Vertical chain collaboration is a strategy for customers' value creation. However, Dutch fishermen are hardly participating in integrated value chains. While supply chain literature describes factors that contribute to successful chain partnerships, scarce research has been done on the dynamics of the sociocultural context for chain collaboration.In 10 semi-structured interviews, representatives of supply chain parties were asked for their perceptions on chain collaboration, trust, and the role of the local community. The interviews were directed at obtaining so-called 'tacit' knowledge, the non-spoken codified truths of social networks. Without generalizing, this research provides benchmarks to monitor how the different domains, laid out in this study, impact chain collaboration: community values, network participation and company competences. An overview is given of socio-economic factors blocking and enhancing chain collaboration at company and community level. Factors such as the strong bonding of family with business in tightly knit networks, a high level of social control, entrepreneurial autonomy, and loyalty as community norm hamper collaboration within the supply chain.Respondents' discourse demonstrates that cultural codes and identity form the very core of the entrepreneur, driving rather than 'embedding' economic behavior. Kinship, religion and peer pressure determine 'windows on the world' when engaging in chain collaboration. Consequently, any analysis of economics that does not integrate sociological and psychological methodology is flawed from the outset. (C) 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

The Netherlands was one of the first nations to introduce ITQs in their fisheries to manage national yearly Total Allowable Catches (TACs). These ITQs have gradually developed from an individual quota system in 1976 to an ITQ system in the 1980s. In 1993 the system was reformed into a co-management system. In this paper it is argued that many of the usual negative socio-economic consequences of ITQs mentioned in the literature have been largely absent, due to the embeddedness of ITQs in co-management arrangements. However, cracks have appeared lately in this combined management system, allowing an identification of its vulnerabilities. These findings show that the social and economic structure of Dutch fisheries is changing from a rather cooperative to a more competitive and exclusive system, more like conventional ITQs.

This chapter discusses the need to define the small-scale coastal fisheries sector in the Netherlands. It shows that the fact that there is no clear definition of what small-scale fisheries is, affects its governability. This seems to go hand in hand with the lack of a clear perspective on what the problems and opportunities of the small-scale fisheries sector are. This is partly because many small-scale metiers ('metiers' is commonly used to describe a fishing activity, which can be characterized by a combination of the area that is fished, the gear that is used, and the species that is targeted (http://datacollection.jrc.ec.europa.eu/wordef/fishing-activitymetier)) are out of sight, as they are outside the bounds of data collected, or hidden in 'default rest categories' or because of lack of clear representation. We argue that the relative invisibility of the small-scale fishing sector in the Netherlands, its diversity, lack of representation, and the 'preference' for specialization of the governing system impacts on the governability of the small-scale fisheries in the Netherlands. In this chapter we apply the theory of interactive governance by describing the governing system and the system-to-be-governed as well as the governing interactions between them to analyze the challenges for small-scale fisheries in the Netherlands.

One of the oldest elements of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) is the principle of ‘relative stability’. Relative stability means that yearly established Total Allowable Catches (TACs) for each fish stock are divided between the Member States of the European Union (EU) according to a fixed allocation key. One way to circumvent the relative stability is the (increasing) practice of swapping quota with other Member States. These swaps have a temporary character, but continuously repeated yearly swaps occur. In recent decades many Member States have shifted resource management responsibilities more towards the industry and the process of quota swapping is in several Member States managed by Producers Organisations (POs) rather than by government administrations. Networks of fishermen and POs try to establish solid relationships and try to put at the same time stability and flexibility into the system. Information and networks play an important role in the process of quota swapping. However, not all POs and fishermen tend to have (equal) access to the required information for quota swapping which raises questions on how transparent this process is. With the upcoming implementation of the landing obligation, the quota swaps between Member States are expected to increase further. This paper describes the extent and the practice of quota swapping, the implications for one of the principles of good governance, transparency, as well as the effects of swapping for the relative stability.

Marine governance involves interaction between networks and actors from different types and levels of organizations. The concept of multi-level or network governance steps away from the assumptions that supra-national and national government at the macro level is the dominant policy making unit. At all levels information is crucial, among others to overcome social dilemmas of collective action in marine resource use and management. In this paper theories of multi-level governance, of collective action, of trust and of information economics will be linked to the idea of the increasing importance of information, information technologies and information processes in environmental governance, which is termed ‘informational governance’. This linking of theories and concepts results in a new and innovative framework to better understand the changing role of information in marine resource management, enterprises, institutions and actual practices of governance. The framework will help to investigate the effectiveness of informational governance in solving problems related to marine resources.

