In Germany, statutory land valuation has developed over the course of almost 60 years into a powerful tool of spatial planning and land policy. The key to statutory land valuation is the concept of Verkehrswert (market value). The Verkehrswert equals the likely selling price of a cadastral parcel of land in the usual course of business at the time of valuation, and considers the legal situation, the actual disposition of the parcel, any other relevant conditions, and the location of the land, but does not take into account unusual or personal circumstances. The article explains the elements of Verkehrswert (market value) which account for the plural values of land such as exchange value, use value, territorial value, and existence value. The German Verkehrswert is not merely an instrument of plan implementation (e.g., land readjustment or compensation for expropriation), but also an analytical tool that helps planners and land policymakers understand when their interventions in land markets are necessary and how they can be helpful.

Innovative land policy does not yield to the pressure of short-term capital exploitation. Rather, innovative land policy establishes a fair balance between the interests of landowners and the public interest. As a keystone of land policy, property – particularly if open to innovation – plays a vital role in achieving this balance. This commentary explains four normative principles that help design innovative property. Since the four principles derive from long-standing ideas about property in land, the commentary uses a distinctly conservative approach. This approach, however, is quite innovative in the face of the reductionist view of property as a right that only serves the purposes of its owners. According to the first principle, innovative land policy must pay attention to the nexus between private and common property. Under the second principle, property in land must account for the government’s positive duty to provide for adequate land uses for all. The third principle distinguishes between property rights of natural and legal persons: personal property guarantees individual liberty, but corporate property is a social function, not a right at all. The fourth principle reminds of the inseparable bond between property in land and land ethics.

Spatial justice or the concept of the just city mostly focus on human animals. Studies in land ethics, environmental ethics, or animal ethics already for some time have been looking at non-human animals and the rest of Nature as subjects in their own rights. In opposition to this view, most concepts of spatial justice rely on the theory of justice by John Rawls, who explicitly denied “animals and the rest of nature” membership in the moral community whose members owe each other justice. Drawing from Aldo Leopold’s land ethic, spatial justice or the just city should offer membership to non-human animals and the rest of Nature. The limits and consequences of assuming spatial justice for the “land community” are examined with a view to human dignity and private property. Spatial justice that conforms with land ethics demands drastic steps similar to the abolition of slavery.

Spatial planning faces the brutal plurality of truths, exacerbated by constant crises and long-term transformation. When ideologically weaponized narratives replace ‘the truth’, planners no longer can validate their inputs into the planning process by referring to an undisputed base of knowledge. We present two approaches to planning theories that help understand why and how planners can address plural rationalities. One approach asserts that polyrationality is inevitable and planners need to listen to other voices, other rationalities. The other approach admonishes planners to choose wisely which worldview, rationality or bias they wish to follow and pursue. Finally, we invite the academic planning community to provide environments that allow for more theory-led debates. The AESOP Thematic Group Planning Theories will continue to provide one such forum.

Jacobs et al talks about pandemics, planning and property among others. The current pandemic brings concepts of property to the foreground. Stay-at-home orders, social distancing, commercial closures, draconian border control, the interruption of air travel (to use just a few examples) are about how space is to be used, about new mandates for (most commonly restrictions to commons, public and private property and often very intense social controversy over who gets to set the rules for property use. How property is understood and treated in the planning process will now be one of our key issues going forward. In April 2020 we started a conversation on how the planning community will struggle with the spreading of the new coronavirus and its mid- and long-term consequences. Above all. we were wondering;about the ways the pandemic would impact spatial planning, particularly with regard to its relationship with common and private property.

Social distancing (also called physical distancing) is a highly recommended intervention against the community spreading of the new coronavirus. Although social distancing is a prudent intervention, its implications and impacts are not. The new distancing rules affect personal space and create a new sense of what is considered clean or dirty. Mary Douglas, founder of Cultural Theory, has asserted that "dirt" is a social construction that combines a social order with the contravention to this order ("Dirt is matter out of place"). As a social construction, however, "dirt" is subject to cultural bias. To some, disobedience to distancing rules is "dirty" (hierarchist bias); to others, the proximity of strangers or outsiders (egalitarian bias); to a third group, the duty to wear masks and other restrictions to personal liberty (individualist bias). Social biases shape the spatial consequences of COVID-19 and social distancing. Using cultural bias to examine reactions to social distancing allows identifying possible components of a clumsy, yet viable response to the COVID-19 crisis.

