Objectives Using external feedback to adjust behavior relies on dopaminergic pathways that are sensitive to age-related change. Prior research using electrophysiological methods has yielded mixed findings regarding age differences in feedback processing. The current study was designed to test predictions of two influential theories-the dopamine hypothesis of aging and socioemotional selectivity theory-regarding the effects of age and feedback properties (valence and social content) on behavioral and electrophysiological markers of feedback processing.Methods Healthy community-dwelling adults (47 younger, 48 older) completed a time-estimation task with social and nonsocial feedback stimuli while EEG data were acquired. Key outcome measures included behavior as well as feedback-sensitive event-related potentials (ERPs): P2, feedback-related negativity (FRN), and P300.Results In both age groups, negative feedback elicited greater behavioral adjustments than positive feedback, and social feedback elicited higher overall performance than nonsocial feedback. Furthermore, all ERP components were sensitive to feedback valence and social content. Whereas both factors were more influential for older versus younger adults during early processing, valence was more influential for younger versus older adults during later processing.Discussion Using a well-powered design, this study shows that age differences in electrophysiological correlates of feedback processing exist even when younger and older adults show similar behavioral responses to feedback. Neither the dopamine theory of aging nor the socioemotional selectivity theory fully accounts for these complex findings, highlighting the need for theoretical refinement and demonstrating the utility of EEG methods in the cognitive neuroscience of aging.

The number of available response options is a central design feature in any experimental psychology paradigm, with binary response paradigms restricting the range of behavioural responses into staying or shifting. Participants (n = 72) played nine blocks of a novel zero-sum game, Dice Dual, while we parametrically manipulated the different number of response options (2, 4, 6) against an unexploitable computerized opponent. When the number of responses exceeded two, this allowed us to identify two types of shift behaviours: between-category shifts relevant to mental model exploitation and within-category shifts reflective of random exploration. Between-category shifts were sensitive to outcome valence, exhibiting an increased shift rate when more response options were available after win, while shift rates were independent of response availability after loss. In contrast, within-category shifts were only sensitive to response availability, with increased shift rates when more response options were available, irrespective of outcome valence. Identifying multiple, functionally different classes of shift behaviour using nonbinary response paradigms allows us to more easily separate attempts at exploitation and exploration. The data also offer more general models of performance regarding suboptimal decision making, where negative outcomes constrict the range of factors considered in future mental model updates.

Differences in response time following previous losses relative to previous wins are robust observations in behavioural science, often attributed to an increased (or decreased) degree of cognitive control exerted after negative feedback, hence, post-loss slowing ( or post-loss speeding). This presumes that the locus of this effect resides in the specific modulation of decision time following negative outcomes. Across two experiments, I demonstrate how the use of absolute rather than relative processing speeds, and the sensitivity of processing speeds in response to specific experimental manipulations (Experiment 1: win rate, Experiment 2: feedback), provide clarity as to the relative weighting of post-win and post-loss states in determining these behavioural effects. Both experiments show that the speeding or slowing of decision-time is largely due to the flexibility generated by post-win cognitive states. Given that post-loss speeding may actually represent post-win slowing , conclusions regarding the modulation of decision-making time as a function of previous outcomes need to be more carefully considered.

We have to make lots of decisions every day, and sometimes we only have a short time or very little energy to put into making certain decisions. What determines whether we make good or bad decisions? Researchers have found there are different types of decision-makers, and they differ in how satisfied they are with their decisions. In our lab, we use simple games such as Rock, Paper, Scissors to study how good and bad decisions are made. We have found that people tend to make worse decisions after a negative outcome, such as losing the previous game. We have also found that people tend to spend less time thinking about their next decision after losing. Based on these results, we suggest taking your time when making a decision after a negative outcome in order to prevent making a hasty decision.

