This paper presents a series of simulation experiments related to the interaction of memory and analogy-making in the AMBR model. This interaction makes it possible to demonstrate blending between superficially dissimilar episodes as a result of the established analogical mapping between them and of superficially and structurally dissimilar episodes as a result of a double analogy with a third episode. Both simulation experiments model the blending effect of analogy-making. The conditions for the emergence of such blending are explored on the basis of a proposed specific analogy-like retrieval mechanism.

Analogy Causes Distorted Memory by Blending Memory Episodes Margarita Pavlova (margarita.velinova@gmail.com) Boicho Kokinov Department of Cognitive Science and Psychology, New Bulgarian University, 21 Montevideo Street Sofia 1618, Bulgaria Abstract The present study compares two cases of blending between episodes: blending of episodes that share a number of elements (superficially similar episodes) and blending of episodes that share the same structure of relations but do not share the same elements. According to classic theories and models of blending, superficially similar episodes are more likely to be blended because there is a larger overlap of the feature vectors representing them. In contrast, according to the AMBR model of analogy-making and memory, analogous episodes are more likely to be blended. The results obtained in the present study support the prediction of the AMBR model: people blend structurally similar episodes much more often than superficially similar ones. These results are consistent with previous experiments on the influence of analogy- making on constructive memory. Keywords: analogy; memory; memory distortions; blending of episodes; psychological experimentation. Constructive Memory Two popular metaphors for memory are known to cognitive psychologists. The classic one suggests that it is a physical place where our memories for events, concepts, and objects are stored and later on retrieved. The more recent metaphor for memory views it as a dynamic and constructive process (Moscovitch, 1995; Loftus, 1997; Neisser & Harsch, 1992; Roediger & McDermott, 1995; Schacter, 1999). This relatively modern concept of memory suggests that we reconstruct episodes by taking a small piece of information about the episode and then with the help of general knowledge about the category to which it belongs, we reconstruct it altogether (Kokinov & Petrov, 2001). According to this constructivist point of view on memory, recollections can not only be partial or lost, but they can also be distorted. There are two known mechanisms of memory distortion – episode blending and schematization (use of general schematic knowledge). There is much evidence now that people do distort real episodes. Sir Frederick Bartlett (1932) first demonstrated a case of memory distortions as a result of intrusions from general schematic knowledge in the reconstruction of the target event. Loftus and Palmer (1974) enriched these findings and demonstrated that depending on the schema activated, the reconstructed episodes varied. Furthermore, various other experiments by Loftus (1977; 1997; 2003) have indicated various instances of blending of episodes – a slideshow and a piece of consecutive information concerning the target object; a real event and an imagined one; a personal experience and an advertisement; an actual autobiographical recollection and an implanted one. All these findings suggest that misinformation alters one’s recollections about an event regardless of it being actual or not. One important conclusion is drawn from these studies: people pick elements from one event and implant them into another, thus mixing up the two events and blending the recollections of both. Simarly, the case study of John Dean’s memory (Neisser, 1981) provided an analysis of his recollections and revealed a lot of inaccuracies. Discrepancies and fault memories are common even for highly emotional events. Neisser & Harsch (1992) focused on the so called flashbulb memories and explored the participants’ immediate and delayed recollections of the Challenger incident, showing that the participants wrongly recalled the event and reported various details most probably taken from different events, hence they strongly believed that their memories were accurate and vivid. Nystrom and McClelland (1992) also obtained similar effects: after studying a number of sentences, their participants blended them. Roediger and McDermott (1995) demonstrated that a word not present in a list could be wrongfully recalled if it was associated with some of the words presented in the list. All of the above mentioned data have been extended and supported in a number of psychological experiments, as well as in cognitive neuroscience, brain imaging, and brain lesions studies (Moscovitch, 1995; Schacter, 1999; Kokinov & Hirst, 2003). Despite the extensive experimental work demonstrating memory distortion, the mechanisms of memory construction are still a topical issue. Various researchers suggest different points of view on the mechanisms and explanation of memory construction. This lack of theory ground in the field makes the research move in various directions with no clear predictions and explanations. Among the few existing models that do explain and reproduce episode blending are Murdock’s TODAM model (1993; 1995), McClelland’s Trace Synthesis Model (1995), and Metcalfe’s CHARM model (1990). Although they are quite different in a number of aspects, these models share a

In attempt to resolve the controversial issue of the influence of the anxiety state on analogy-making this paper presents a replication of the original Tohill and Holyoak study extending it with a new factor – the complexity of the mapping. It turns out that the anxiety influence interacts with the complexity of the mapping task. This has certain implications for the models of analogy and for the further study of the role anxiety plays in analogy-making.

