The architecture of supervision – how we define the allocation of supervisory powers to different policy institutions – can have implications for policy conduct and for the economic and financial environment in which these policies are implemented. Theoretically, an integrated structure for monetary policy and supervision brings important benefits arising from better information flow and policy coordination. Aggregate supervisory information may significantly improve the conduct of monetary policy and the effectiveness of the lender of last resort function. As long as the process towards an integrated structure does not shrink the set of available tools, monetary policy and supervision are no less effective in pursuing their objectives than a separated structure. Additionally, an integrated structure does not seem to be correlated with more price and/or financial instability, as suggested by analysing a large global set of countries with different supervisory set-ups. A centralised structure for supervision entails significant benefits in terms of fewer opportunities for supervisory arbitrage by banks and less informational asymmetry. A large central supervisor can take advantage of economies of scale and scope in supervision and gain a broader perspective on the stability of the entire banking sector, which should result in improved financial stability. Potential drawbacks of a centralised supervisory structure are the possible lack of specialisation relative to local supervisors and the increased distance between the supervisor and the supervised institutions. We discuss the implications of our findings in the euro area context and in relation to the design of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). JEL Classification: E5, G21, G38

Extending the data set used in Beyer (2009) to 2017, we estimate I(1) and I(2) money demand models for euro area M3. After including two broken trends and a few dummies to account for shifts in the variables following the global financial crisis and the ECB's non-standard monetary policy measures, we find that the money demand and the real wealth relations identified in Beyer (2009) have remained remarkably stable throughout the extended sample period. Testing for price homogeneity in the I(2) model we find that the nominal-to-real transformation is not rejected for the money relation whereas the wealth relation cannot be expressed in real terms.

This paper investigates the interrelations between monetary macro- and microprudential policies. It first provides an overview of the three policies, starting with their main instruments and objectives. Monetary policy aims at maintaining price stability and promoting balanced economic growth, macroprudential policies aim at safeguarding the stability of the overall financial system, while microprudential policies contribute to the safety and soundness of individual entities. Subsequently, the paper provides a simplified description of their respective transmission mechanisms and analyses the interactions between them. A conceptual framework is first presented on the basis of which the analysis of the interactions across the different policies can be demonstrated in a stylised manner. These stylised descriptions are then further complemented by model-based simulations illustrating the significant complementarities and interactions between them. Finally, the paper concludes that from a conceptual point of view there are numerous areas of interaction between the policies. These create scope for synergies, which can be reaped by sharing information and expertise across the various policy areas. JEL Classification: E58, G28

Ten years after the global and European financial crises, significant progress has been made both in financial and economic research to address the shortcomings of mainstream modelling frameworks used to inform monetary and financial policymaking.This article first reviews the progress made in the field of econometric modelling, namely more elaborated financial sectors, partial non-linearity, addressing the effective lower bound for interest rates, and dealing with heterogeneity across countries and economic agents.We then describe how such progress has helped assessing the impact of unconventional monetary policy and the interaction between monetary and prudential policies, also building on the extensive use of micro-data.We conclude that more research remains needed on the transmission of negative rates and their financial stability repercussions, and to understand better central bank communication (including forward guidance on monetary policy) by introducing elements of bounded rationality.Research remains also needed on building models with more heterogeneous agents, given the relevance of heterogeneity for the transmission of monetary policy and the rising importance of inequality in the broader policy discussion.

During the turbulent 1970s and 1980s the Bundesbank established an outstanding reputation in the world of central banking.Germany achieved a high degree of domestic stability and provided safe haven for investors in times of turmoil in the international financial system.Eventually the Bundesbank provided the role model for the European Central Bank.Hence, we examine an episode of lasting importance in European monetary history.The purpose of this paper is to highlight how the Bundesbank monetary policy strategy contributed to this success.We analyze the strategy as it was conceived, communicated and refined by the Bundesbank itself.We propose a theoretical framework (following Söderström, 2005) where monetary targeting is interpreted, first and foremost, as a commitment device.In our setting, a monetary target helps anchoring inflation and inflation expectations.We derive an interest rate rule and show empirically that it approximates the way the Bundesbank conducted monetary policy over the period 1975-1998.We compare the Bundesbank's monetary policy rule with those of the FED and of the Bank of England.We find that the Bundesbank's policy reaction function was characterized by strong persistence of policy rates as well as a strong response to deviations of inflation from target and to the activity growth gap.In contrast, the response to the level of the output gap was not significant.In our empirical analysis we use real-time data, as available to policy-makers at the time.

