Since the mid-1990's the European Union (EU) aims at pushing global climate policy. The objective is to promote international cooperation by the adoption of substantial EU-wide greenhouse gas emission reduction targets and their least-cost implementation. Our quantitative impact assessment of the EU Climate and Energy Package shows that the myriad of instruments used in the EU to curb greenhouse gas emissions is doomed to generate substantial excess cost. We conclude that EU climate and energy policy should better disentangle its choices of objectives, targets, and policy instruments on rigorous economic grounds in order to improve the coherence and overall cost-effectiveness of policy initiatives.
In view of pressing unemployment problems, policy makers across all parties jump on the prospects of renewable energy promotion as a job creation engine which can boost economic well-being. Our analytical model shows that initial labor market rigidities in theory provide some scope for such a double dividend. However, the practical outcome of renewable energy promotion might be sobering. Our computable general equilibrium analysis of subsidized electricity production from renewable energy sources (RES-E) in Germany suggests that the prospects for employment and welfare gains are quite limited and hinge crucially on the level of the subsidy rate and the financing mechanism. If RES-E subsidies are financed by labor taxes, welfare and employment effects are strictly negative for a broad range of subsidy rates. The use of an electricity tax to fund RES-E subsidies generates minor benefits for small subsidy rates but these benefits quickly turn into significant losses as the subsidy rate exceeds some threshold value.
This paper investigates the competition effects of the entry of Vattenfall into the German electricity market. While the competition authorities supported the entry by approving Vattenfall’s acquisition of three regional utilities, other market participants raised concerns over the emergence of an upcoming oligopoly in the German market for power generation. We contrast the efficiency hypothesis postulating pro-competitive effects of mergers with the market power hypothesis postulating anti-competitive effects. For the analysis of the two opposing hypotheses, we use an event study approach to the stock prices of Vattenfall’s competitors in the German market. While we find no empirical evidence for increased market power in the German electricity market due to Vattenfall’s mergers, there is some indication for efficiency increases. We therefore cannot oppose the view of the competition authorities predicting an overall positive effect for consumers as a result of Vattenfall’s entry into the German electricity market.
ABSTRACTIn this paper we examine the influence of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows on energy intensities of developing countries empirically. We first replicate a simple ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation, as it is found in the literature, that suggests energy-intensity reductions from FDI inflows. However, the OLS estimation turns out to be spurious and only a starting point for further research. In our regressions we use macro-level panel data on 60 developing countries for the period 1975–2004, including other potential determinants of energy intensities, and carry out robustness checks with more specific data. The results do not confirm the hypothesis that aggregate FDI inflows reduce energy intensity of developing countries. Rather, foreign development aid seems to be related to energy efficiency gains.