Abstract Reward-based motivation modulates attention and cognitive control across the life span, but little is known about age differences in the temporal dynamics of motivated attention. The current study examined the effects of financial incentives on visual attention using ERPs. Participants (26 younger, aged 18–33 years; 24 older, aged 65–95 years) completed an incentivized flanker task in which trial-level incentive cues signaled the availability of performance-contingent reward, and subsequent alerting cues signaled the onset of the flanker target. ERP components of interest included cue-related components (incentive-cue P2 and contingent negative variation, and alerting-cue N1) as well as target-related components (target N1 and P3). Transient effects of incentives were assessed by comparing ERP amplitudes across incentive and non-incentive trials from mixed-incentive blocks. Sustained effects of incentives were assessed by comparing ERP amplitudes across non-incentive trials from mixed-incentive blocks and non-incentive trials from pure non-incentive blocks. Younger adults showed transient effects of incentives on all components, whereas older adults showed these effects for incentive-cue P2 and alerting-cue N1 only. Both age groups showed sustained effects of incentives on cue-locked ERPs, but only younger adults showed sustained effects on target-locked ERPs. RT patterns mirrored the ERP findings, in that younger adults showed greater incentive-based modulation than older adults, but at a greater cost to accuracy. Overall, these findings reveal widespread age differences in the dynamics of incentive-motivated attention and cognitive control, particularly at longer timescales.

We argue that the feedback traditionally used to indicate negative outcomes causes future detrimental performance because of the default goal of win maximization. In gaming paradigms where participants intentionally performed as well (win maximization) and as poorly (loss maximization) as possible, we showed a double dissociation where actions following wins were more consistent during win maximization, but actions following losses were more consistent during loss maximization. This broader distinction between goal-congruent and goal-incongruent feedback suggests that individuals are able to flexibly redefine their definition of ‘success’, and provide a reconsideration of the way we think about ‘losing’.

A recent global health crisis demanded the wholesale configuration of both teaching and research from in-person to on-line formats. This allowed for an environmental sweep regarding the replicability of some classic and contemporary findings in Cognitive Psychology in the context of an undergraduate course, in which eight portable experimental packages were written for mobile phone. Running across three semesters (average n per study = 585), data consistently produced evidence either for (Faces, Search, Object, RPS, Rotate) or against (Doodle, Trivia) the original findings, with the exception of one study (House) that produced ambiguous findings. The scheme not only allows students exposure to and discussion of the replication crisis within empirical science, but also provides a framework for the future implementation of experiential learning during remote and asynchronous teaching. With continued evaluation made possible via Open Science Framework, a central question is whether on-line data collection violates an essential auxiliary assumption for the replication of in-person data.

Reward-based motivation is associated with transient and sustained dopaminergic activity and with modulatory effects on attention and cognitive control. Age-related changes in the dopamine system are well documented, but little is known about age differences in the temporal dynamics of motivational influences on cognitive functions. The current study examined the effects of financial incentives on visual attention using event-related potentials (ERPs). Participants (26 younger, aged 18-33; 24 older, aged 65-95) completed an incentivized flanker task in which trial-level incentive cues signaled the availability of performance-contingent reward, and subsequent alerting cues signaled the onset of the flanker target. ERP components of interest included incentive-cue P2 and CNV, alerting-cue N1, target N1, and target P3. Transient effects of incentives were assessed by comparing ERP amplitudes across incentive and non-incentive trials from mixed-incentive blocks. Younger adults showed transient effects of incentives on all components, whereas older adults showed effects for incentive-cue P2 and alerting-cue N1 only. Sustained effects of incentives were assessed by comparing ERP amplitudes across non-incentive trials from mixed-incentive blocks and non-incentive trials from pure non-incentive blocks. Both age groups showed sustained effects of incentives on cue-locked ERPs, but only younger adults showed sustained effects on target-locked ERPs. Reaction-time patterns mirrored the ERP findings, in that younger adults showed greater incentive-based modulation than older adults. Overall, these findings suggest that both transient and sustained effects of incentives on visual attention are more fleeting for older than younger adults, consistent with widespread alterations in dopaminergic neuromodulation in aging.

In two experiments, we used the simple zero-sum game Rock, Paper and Scissors to study the common reinforcement-based rules of repeating choices after winning (win-stay) and shifting from previous choice options after losing (lose-shift). Participants played the game against both computer opponents who could not be exploited and computer opponents who could be exploited by making choices that would at times conflict with reinforcement. Against unexploitable opponents, participants achieved an approximation of random behavior, contrary to previous research commonly finding reinforcement biases. Against exploitable opponents, the participants learned to exploit the opponent regardless of whether optimal choices conflicted with reinforcement or not. The data suggest that learning a rule that allows one to exploit was largely determined by the outcome of the previous trial.