One of the major tasks within the SOCIOEC project is the investigation of the incentive structure and associated behavioral responses of fishers related to specific management measures. To analyze the incentives several methods will be used, including a novel approach using the game ecoOcean. EcoOcean is a graphical interface presenting a cellular based projection of an ocean with fish stocks, where up to four players/users (representing different stakeholders) can navigate their vessels and trawls. With simple modifications of the game mechanics, we will investigate the effect of, among others, changes in price, different gear technology or changes in total allowable catch on the behavior of stakeholders and students as a control group. The set up of a focused group like situation will allow the researchers to observe behaviour in a different context than a one-to-one interview. We plan to use this game table additionally to simulate management measures fishers propose for the future and to simulate results. This presentation will show the basic game design and exemplifies an experiment on changes in fuel prices.

The sustainable seafood movement has given greater credence to non-governmental organisation (NGO) involvement in fisheries' governance through a series of market-based tools and strategies, including consumer awareness campaigns and seafood certification schemes. Despite their proliferation in recent years, the market-based translation of consumer demand directly steering fishermen towards more sustainable practices, we argue, limits our understanding of the wider patterns of interaction that these tools can engender. Using the case of the Dutch Good Fish Guide or Viswijzer, we contend that market-based tools can be effective in creating both horizontal and vertical spaces of interaction between key actors in the Dutch fishery sector. We conclude that while market-based impacts may be negligible, the Viswijzer presents a powerful communicative instrument that has succeeded in fostering more face-to-face interaction and deliberation between otherwise disparate actors. Constructive collaboration between NGOs and industry can therefore create the requisite level of trust in the transition towards sustainable fisheries.

This paper focuses on changing trust relationships among fishermen following new governance arrangements. The previous 'thick' trust relationships that characterized the Dutch fisheries industry under a neo-corporatist arrangement had resulted in an isolation of local fishermen groups vis-a-vis outsiders. However, under new governance arrangements, in particular the so-called Study Groups, these trust relationships are changing. The establishment of Study Groups, where fishermen from different localities have to cooperate on sustainability innovations in order to receive subsidies, lead to more diversity within the industry, more collaborations across localities and new forms of 'thin' trust. As such, these Study Groups can be understood as successful experiments in further opening up of the fisheries community. (C) 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Until the 1990s fisheries were largely managed by the state. Since then, Dutch government and the sector increasingly recognized that a fishing industry cannot be managed effectively without the cooperation and participation of fishers to formulate policy and to implement and enforce laws and regulations. As a result, in the nineties, the existing neo-corporatist arrangement was replaced by a co-management system in the Dutch flatfish fishery. Co-management is often seen as leading to greater procedural legitimacy and subsequently compliance. However, constructing an effective co-management arrangement is not only a matter of building institutions but also a matter of building trust relations between the government and industry. Institutional arrangements such as co-management can contribute to these trust building processes; however, a too strong reliance on institutional arrangements can lead to distrust when new challenges are being faced and institutional arrangements fail to adapt to these changes.

Dit rapport gaat over het politieke en maatschappelijk krachtenveld waarin de Nederlandse visserijsector zich bevindt en op welke wijze dit de transitie naar een duurzame visserij (kan) beinvloed(t)(en). Het laat zien hoe partijen binnen en buiten de sector tegen de visserij aankijken, welke belemmerende en stimulerende (f)actoren zij onderscheiden en welke mate van invloed deze partijen hebben. This report concerns the political and social field of influence within which the Dutch fishing sector operates and the way in which this influences (or could influence) the transition towards sustainable fishing. It demonstrates how parties both within and outside the sector view the fisheries sector, which obstructive and stimulating factors and actors they distinguish, and the extent of the influence of these parties.

Rapport van een onderzoek in opdracht van Directie Visserij van het Ministerie van LNV naar het economisch belang van de sportvisserij in Nederland en van de recreatief-toeristische potentie ervan. Het totaal van de jaarlijkse uitgaven van sportvissers aan hun sport representeert de economische waarde. Aan dit bedrag is een schatting van de werkgelegenheid gekoppeld op grond van toegevoegde waarden per mensjaar ontleend aan het CBS. Voor de sportvisserij op de binnenwateren leveren bestaande onderzoeken uiteenlopende schattingen van totale uitgaven en werkgelegenheid. De maximale schatting komt op circa 600 miljoen euro als jaarlijkse omzet en een werkgelegenheid van ruim 2.500 mensjaren. Voor de zeesportvisserij zijn gegevens verzameld via interviews en literatuur. De economische waarde van de zeesportvisserij wordt geschat op ruim 125 miljoen euro; de ermee samenhangende werkgelegenheid is circa 800 mensjaren. De totale omzet en werkgelegenheid in de sportvisserij in Nederland komen daarmee op 725 miljoen euro en 3.300 mensjaren. Als recreatief-toeristische potentie wordt beschouwd: het groeipotentieel van de recreatief- toeristische voorzieningen ten behoeve van de sportvisserij. Op grond van tendensen in relevante gebieden wordt een bescheiden groei van de behoefte aan dergelijke voorzieningen verwacht. De omzet en werkgelegenheid in deze branche zullen hoogstens groeien tot resp. 340 miljoen euro en circa 1.300 mensjaren.