Numerous behavioral and neuro-imaging studies have demonstrated that the motor system is activated when people are presented with manipulable objects. However it remains a matter of debate whether these results should be interpreted as evidence that certain conceptual processes employ motor programs. In order to address this issue, we conducted two experiments which required participants to assess the functions of tool-like objects and respond verbally. The results demonstrate that action affordances may constrain performance in tasks which are not based on the stimulus-response compatibility paradigm. We argue that this finding supports the causal role of the motor system in conceptual processing and that it cannot be explained by spreading of activation and response interference.

Perception of Ambiguous Drawings and the Construction and Inhibition of its Alternative Interpretation – Reflections on Consciousness Svetoslav Bliznashki (valsotevs@gmail.com) Mariya Popova (popova.mariya@gmail.com) Boicho Kokinov (bkokinov@nbu.com) Central and East European Center for Cognitive Science, Department of Cognitive Science and Psychology, New Bulgarian University 21, Montevideo Str., Sofia 1618Bulgaria Abstract Based on some of our previous experimental findings concerning the negative priming which occasionally occurs during perception of ambiguous drawings we propose a simple mathematical model which we believe may account for important aspects of our data. We tested some (but not all) of the crucial predictions of our model using a newly developed set of asymmetric ambiguous drawings. The results further supported the phenomenon of negative priming taking place during perception of ambiguous drawings and were consistent with the predictions of the model. Keywords: ambiguous drawings; negative priming; vector reflection. Introduction Early gestalt psychologists pointed out that human beings are incapable of perceiving two interpretations of an ambiguous drawing simultaneously. Only one of the interpretations seems to be consciously available at any given moment. Numerous studies show that the conscious experience of a particular interpretation of an ambiguous drawing is subject to context effects (e.g. Balceits & Dunning, 2006; Fisher, 1968; Long & Olszweski, 1999, 2004; Rock & Mitchener, 1992; Kokinov et al., 2007, 2009), i.e. depending on the context we can experience either of the two interpretations. These context effects raise the question whether both interpretations are built in parallel but only the stronger is experienced, or depending on the context only the relevant interpretation is built. This question is analogous to the question asked by Swinney (1979) whether both meanings of a homophone are accessed when the word is encountered or only the meaning relevant to the context. The answer provided by Swinney is that both meanings are accessed. His explanation is in terms of an autonomous lexical access device that does not interact with the context. However, in the case of perception of a picture it is impossible to think in terms of access to pre-stored meanings of the picture, it is clear that the interpretations have to be constructed on the fly. Thus if it turns out that the alternative interpretation is also primed, that would mean that both interpretations are constructed in parallel. Such results would potentially cause a re-interpretation of Swinney’s results since that would mean that this is not a specific linguistic phenomenon that could be explained by the specific organization of the language system and more general explanations should be sought for. Kokinov, Biznashki, Kosev, and Hristova (2007) were interested in how analogy could cause re-representation and re-interpretation of an ambiguous picture. In a further extension of Experiment 1, Bliznashki and Kokinov decided to use additionally Swinney’s methodology (a post-test Lexical Decision Task, called LDT for short) in order to evaluate whether the unseen interpretation will be primed. If this was the case, that would be evidence in favor of the idea that parallel processes are constructing both interpretations. The results of this experiment confirmed the hypothesis of parallel representation building of both interpretations, however, they were rather surprising since we obtained negative priming, i.e. we obtained evidence that the unseen interpretation was inhibited (Kokinov, Vankov, Bliznashki, 2009). This was in accordance with some simulation data with the AMBR model which also exhibited inhibition of the corresponding concepts. We were happy with these results, but there was a puzzle that remained unresolved and which we found very challenging. In this experiment we used an asymmetric drawing with one interpretation being easy to perceive and the other one being hard to notice. We also varied the context in which the drawing was provided by pushing the participants in the study to perceive either the easy or the hard interpretation in order to solve a complex analogical task. We were happy to prove that the relational structure of the task exerted strong influence upon subjects’ perception (which was the main goal of our studies) but we were puzzled to find out that the negative priming was not always present. More specifically the negative priming occurred if and only if subjects were contextually prompted to perceive the weak (hard-to-see) interpretation of the drawing. In that case the strong (easy-to-see) interpretation showed pronounced negative priming during a Lexical Decision Task which followed immediately after the presentation of the ambiguous drawing, while if the participants saw the easy to see interpretation, there was no negative priming of the alternative interpretation. In our current study we try to explain that finding in formal terms as well as to replicate the results in an experiment specifically designed to detect priming of an unperceived interpretation of ambiguous drawings (which was not the case with our previous studies which focused primarily on exploring the parallel nature of different processes which took place during analogical reasoning).