Previous data suggest zero-value, neutral outcomes (draw) are subjectively assigned negative rather than positive valence. The combined observations of faster rather than slower reaction times, subsequent actions defined by shift rather than stay behaviour, reduced flexibility, and, larger rather than smaller deviations from optimal performance following draws all align with the consequences of explicitly negative outcomes such as losses. We further tested the relationships between neutral, positive and negative outcomes by manipulating value salience and observing their behavioural profiles. Despite speeded reaction times and a non-significant bias towards shift behaviour similar to losses when draws were assigned the value of 0 (Experiment 1), the degree of shift behaviour approached an approximation of optimal performance when the draw value was explicitly positive (+1). This was in contrast to when the draw value was explicitly negative (-1), which led to a significant increase in the degree of shift behaviour (Experiment 2). Similar modifications were absent when the same value manipulations were applied to win or lose trials (Experiment 3). Rather than viewing draws as neutral and valence-free outcomes, the processing cascade generated by draws produces a complex behavioural profile containing elements found in response to both explicitly positive and explicitly negative results.

A presumption in previous work has been that sub-optimality in competitive performance following loss is the result of a reduction in decision-making time (i.e., post-error speeding). The main goal of this paper is to test the relationship between decision-making speed and quality, with the hypothesis that slowing down decision-making should increase the likelihood of successful performance in cases where a model of opponent domination can be implemented. Across Experiments 1-3, the speed and quality of competitive decision-making was examined in a zero-sum game as a function of the nature of the opponent (unexploitable, exploiting, exploitable). Performance was also examined against the nature of a credit (or token) system used as a within-experimental manipulation (no credit, fixed credit, variable credit). To compliment reaction time variation as a function of outcome, both the fixed credit and variable credit conditions were designed to slow down decision-making, relative to a no credit condition where the game could be played in quick succession and without interruption. The data confirmed that (a) self-imposed reductions in processing time following losses (post-error speeding) were causal factors in determining poorer-quality behaviour, (b) the expression of lose-shift was less flexible than the expression of win-stay, and, (c) the use of a variable credit system may enhance the perceived control participants have against exploitable opponents. Future work should seek to disentangle temporal delay and response interruption as determinants of decision-making quality against numerous styles of opponency.

We explored the possibility that in order for longer-form expressions of reinforcement learning (win-calmness, loss-restlessness) to manifest across tasks, they must first develop because of micro-transactions within tasks. We found no evidence of win-calmness or loss-restlessness when wins could not be maximised (unexploitable opponents), nor when the threat of win minimisation was presented (exploiting opponents), but evidence of win-calmness (but not loss-restlessness) when wins could be maximised (exploitable opponents).

Predictability is a hallmark of poor-quality decision-making during competition. One source of predictability is the strong association between current outcome and future action, as dictated by the reinforcement learning principles of win–stay and lose–shift. We tested the idea that predictability could be reduced during competition by weakening the associations between outcome and action. To do this, participants completed a competitive zero-sum game in which the opponent from the current trial was either replayed (opponent repeat) thereby strengthening the association, or, replaced (opponent change) by a different competitor thereby weakening the association. We observed that win–stay behavior was reduced during opponent change trials but lose–shiftbehavior remained reliably predictable. Consistent with the group data, the number of individuals who exhibited predictable behavior following wins decreased for opponent change relative to opponent repeat trials. Our data show that future actions are more under internal control following positive relative to negative outcomes, and that externally breaking the bonds between outcome and action via opponent association also allows us to become less prone to exploitation.

