The literature on action control is rife with differences in terminology. This consensus statement contributes shared definitions for perception-action integration concepts as informed by the framework of event coding. The literature on action control is rife with differences in terminology. This consensus statement contributes shared definitions for perception-action integration concepts as informed by the framework of event coding.
The sense of agency varies as a function of arousal in negative emotional contexts. As yet, it is unknown whether the same is true for positive affect, and how inter-individual characteristics might predict these effects. Temporal binding, an implicit measure of the sense of agency, was measured in 59 participants before and after watching either an emotionally neutral film clip or a positive film clip with high or low arousal. Analyses included participants’ individual differences in subjective affective ratings, physiological arousal (pupillometry, skin conductance, heart rate), striatal dopamine levels via eye blink rates, and psychopathy. Linear mixed models showed that sexual arousal decreased temporal binding whereas calm pleasure had no facilitation effect on binding. Striatal dopamine levels were positively linked whereas subjective and physiological arousal may be negatively associated with binding towards actions. Psychopathic traits reduced the effect of high arousal on binding towards actions. These results provide evidence that individual differences influence the extent to which the temporal binding is affected by high arousing states with positive valence.
The sense of agency varies as a function of arousal and valence in negative emotional contexts. As yet, it is unknown whether the same is true for positive affect, and how inter-individual characteristics might predict these effects. Temporal binding, an implicit measure of the sense of agency, was measured in 59 participants before and after watching either an emotionally neutral film clip or a positive film clip with high or low arousal. Analyses included participants’ subjective affective ratings, physiological arousal (pupillometry, skin conductance, heart rate), and individual differences (arousal reactivity via psychopathy, eye blink rates). Linear mixed models showed that low arousal reactivity reduced the effect of high arousal on binding towards actions. Low arousal reactivity reversed the effects of high arousal on binding towards outcomes. These results provide evidence that individual differences influence the extent to which the sense of agency is affected by positive emotional states.
Emotional states have been indicated to affect intentional binding, resulting in an increase or decrease as a function of valence and arousal. Sexual arousal is a complex emotional state proven to impair attentional and perceptual processes, and is therefore highly relevant to feeling in control over one's actions. We suggest that sexual arousal affects intentional binding in the same way as highly negative arousing states such as fear and anger. Ninety participants performed the intentional binding task before and after watching an either sexually arousing or emotionally neutral film clip. Analyses were conducted for the subcomponents action and outcome binding separately including the change in arousal before and after the emotion induction as a continuous measure. Results showed an interactive effect for time of measurement (before and after emotion induction) and arousal change on action binding: a decrease in action binding was noted in participants who reported to be more aroused and an increase in action binding was observed for participants who reported to be less aroused. Results emphasize that alterations in action binding are likely to reflect the deficits in the dopaminergic system involved in action execution. An impaired feeling of control in aroused states may play a crucial role for the underlying psychological mechanisms of impulsive violent behavior.
This study investigated sex differences in performance and neuronal activity in a mental rotation task with abstract and embodied figures. Fifty-eight participants (26 females and 32 males) completed a chronometric mental rotation task with cube figures, human figures, and body postures. The results are straightforward: depending on angular disparity, participants had a faster reaction time and a higher accuracy rate for embodied stimuli compared to cube figures. The electroencephalogram (EEG) activity pattern showed a higher negative amplitude modulation in the frontal electrodes for females compared to males during the late (400–600 ms) time interval. From 200 to 400 ms after stimulus onset, there was a different activation pattern in the parietal and central electrodes, whereas frontal electrodes did not show differences between embodied and abstract stimuli. From 400 to 600 ms after stimulus onset, there was a different pattern in the central and frontal electrodes but not in the parietal areas for embodied figures in compared to cube figures. Concluding, even though there were no sex differences in the behavioral data, the EEG data did show alterations at the late time interval. Thus, the disparate results regarding sex differences that depend on the type of analysis (behavioral versus neurophysiological) should be more thoroughly investigated. Furthermore, the difference in processing embodied stimuli in an object-based mental rotation task could be confirmed in EEG activity pattern for the first time.
Sense of agency refers to the feeling of control over one’s own actions. The strength of this sense varies inter-individually. This means that people differ in their perception concerning the intensity of their intentions and actions. The current study aims to determine the factors influencing this sense of agency on a personality level. Furthermore, it gives insight into the correlative relation between the strength of the sense of agency and substance use. The study involved 210 participants who were tested for the experiment (intentional binding paradigm for sense of agency, hand paradigm for intentionality bias, questionnaires FAD-Plus, NI-20, substance use). Significant determinants in personality were narcissism (vulnerable subtype) and substance use (consumption in general beyond cannabis, and particularly for the substances cannabis, ecstasy, and cocaine). Both personality types were associated with a weaker sense of agency compared to controls. For both results, alterations in the dopaminergic system need to be discussed. The present results confirm prior hypotheses that dopamine seems to play a crucial role in perception of agency. Possibly a higher accessibility of dopamine increases sense of agency (hyper-binding), whereas a lower accessibility of dopamine decreases sense of agency (hypo-binding). A second aim of the study was to see whether there is a connection between sense of agency and intentionality bias. The perception of intention in others differs widely; some people tend to see arbitrary or accidental actions as unintentional, and others quickly label actions as ‘intentional’ although the information is not distinct for a categorization. This cognitive error is called intentionality bias. Results could not confirm a relationship between the two constructs—one’s own intention and judging intention in others. This may be due to a lack of connection between the two constructs or to methodological aspects. Further directions and limitations are discussed.
We shape our surroundings; form the rooms we live in, so that we feel comfortable in them. This shows parts of our personality - it can be inferred from our environment. In this study, we created stereotypical desks embodying different personality styles and let 190 students choose which desk fits - in their subjective perspective - the most to their personality. To determine their personality style, the personality style and disorder inventory (PSSI) was used. Correspondence analysis (CA) was conducted to investigate the relationship between personality styles and choice of desks. Results did not show convergence of personality styles and desks. Contrary to the popular scientific idea, personality and creation of surroundings were not related; regarding our study, the relation is uninterpretable suggesting an individual's desk choice is not statistically dependent on one's individual's highest PSSI subscale. The study can be regarded as a pilot project for desk designs as classification tool for personality.