manager turnovers, and managers' affiliation with the Republican Party. Conversely, the effect is stronger for more highly contested environmental proposals. Overall, our results suggest that mutual fund management's direct experience with extreme environment events plays a significant role in motivating the fund's environmental engagements.

Firms in the same networks tend to have similar corporate governance practices. However, disentangling peer effects, where governance practices propagate from one firm to another, from selection effects, where firms with similar preferences self-select into linked groups, is difficult to do. Studying board-interlocked firms, we utilize the staggered adoption of universal demand laws across states to identify and estimate causal peer effects in governance policies. We find support for the existence of peer effects in the adoption of antitakeover provisions. The impact of universal demand laws on the governance experience of interlocking directors likely explains these effects.

When board-CEO relations are strained, management may reduce cooperation with the board and impede the disclosure of relevant information. Because liquidity is a function of uncertainty, it will reflect board-CEO tensions. Using a sample of East Asia companies, we test this prediction by investigating the association between board composition and share liquidity. Although greater board independence generally increases liquidity, its impact is lower when board-management relations are plausibly strained, for example, when CEOs are subject to replacement. Its impact is also lower when CEOs have greater bargaining power. Patterns of accounting transparency are consistent with those we document for liquidity. The evidence thus suggests that board independence can be costly in some circumstances, with a net effect that depends on both the relationship between and the comparative negotiating strengths of the CEO and the board.

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We study the relationship between mutual fund management’s direct experience with air pollution and the fund’s engagements with its portfolio companies on environmental issues. We find that higher air pollution in a fund’s home county increases its propensity to vote in support of shareholders’ environmental proposals. The effect is weakened by fund manager turnovers, and the managers’ affiliation with the Republican Party. Conversely, the effect is strengthened by more recent air-pollution events, and more highly contested environmental proposals. Overall, our results suggest that mutual fund management’s direct air-pollution experience plays a crucial role in motivating the fund’s environmental engagements.

We examine how the tail behavior of risk factors affects the tail behavior of individual bank stock returns in the United States. Using 26 common risk factors, we construct univariate and multivariate conditional exceedance measures. We find that returns on banking industry, security-trading industry, and broad market portfolios have the largest impact on the probability of observing high positive tail returns on bank stocks. A small-minus-big bank return factor, market volatility, and a profitability risk factor have the largest impacts on the probability of lower tail returns. Bank capital ratios and total allowances for loan losses are notably related to tail risk.

We return to the long-standing question 'Who owns the assets in a defined benefit pension plan?' Unlike earlier studies, we condition the market's assessment of implicit property rights on the sponsoring firm's financial health. Valuations of financially strong firms, and those that are strengthening, are more responsive to pension plan funding. For these firms, each extra dollar of net plan assets is valued at between $0.50 and $1.00. In contrast, for weak and weakening firms, valuation effects are statistically indistinguishable from zero. This result is consistent with the higher likelihood that they will renege on their pension obligations.

Perluasan yang cepat dari pasar keuangan selama beberapa dekade belakangan merupakan bagian dari inovasi dalam sekuritasasi dan peningkatan kredit yang akhirnya melahirkan strategi perdagangan baru. Strategi-strategi ini secara bergantian membuat bergantian membuat perkembangan yang layak dalam kebutuhan, buku Dasar-Dasar Investasi Buku 1 Edisi 9 ini berkembang sejalan dengan pasar keuangan yang ada. Buku ini terfokus pada analisis investasi, yang memungkinkan kita untuk mempresentasikan aplikasi yang praktis dari teori investasi dan menyampaikan wawasan dari nilai praktis. Sebagai tambahan, di buku ini, terdapat koleksi sistematis dari spreadsheet Excel yang akan memberikan Anda kemudahan untuk mengeksplorasi konsep lebih dari yang pernah ada sebelumnya. Dalam upaya untuk menghubungkan teori terhadap praktik, pendekatan alam buku ini konsisten dengan yang diberikan oleh Institut CFA. Institut ini mengelola pedidikan dan program sertifikasi untuk gelar Analisis Keuangan Tersertifikasi (Chartered Financial Analyst-CFA). Terdapat pertanyaan-pertanyaan dari ujian CFA sebelumnya di soal-soal akhir bab dan telah ditambahkan model pertanyaan CFA baru merupakan turunan dari kursus persiapan Kaplan-Schweser dalam edisi ini.

