AbstractThis chapter details a plan for the reconstruction of Ukraine with the aim of the country one day becoming a full member of the EU. When the war is over the EU must be ready to help Ukraine build new and better for a future in the union. Every day that the war continues, the enormous cost of reconstruction increases. Ukraine will need extensive support which the authors argue should be handled by an EU agency that coordinates donors in a close dialogue with the Ukrainian government on goals and processes. Other important principles of reconstruction are that aid should arrive quickly, but with appropriate conditions; that the money sent to Ukraine is grants and not loans; and that the focus of the reconstruction is to create a sustainable economy with a clear green transition in terms of energy and infrastructure. Ukraine's entry into the EU should be used to prioritize institutional reforms that strengthen the reconstruction of all sections of Ukrainian society. The authors point out that a successful Ukraine in the EU will strengthen not only Ukraine's but also the entire EU's economic prosperity and security.

AbstractThis chapter analyzes how the European Union (EU) and Russia's interdependence has developed with a focus on Russian energy exports to the EU. The main question is whether this will lead to division or greater cohesion in the EU when Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine has forced the EU to reconsider its dependence on Russian energy. The chapter details the different types of energy EU countries imported from Russia and discusses the sanctions implemented by both sides. The effects of sanctions will be felt both in Europe and in Russia in the short term, but in the longer term, Russia is the big loser both in terms of relations with the EU and its own economic development. Energy exports are a fundamental driver of the Russian economy and without major institutional changes, the country will not be able to rid itself of its dependence on fossil energy exports. For the EU, the major challenge will be to deal with the internal fissures that are exposed when it reconsiders its relationship with Russia. The authors argue that this is a historic opportunity to accelerate the green transition in the EU while improving the Union's security by making itself independent of Russian energy.

Global Finance, Local Control: Corruption and Wealth in Contemporary Russia. By Igor Logvinenko. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2021. xviii, 228 pp. Appendix. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Figures. $49.95, hard bound. - Volume 82 Issue 1

"Taking Stock of Shock. Social Consequences of the 1989 Revolutions." Europe-Asia Studies, 74(6), pp. 1082–1083 Additional informationNotes on contributorsAnders ÅslundAnders Åslund, Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA; Senior Fellow, Stockholm Free World Forum, Sweden. Email: andersaslund1@gmail.com

"Navalny. Putin’s Nemesis, Russia’s Future?." Europe-Asia Studies, 74(8), pp. 1507–1508 Additional informationNotes on contributorsAnders ÅslundAnders Åslund, Center for Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies, Georgetown University, Washington DC, USA. Email: andersaslund1@gmail.com

The situation of Belarus is currently quite clear. Lukashenka is hanging on to power because of his continued grasp on the security forces and Putin's support. Russia controls as much as it wants to control. So far, no significant cracks have appeared in Lukashenka's hold on the security forces. While the popular protests of 2020 were far stronger than any previous popular Belarusian protests, Lukashenka is a survivor. He has persisted during several political and financial crises. He hopes to also survive this time and he is playing for time.The Belarusian democratic movement understands, and it fears that its time is running out, so it calls for maximum pressure on Lukashenka. The EU should follow its lead. This runs contrary to the standard procedure of ratcheting sanctions up step by step. The aim of Western sanctions should be to maximize the cost to not only Belarus but also to Russia to ease Russian interest in controlling Belarus as early as possible.The targets of the sanctions should be multiple: Lukashenka, his family and cronies; culprits of human rights violations; Belarusian state financial institutions; the big Belarusian state companies; Russian state banks in Belarus; big Kremlin-related companies in Belarus; Russian businessmen assisting the Kremlin in Belarus; and the Belarusian arms trade. International financial institutions should not be allowed to assist the Belarusian state. Bona fide Belarusian private enterprises and their trade should not be sanctioned.

The new Ukrainian government faced all the challenges of a newly independent state at the same time that the country was in a grave and multifaceted economic crisis. Much of the early economic discussion in Ukraine focused on how to isolate Ukraine from Russia's inflation and to establish an independent currency. Economic science and the social sciences generally had been weak in Ukraine ever since the founding of the Soviet Union. With a reform team in government, a serious reform program, parliamentary approval, an International Monetary Fund program, and substantial international financing, Ukraine seemed set for a serious economic reform. The crisis Ukraine experienced in 1993 was a classical case of hyperinflation brought about by disorganization, confusion, and corruption. In 1995, Ukraine consumed USD 12 billion in energy, as much as all of France, which produced almost thirty times more gross domestic product. The chapter also presents an overview of the key concepts discussed in this book.