Does Analogy Facilitate Transitive Inference in Young Children? Milena Mutafchieva (mmutafchieva@nbu.bg) Kristina Gotseva (goceva@students.nbu.bg) Boicho Kokinov (bkokinov@nbu.bg) Central and East European Center for Cognitive Science, Department of Cognitive Science and Psychology, New Bulgarian University, 21 Montevideo Street Sofia 1618, Bulgaria Abstract Both transitive reasoning and analogy-making are present at very early stage of human development and the question arises whether the two developmental trajectories interact with each other. We are presenting an experiment with 4 years old children to test the hypothesis that the analogy- making capabilities can scaffold and facilitate the development of transitive inference and the empirical data support this hypothesis. Introduction Transitive inference is the simplest form of deductive reasoning that combines two premises R(a,b) and R(b,c) and makes the conclusion that R(a,c). For example, if John is stronger than Peter, and Peter is stronger than Bill, then necessarily, John is stronger than Bill. Piaget (1921) was the first psychologist who introduced the topic of transitive inference in the developmental framework. He and his collaborators claimed that the ability of transitive reasoning is developed relatively late during the stage of concrete operations (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958, 1964): first at the age of 8 about size relations like “bigger than”, and even later on about other relations like “heavier than”. The developmental trajectory of transitive reasoning has been extensively studied and disputed in the literature and many psychologists found evidence that this ability is present much earlier in the development than it was assumed by Piaget. Thus since 1970s the research in the area was dominated by the debate about the age at which children can be considered to make transitive inferences. According to Trabasso (1977) and Halford (1993) this age depends on the specific procedure that tests the ability and under certain circumstances even children at the age of 4 can exhibit this capacity. McGonigle and Chalmers (1977) challenged the field by demonstrating that monkeys can also make transitive inferences. More recently it has been demonstrated that rats (Roberts & Phelps, 1994), pigeons (von Fersen et al, 1991, Lasareva & Wasserman, 2006), and even fishes (Grosenick, Clement & Fernald, 2007) do make transitive inferences. It has been argued that transitive inference is important for the survival because it allows the animals to determine social dominance of other animals without getting into mortal fights. A very similar debate has also dominated the field of analogical reasoning development. Inhelder and Piaget (1958, 1964) claim that analogical reasoning is a type of reasoning which develops during the formal operation stage i.e. after 11 years of age. However, like in the field of transitive inference, modern researchers have demonstrated that analogy is present at very early age if not from birth (Goswami, 1991, 2001, Kotovsky & Gentner, 1996). And again there is now some evidence that Chimpanzees (Gillan, Premack, & Woodruff, 1981; Oden, Thompson & Premack, 2001), Baboons (Fagot & Parron, 2010), Capuchin monkeys (Truppa et al, 2010, 2011), and even New Caledonian Crows (Taylor et al., 2007) can make analogies. This research suggests that both transitive inference and analogy-making are very old evolutionary and are also present from very early age in human beings and the question arises whether the development of the two capabilities interact with each other. Kokinov (1990, 1992) suggested that in fact deductive, inductive and analogical reasoning might be produced by the very same mechanisms. His proposal is that the analogical reasoning mechanisms are the basis and they are then used for deduction and induction as well. He obtained some experimental support for this proposal using adults. Halford (1993) suggested that deductive reasoning development is based on the already developed analogical reasoning capacities, but did not present empirical evidence for his claim. Goswami (1995) tried to find support for that idea by providing analogies to children in the class inclusion problem, but could not find an effect of the analogy. Based on the two proposals above Mutafchieva and Kokinov (2008) designed an experiment to test whether analogy can actually help children make better transitive inferences and obtained positive results. However, the doubt remained whether this is really transitive reasoning. The current paper presents an experimental study that replicates and further extends these initial findings making sure that children are making proper transitive inferences. Another topic of hot debate is the methodology of measuring transitive inference capabilities. Various authors have suggested various procedures and it might be that they measure different aspects of the transitive reasoning abilities. Inhelder and Piaget (1958, 1964) used the original definition of transitive inference with three objects where the premises are presented as two comparisons and the question is about the relation between the two objects unseen together. Later on, however, Bryant and Trabasso (1971) and McGonigle and Chalmers (1977) have used a form of the task with 5 items in a series with extensive training of some pairs and asking about others that are