For about 250 years, private property has been ideologized as an instrument of the owners’ power to exclude. The most popular expression of the ideology of exclusion (although not his exclusive invention) is attributed to Sir William Blackstone. Speculative vacancies, a recent development in the real estate industry criticized by the UN Special Rapporteur on housing, emphasize the anti-social ideology of Blackstonian property. The article suggests that an ideology proposed by the French jurist Léon Duguit should be considered as an alternative. Based on the teachings of Comte and Durkheim, Duguit rejected the idea of property as a right and treated property as a social function. His views offer spatial planners new opportunities to define the content and boundaries of private property in land.

Although human dignity has caught the attention of scholars in many different fields, planners remain unresponsive. Three reasons may be given for planners’ neglect of human dignity: (1) so far, nobody has inspired planners to cherish human dignity as a planning value or goal; (2) planners respect and protect human dignity, but do not use the term; (3) planners distrust values that are not too complex for laypersons. Two cases illustrate the possible consequences of ‘planning for dignity’ – the case of the knitting ladies of Blikkiesdorp (Cape Town), and the poor door controversy of 2014. The most important conclusions are that planners, in order to align their plans with human dignity (or ubuntu), must co-produce their selves within local communities affected by their plans. Moreover, planners must recognize the tension that exists between social justice and human dignity: A plan that is socially just can still be humiliating.

Although human dignity has caught the attention of scholars in many different fields, planners remain unresponsive. Three reasons may be given for planners’ neglect of human dignity: (1) so far, nobody has inspired planners to cherish human dignity as a planning value or goal; (2) planners respect and protect human dignity, but do not use the term; (3) planners distrust values that are not too complex for laypersons. Two cases illustrate the possible consequences of ‘planning for dignity’ – the case of the knitting ladies of Blikkiesdorp (Cape Town), and the poor door controversy of 2014. The most important conclusions are that planners, in order to align their plans with human dignity (or ubuntu), must co-produce their selves within local communities affected by their plans. Moreover, planners must recognize the tension that exists between social justice and human dignity: A plan that is socially just can still be humiliating.

The Interface on planning in a hyper-polarized world (Trapenberg Frick & Myers, 2018) assembles a collection of views on citizens’ activism in today’s age of widespread discontent, anxiety, and hat...

According to the credibility thesis (Ho, 2014 and 2016), property in land is determined by its functions. The form of property would follow its functions. But what type of form follows the functions of property? The article considers four meanings of the concept of 'form of property:' property in the Blackstonian sense as a mere shell for ownership (and its counterpart, property as social function); the sources of property law (fontes iuris) in international and domestic law; property as a highly formalized right in a legal system well-ordered by land cadastres and land registers (and its counterpart, informal land rights); and property as a standardized 'bundle of rights' (and its counterpart, polyrational or bespoke property). Since land rights, fulfilling their desired function, can be credible without full formalization or standardization, land policy must not consider dichotomies (such as 'formal' versus 'informal'), but degrees of (in)formality or credibility.

Encounters in planning thought is a collection of oral history, conveyed by eminent planning scholars, who have shaped conversations on spatial planning for the past 50 years. The 16 autobiographic...

The Supreme Court of India, in interpreting the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution of India (1949), used a broad definition which linked life, human dignity, and minimal property: 'We think that the right to life includes the right to live with human dignity and all that goes along with it, namely, the bare necessaries of life such as adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter ...' (Justice Bhagawati in Francis Coralie v. Union Territory of Delhi, AIR 1981 SC 746). The 2007 Global Report on Human Settlements quotes this and other cases decided by the Supreme Court of India to assert that '[h] ousing rights in India are an extraordinary example of practice departing sharply from law' (UN Habitat 2007: 158). The assertion is even more surprising because India belongs to a group of countries that reject the protection of property as a constitutional right. Land rights are a contentious issue everywhere, but in India, in 1955, the right to property as one of the fundamental rights (Article 36 of the Constitution of India) was repealed in order to facilitate nation-wide land reforms (Shea 1956: 1). The drastic measure, UN Habitat seems to think, has not been sufficient. Several chapters in this book deal with the evolution of property rights (Chap. 2), land acquisition (Chaps. 6 and 7), or housing in India (Chaps. 8 and 9). Chapter 1 introduces these chapters, yet not from an Indian perspective, but from the perspective of UN-sponsored human rights law and of political philosophy.