In this paper we modify and extend the framework of Diebold and Yilmaz (2011) to quantify spillovers between sovereign credit markets and banks in the euro area. Spillovers are estimated recursively from a vector autoregressive model of daily changes in credit default swap (CDS) spreads with exogenous common factors. We account for interdependencies between sovereign and bank CDS spreads and derive generalized impulse response functions. Specifically, we assess the systemic effect of an unexpected shock to the creditworthiness of a sovereign or country-specific bank index on other sovereigns and bank CDSs between October 2009 and July 2012. Channels of shock transmission from or to sovereigns and banks are summarized in a Contagion Index and its four components: (i) among sovereigns, (ii) among banks, (iii) from sovereigns to banks, and (iv) from banks to sovereigns. We also highlight the impact of policy-related events on the Contagion Index.

There is scant empirical support in the literature for the Fisher effect in the long run, though it is often assumed in theoretical models. We argue that a break in the cointegrating relation introduces a spurious unit root that leads to a rejection of cointegration. We applied new break tests and tested for nonlinearity in the cointegrating relation with post World War II data for 15 countries. Our empirical results support cointegration, after accounting for breaks, and a linear Fisher relation in the long run. This is in contrast to several recent studies that found no support for linear cointegration.

Beyer, Doornik and Hendry (2000, 2001) show analytically that three out of four aggregation methods yield problematic results when exchange rate shifts induce relative-price changes between individual countries and found the least problematic method to be the variable weight method of growth rates. This papers shows, however, that the latter is sensitive to the choice of base year when based on real GDP weights whereas not on nominal GDP weights. A comparison of aggregates calculated with different methods shows that the differences are tiny in absolute value but highly persistent. To investigate the impact on the cointegration properties in empirical modelling, the monetary model in Coenen & Vega (2001) based on fixed weights was re-estimated using flexible real and nominal GDP weights. In general, the results remained reasonably robust to the choice of aggregation method.

There is scant empirical support in the literature for the Fisher effect in the long run, though it is often assumed in theoretical models. We argue that a break in the cointegrating relation introduces a spurious unit root that leads to a rejection of cointegration. We applied new break tests and tested for nonlinearity in the cointegrating relation with post-war data for 15 countries. Our empirical results support cointegration, after accounting for breaks, and a linear Fisher relation in the long run. This is in contrast to several recent studies that found no support for linear cointegration.

In this paper we present an empirically stable money demand model for Euro area M3. We show that housing wealth is an important explanatory variable of long-run money demand that captures the trending behaviour of M3 velocity, in particular its shift in the first half of this decade. We show that the current financial crisis has no impact on the stability of our money demand model.

This volume contains a collection of papers, commentaries and speeches that review the strategic and operational decisions taken by the central banks to combat the crisis and that reflect on the lessons for the future. The contributions are grouped around five broad topics: monetary policy strategy, lessons from historical experiences, challenges for macroeconomic and finance theory, the international dimension of the crisis, and operational frameworks for monetary policy.

DSGE models are characterized by the presence of expectations as explanatory variables.To use these models for policy evaluation, the econometrician must estimate the parameters of expectation terms.Standard estimation methods have several drawbacks, including possible lack or weakness of identification of the parameters, misspecification of the model due to omitted variables or parameter instability, and the common use of inefficient estimation methods.Several authors have raised concerns over the implications of using inappropriate instruments to achieve identification.In this paper we analyze the practical relevance of these problems and we propose to combine factor analysis for information extraction from large data sets and GMM to estimate the parameters of systems of forward looking equations.Using these techniques, we evaluate the robustness of recent findings on the importance of forward looking components in the equations of a standard New-Keynesian model.

We study identification in a class of linear rational expectations models. For any given exactly identified model, we provide an algorithm that generates a class of equivalent models that have the same reduced form. We use our algorithm to show that a model proposed by Jess Benhabib and Roger Farmer is observationally equivalent to the standard new-Keynesian model when observed over a single policy regime. However, the two models have different implications for the design of an optimal policy rule.

Testing for Indeterminacy: An Application to U.S. Monetary Policy: Comment by Andreas Beyer and Roger E. A. Farmer. Published in volume 97, issue 1, pages 524-529 of American Economic Review, March 2007

We study the low frequency comovements in unemployment, inflation and the federal funds rate in the U.S. From 1970 through 1979 all three series trended up together; after 1979 they all trended down. The conventional explanation for the buildup of inflation in the 1970's is that the Fed reacted to an increase in the natural rate of unemployment by conducting an overly passive monetary policy. We show that this explanation is difficult to reconcile with the observed comovement of the fed funds rate and inflation. We argue instead that the source of the inflation buildup in the 1970's was a downward drift in the real interest rate that was translated into a simultaneous increase in unemployment and inflation by passive Fed policy. Our explanation relies on the existence in the data of an upward sloping long run Phillips curve.

We study identification in a class of linear rational expectations models. For any given exactly identified model, we provide an algorithm that generates a class of equivalent models that have the same reduced form. We use our algorithm to show that a model proposed by Jess Benhabib and Roger Farmer is observationally equivalent to the standard new-Keynesian model when observed over a single policy regime. However, the two models have different implications for the design of an optimal policy rule