Competition in health care markets should lead to lower prices and less dispersion, with consumer choice as the driving mechanism. Several studies document price variation, suggesting room for improvement; however, they relied on selected data from insurers who provide access to data, limiting generalizability. We document the nature of price variation in the private US market across geography, payer, and provider by leveraging a new dataset, implementing a descriptive analysis using the most comprehensive data available: Transparency-in-Coverage. We measured health care prices in 3 ways: percentile distribution prices for common services, state-level and insurer-level facility fee price indices, and regression-adjusted mean inpatient and outpatient prices. Variation is large: the mean facility fee for a foot X-ray, for example, is $86 at Anthem and $190 at UnitedHealth. Pricing does not appear to be uniform; there is just 22% correlation between an insurer's inpatient price and outpatient facility price. And there is little difference in ordering of high-price states depending on alternative measures, such as relative to Medicare. Results suggest greater consideration of policies to address high and variable prices for US health care.

This cross-sectional study describes the health care prices publicly posted by Humana and the price variations by geography, service, and other factors.

Surprise billing laws that allow dispute arbitration relying on provider charges may incentivize out-of-network providers to increase their charges to increase upcoming or future out-of-network payments. Although the federal No Surprises Act forbids arbitrators from considering charges during payment disputes over surprise bills covered by the act, states with existing laws can continue to use the specified state laws, which may allow the consideration of charges. This analysis examined provider charges in two such states, using claims data to compare trends in billed charges for out-of-network care during surprise bill scenarios involving nonemergency inpatient hospitalizations. The analysis considered New York, where state law uses arbitration tied to charges; California, where state law uses a payment standard rather than charges; and a comparison group of states without a law regarding surprise billing. We estimated that provider out-of-network charges for the nonemergency out-of-network bills we studied increased by $1,157 (24 percent) in New York after the passage of New York's surprise billing law and decreased by $752 (25 percent) in California compared to states without surprise billing laws. Assistant surgeons and surgical assistants had a large increase in charges in New York from before to after the law's passage, which may have driven the overall increase in charges.

Consumers, public officials, and even managers of health care and insurance are unhappy about care quality, access, and costs. This book shows that is because efforts to do something about these problems often rely on hope or conjecture, not rigorous evidence of effectiveness. In this book, experts in the field separate the speculative from the proven with regard to how care is rendered, how patients can be in control, how providers should be paid, and how disparities can be reduced – and they also identify the issues for which evidence is currently missing. It provides an antidote to frustration and a clear-eyed guide for forward progress, helping health care and insurance innovators make better decisions on deciding whether to go ahead now based on current evidence, to seek and wait for additional evidence, or to move on to different ideas. It will be useful to practitioners in hospital systems, medical groups, and insurance organizations and can also be used in executive and MBA teaching.

A trite, if apt, metaphor for the American health care and insurance system is a battleship that has been sailing in a particular direction for many years, with many of us as free riders in a direction we do not prefer. That direction is characterized by spending growth that outpaces virtually any other sectoral trend in the economy, and by quality and outcome measures that, at best, improve little and, at worst, deteriorate. The battleship takes up 18 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), furnishes employment to nearly 15 percent of the workforce, and consumes a large share of federal and state governmental budgets (Figure 2.1). Even if we could figure out how to cut the power, this dreadnought would continue to coast in the same direction for the foreseeable future. The obvious conclusion is that it has been and will continue to be hard to turn the vessel to go in a different direction. As of this writing, the novel coronavirus pandemic has affected the use of care as well, putting many “normal” services on hold to accommodate sick patients. And while it is too early to conclusively confirm the effect of the pandemic on spending trends, there is likely to be an effect (although even the direction is not known). Once the pandemic stabilizes, consumption of health care services will probably not return exactly to past behaviors, but there will be a strong tendency to slide back. What might help to avoid doing so, and most importantly, what evidence can be currently offered or generated to support efforts to change course?

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Surprise medical bills occur when a patient unexpectedly or involuntarily receives care from an out-of-network provider and is billed for the amount not covered by insurance. Past studies were unable to observe whether bills for such care were sent to patients and, if so, how much patients paid directly to out-of-network providers. We used data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey to measure how much privately insured emergency patients paid when they likely received a surprise bill and how much physicians received in these situations. Physicians collected 65 percent of the charged amount for likely surprise bills compared with 52 percent for other cases. Patients who likely received a surprise out-of-network bill for emergency care paid physicians more than ten times as much as other emergency patients paid, on average.

In 2018 New Jersey implemented a final-offer arbitration system to resolve payment disputes between insurers and out-of-network providers over surprise medical bills. Similar proposals are being considered by Congress and other states. In this article we examine how arbitration decisions compare with other relevant provider payment amounts by linking administrative data from New Jersey arbitration cases to Medicare and commercial insurance claims data. We find that decisions track closely with one of the metrics that arbitrators are shown—the eightieth percentile of provider charges—with the median decision being 5.7 times prevailing in-network rates for the same services. It is not a foregone conclusion that arbitrators will select winning offers based on proximity to this target, although our findings suggest that it is a strong anchor. The amount that providers can expect to receive through the arbitration process also affects their bargaining leverage with insurers, which could affect in-network negotiated rates more broadly. Therefore, basing arbitration decisions or a payment standard on unilaterally set provider-billed charges appears likely to increase health care costs relative to other surprise billing solutions and perversely incentivizes providers to inflate their charges over time.

A surprise medical bill is a bill from an out-of-network provider that was not expected by the patient or that came from an out-of-network provider not chosen by the patient. We investigated consumers' hospital choices after receipt of surprise out-of-network medical bills in an elective situation, using a large national sample of medical claims for obstetric patients with two deliveries covered by employer-sponsored health insurance in 2007-14. We found that 11 percent of mothers experienced a surprise out-of-network bill with their first delivery, and this was associated with an increase of 13 percent in the odds of switching hospitals for the second delivery, compared to mothers who did not experience a surprise bill. Mothers who switched hospitals after a surprise out-of-network bill reduced their relative risk of receiving a second surprise medical bill by 56 percent, compared to mothers who did not switch after receiving their first surprise bill. These results highlight the harmful effects of surprise out-of-network bills, as patients are more likely to switch from their preferred hospital after receiving a surprise bill. Patients would benefit significantly from laws protecting them from the damaging financial consequences of surprise out-of-network bills, including those incurred in elective situations.

A surprise medical bill is a bill from an out-of-network provider that was not expected by the patient or that came from an out-of-network provider not chosen by the patient. In 2014, 20 percent of hospital inpatient admissions that originated in the emergency department (ED), 14 percent of outpatient visits to the ED, and 9 percent of elective inpatient admissions likely led to a surprise medical bill.