Game spaces in which an organism must repeatedly compete with an opponent for mutually exclusive outcomes are critical methodologies for understanding decision-making under pressure. In the non-transitive game rock, paper, scissors (RPS), the only technique that guarantees the lack of exploitation is to perform randomly in accordance with mixed-strategy. However, such behavior is thought to be outside bounded rationality and so decision-making can become deterministic, predictable, and ultimately exploitable. This review identifies similarities across economics, neuroscience, nonlinear dynamics, human, and animal cognition literatures, and provides a taxonomy of RPS strategy. RPS strategies are discussed in terms of (a) whether the relevant computations require sensitivity to item frequency, the cyclic relationships between responses, or the outcome of the previous trial, and (b) whether the strategy is framed around the self or other. The negative implication of this taxonomy is that despite the differences in cognitive economy and recursive thought, many of the identified strategies are behaviorally isomorphic. This makes it difficult to infer strategy from behavior. The positive implication is that this isomorphism can be used as a novel design feature in furthering our understanding of the attribution, agency, and acquisition of strategy in RPS and other game spaces.

To examine the behavioural and neural interactions between objective and subjective performance during competitive decision-making, participants completed a Matching Pennies game where win-rates were fixed within three conditions ( win > lose, win = lose, win < lose ) and outcomes were predicted at each trial. Using random behaviour as the hallmark of optimal performance, we observed item ( heads ), contingency ( win-stay, lose-shift ) and combinatorial (HH, HT, TH, TT) biases across all conditions. Higher-quality behaviour represented by a reduction in combinatorial bias was observed during high win-rate exposure. In contrast, over-optimism biases were observed only in conditions where win rates were equal to, or less than, loss rates. At a group level, a neural measure of outcome evaluation (feedback-related negativity; FRN) indexed the binary distinction between positive and negative outcome. At an individual level, increased belief in successful performance accentuated FRN amplitude differences between wins and losses. Taken together, the data suggest that objective experiences of, or, subjective beliefs in, the predominance of positive outcomes are mutual attempts to self-regulate performance during competition. In this way, increased exposure to positive outcomes (real or imagined) help to weight the output of the more diligent and analytic System 2, relative to the impulsive and intuitive System 1.

To understand the boundaries we set for ourselves in terms of environmental responsibility during competition, we examined a neural index of outcome valence (feedback-related negativity; FRN) in relation to earlier indices of visual attention (N1), later indices of motivational significance (P3), and, eventual behaviour. In Experiment 1 ( n =36), participants either were ( play ) or were not ( observe ) responsible for action selection. In Experiment 2 ( n =36), opponents additionally either could ( exploitable ) or could not ( unexploitable ) be beaten. Various failures in reinforcement learning expression were revealed including large-scale approximations of random behaviour. Against unexploitable opponents, N1 determined the extent to which negative and positive outcomes were perceived as distinct categories by FRN. Against exploitable opponents, FRN determined the extent to which P3 generated neural gain for future events. Differential activation of the N1 – FRN – P3 processing chain provides a framework for understanding the behavioural dynamism observed during competitive decision making.

A recent paper by Fielding et al. (J Gamb Stud, 2017) argued that the brain's reward response could occur without the presentation of actual reward. We suggest that since (a) the event-related potentials reported in this paper are atypical of the previous literature, and, (b) a simpler account of the data in terms of sensitivity to outcome frequency cannot be ruled out, the extent to which the brain's reward response can occur without the presentation of actual reward should remain an open question.

Preparing for upcoming events, separating task-relevant from task-irrelevant information and efficiently responding to stimuli all require cognitive control. The adaptive recruitment of cognitive control depends on activity in the dopaminergic reward system as well as the frontoparietal control network. In healthy aging, dopaminergic neuromodulation is reduced, resulting in altered incentive-based recruitment of control mechanisms. In the present study, younger adults (18–28 years) and healthy older adults (66–89 years) completed an incentivized flanker task that included gain, loss, and neutral trials. Event-related potentials (ERPs) were recorded at the time of incentive cue and target presentation. We examined the contingent negative variation (CNV), implicated in stimulus anticipation and response preparation, as well as the P3, which is involved in the evaluation of visual stimuli. Both younger and older adults showed transient incentive-based modulation of CNV. Critically, cue-locked and target-locked P3s were influenced by transient and sustained effects of incentives in younger adults, while such modulation was limited to a sustained effect of gain incentives on cue-P3 in older adults. Overall, these findings are in line with an age-related reduction in the flexible recruitment of preparatory and target-related cognitive control processes in the presence of motivational incentives.