A conundrum this paper aims to explain is how Russia, a country that pursues such rigorous and conservative macroeconomic policies can be so tolerant of state and crony capitalism. The key issue is what Putin’s economic model amounts to, which is being presented already in section one. Section two reviews Russia’s recent economic performance, while the three ensuing sections examine three key aspects of the Russian economy, namely the eminent macroeconomic policy, the role of energy, and the impact of the Western sanctions since 2014. The final section attempts to answer the likelihood of serious market reforms.

This chapter is concerned with the impact of the EU enlargement on the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries, particularly in terms of GDP growth, trade, and the impact on the overall economic system. It discusses profound long-term changes, the time perspective should be at least a decade. The chapter utilizes unweighted averages, as the purpose is to illustrate the relative position of various countries. It shows empirical tests of the determinants of exports of former socialist countries. The chapter suggests that the statistical problems are considerable. The effect of accession of an adjacent group of states on growth of the CIS states is of course not immediate. The major economic reality in the CIS states is that the industries inherited from communist planning are outdated and sometimes perverse vis-a-vis the economic endowments of the countries. The post-communist countries vary considerably in terms of the rates at which they have eliminated barriers to structural change.

The Economic History ReviewVolume 68, Issue 1 p. 393-395 BOOK REVIEW Ruslan Dzarasov, The conundrum of Russian capitalism (London: PlutoPress, 2014. Pp. x + 294. ISBN 9780745332789 Pbk. $145.00) Anders Åslund, Anders Åslund Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington, DCSearch for more papers by this author Anders Åslund, Anders Åslund Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington, DCSearch for more papers by this author First published: 07 January 2015 https://doi.org/10.1111/ehr.12108_32Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Volume68, Issue1February 2015Pages 393-395 RelatedInformation

This paper discusses why Greece has done so poorly in comparison with all other European Union countries since the onslaught of the global financial crisis in 2008. To show what was wrong with its fiscal adjustment, this paper compares Greece with the other European Union country that was hit be the most severe fiscal crisis, namely Latvia. The conclusion is that front-loaded fiscal adjustment works much better. Greek economic policy has been a popular topic among opinion writers, notably Nobel Prize winner and New York Times columnist Paul Krugman, who claimed that Greece suffered from austerity. Because of his prominence in the international public debate, I shall scrutinize his arguments on the Greek crisis. The paper also examines what policy the International Monetary Fund has pursued with regard to Greece, and how its views have been influenced by the debate and Greek economic developments. Finally, the paper assesses what lessons can be drawn from the contrasting experiences of Latvia and Greece. The conclusion is that a fiscal adjustment should be sufficient to resolve the crisis to restore confidence and that it should be as front-loaded as is practically and politically possible.

Emerging-market growth from 2000 to 2012 was untypically high. This paper highlights the many reasons why emerging-economy growth is likely to be lower going forward. Much of the catch-up potential has already been used up. The extraordinary credit and commodity booms are over, and many large emerging economies are financially fragile. They have major governance problems, so they need to carry out major structural reforms to be able to proceed with a decent growth rate, but many policymakers are still in a state of hubris and not very inclined to opt for reforms. They are caught up in state and crony capitalism. Rather than providing free markets for all, the West might limit its endeavors to its own benefit. Economic convergence has hardly come to an end, but it has probably reached a hiatus that is likely to last many years. The emerging economies need to improve their quality of governance and other economic policies substantially to truly catch up. For a decade or so, the West could take the global economic lead once again as in the1980s.

Ukraine has an economy today that is not much larger than in 1990. The main explanation is that Ukraine had no economic policy in the first three years of its independence, 1991–1994. The Soviet economic system lingered, but the government allowed large fiscal deficits, which it financed with monetary emission, causing hyperinflation of 10,200% in 1993. Meanwhile, a small number of clever operators bought commodities either in Russia or Ukraine at low state-controlled prices and sold them on free markets at home or abroad at several times higher prices. These people became oligarchs, and they have dominated Ukraine’s economy and politics until the present. Corruption became particularly brazen under President Viktor Yanukovych. Today, Ukraine has at least a chance to break out of this vicious circle of corruption and chronic economic underperformance subject to making some fundamental changes in the country’s economic policies.

A key to understanding any society is its informal institutions, which influence both its economy and its politics. In Ukraine, the most important such institution is endemic corruption, which— aside from Russia’s campaign against Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty—is the main threat to the nation. Under Viktor Yanukovych, this corruption took three forms: The first had to do with the trade in natural gas; the second involved Yanukovych handing out large infrastructure projects at his personal discretion; and the third was outright stealing from the government. Now that the Ukrainian people have now made a choice for Europe, they will have their best chance to clean up their country’s long-corrupt economy and political realm.