Buku ini berfokus pada analisis investasi, yang memungkinkan kita untuk mempresentasikan aplikasi yang praktis dari teori investasi dan menyampaikan wawasan dari nilai praktis. Sebagai tambahan, dibuku ini terdapat koleksi sistematis dari spreadsheet excel yang akan memberikan Anda kemudahan untuk mengeksplorasi konsep lebih dalam dari yang pernah ada sebelumnya.

The market views bad-news management earnings forecasts as more credible than good-news forecasts not because good-news forecasts are biased, but rather because they are noisier than bad-news forecasts. After controlling for noise, the difference in market response disappears. Bad-news forecasts have unconditionally lower dispersion around final earnings and, unlike good-news forecasts, bad-news forecasts become more accurate and contain higher magnitude updates as earnings announcement dates approach. The results provide new direct evidence that management differentially seeks to verify bad news, and withholds greater amounts of bad news while it seeks verification. Consistent with rational markets, this mitigation of noise provides a novel explanation for the asymmetric market response to management earnings forecasts.

We investigate the link between abnormal CEO compensation and firm performance, asking whether high unexplained compensation relative to several benchmarks is a sign of hard-to-measure but desirable executive attributes or is instead a symptom of unsolved agency problems. We find that abnormally high CEO pay predicts worse future firm performance. Abnormally high compensation that is performance-contingent is a less ominous signal about the future success of the firm. But abnormal levels of even performance-contingent compensation predict worse future performance. We conclude that abnormally high CEO pay can be useful as an independent indicator of agency problems. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

In this paper we present a new measure to investigate the functional structure of financial markets, the Sector Dominance Ratio (SDR). We study the information embedded in raw and partial correlations using random matrix theory (RMT) and examine the evolution of economic sectoral makeup on a yearly and monthly basis for four stock markets, those of the U.S., U.K., Germany and Japan, during the period from January 2000 to December 2010. We investigate the information contained in raw and partial correlations using the sector dominance ratio and its variation over time. The evolution of economic sectoral activities can be discerned through the largest eigenvectors of both raw correlation and partial correlation matrices. We find a characteristic change of the largest eigenvalue from raw and partial correlations and the SDR that coincides with sharp breaks in asset valuations. Finally, we propose the SDR as an indicator for changes in VIX indexes.

We show that a pattern of earnings management in bank financial statements has little bearing on downside risk during quiet periods, but seems to have a big impact during a financial crisis. Banks demonstrating more aggressive earnings management prior to 2007 exhibit substantially higher stock market risk once the financial crisis begins as measured by the incidence of large weekly stock price “crashes” as well as by the pattern of full‐year returns. Stock price crashes also predict future deterioration in operating performance. Bank regulators may therefore interpret them as early warning signs of impending problems.

We show that a pattern of earnings management in bank financial statements has little bearing on downside risk during quiet periods, but seems to have a big impact during a financial crisis. More aggressive earnings managers prior to 2007 exhibit substantially higher risk once the financial crisis begins. This risk is evident in both the incidence of large weekly stock price “crashes” as well as in the pattern of full-year returns. Consistent with the literature on earnings management and crash risk in industrial firms, these results support the hypothesis that banks can use accounting discretion to hide relevant information for some time, but in a period of severe distress in which accounting choices can no longer obscure performance, information comes out in larger amounts, resulting in substantially worse stock market returns. We also show that these stock price crashes predict future deterioration in operating performance, which is of greater direct relevance to regulators, and thus may serve as an early warning signal of impending problems.