During the workshop experimental support or rejection of the AMBR model will be discussed. Depending on the interests of the participants this could include topics like: • Context sensitivity of human cognitive processes • Constructive memory • Biases in judgment • Unconscious analogies • How emotions influence analogy-making • Interaction between perception and thinking in the interpretation of ambiguous drawings • Embodied cognition view on analogy The students will participate in active discussions and will be involved in experimental design tasks to test the model predictions. This will include both group work and individual assignments encouraging them to relate the theory with their own research plans. Literature (all optional, depending on the specific interests of the participant) • Kokinov, B., Petrov, A. (2001). Integration of Memory and Reasoning in Analogy-Making: The AMBR Model. In: Gentner, D., Holyoak, K., Kokinov, B. (eds.) The Analogical Mind: Perspectives from Cognitive Science, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. • Kokinov, B., Zareva-Toncheva, N. (2001). Episode Blending as Result of Analogical Problem Solving. In: Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ. • Kokinov, B. (2003). The Mechanisms of Episode Construction and Blending in DUAL and AMBR: Interaction Between Memory and Analogy. In: Kokinov, B., Hirst, W. (ed.) Constructive Memory. Sofia: NBU Press. • Grinberg, M., Kokinov, B. (2003). Analogy-Based Episode Blending in AMBR. In: Kokinov, B., Hirst, W. (ed.) Constructive Memory. Sofia: NBU Press. • Kokinov, B., Hristova, P., Petkov, G. (2004). Does Irrelevant Information Play a Role in Judgment? In: Proceedings of the 26th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ. • Petkov, G. & Kokinov, B. (2006). JUDGEMAP - Integration of Analogy-Making, Judgment, and Choice. In: Proceedings of the 28th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ. • Kokinov, B., Raeva, D. (2007). A Cognitive Approach to Context Effects on Individual Decision Making Under Risk. In: Richard Topol and Bernard Walliser (eds.) Cognitive Economics: New Trends (Contributions to Economic Analysis, Volume 280), Amsterdam: Elsevier. pp. 99-116 • Kokinov, B. (2007). Can Mass Media and the Educational Institutions Change the Entrepreneurial Culture? A Study of How a Single Story Can Change the Risk-Taking Behavior of Individuals. Global Business and Economics Review, vol. 9 (2,3), pp. 286-296. • Feldman. V., Kokinov, B. (2009). Analogical Episodes are More Likely to be Blended than Superficially Similar Ones. In: Proceedings of the 31st Annual Conference on Cognitive Science. Lawrence Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ. • Kokinov, B., Bliznashki, S., Kosev, S., Hristova, P. (2007). Analogical Mapping and Perception: Can Mapping Cause a Re-Representation of the Target Stimulus? In: Proceedings of the 29th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ. • Kokinov, B., Vankov, I., Bliznashki, S. (2009). How Analogy Could Force Re-representation of the Target and Inhibition of the Alternative Interpretation. In: Kokinov, B., Holyoak, K., Gentner, D. (eds.). New Frontiers in Analogy Research. Sofia: NBU Press. • Feldman, V., Kokinov, B. (2009). Anxiety Restricts the Analogical Search in an Analogy Generation Task. In: Kokinov, B., Holyoak, K., Gentner, D. (eds.). New Frontiers in Analogy Research. Sofia: NBU Press. • Vankov, I., Kokinov, B. (2009). Grounding Relations in Action. In: Kokinov, B., Holyoak, K., Gentner, D. (eds.). New Frontiers in Analogy Research. Sofia: NBU Press. • Vankov, I., Kokinov, B. (2010). The role of action in perceiving and comparing functional relations. In: Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. • Feldman, V., Hristova, P., Kokinov, B.(2010). How Does Anxiety Influence Analogical Mapping? In: Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. • Hristova, P., Kokinov, B. (2011). Anxiety Fosters Relational Encoding. In: Kokinov, B., Karmiloff-Smith, A., Nersessian, N. (eds.) European Perspectives on Cognitive Science. NBU Press. • Vankov, I., Kokinov, B. (2011). Embodied Comparison of Functional Relations. In: Kokinov, B., Karmiloff-Smith, A., Nersessian, N. (eds.) European Perspectives on Cognitive Science. NBU Press.

This paper describes how the AMBR model explains multiple analogies and more specifically how the use of a superficially similar analogical base, that turns out to be inappropriate (we call it a bridge analogy), may actually lead to the rerepresentation of the target and the activation of a more appropriate remote analogical source. A simulation is described that demonstrates this capability of the model. A specific prediction of the model about the re-representation that the presence of the bridge analogical source is causing is tested in a psychological experiment.

The Embodied Conceptual Combination (ECCo) theory differs from previous theories of conceptual combination in two key respects. First, ECCo proposes two basic interpretation types: destructive and nondestructive. Second, ECCo assumes complementary roles for linguistic distributional information and perceptual simulation information. Here, we empirically test these assumptions using a noun-noun compound interpretation task. We show that ECCo's destructive/nondestructive interpretation distinction is a significant predictor of people's successful interpretation times, while the traditional property/relationbased distinction is not. We also demonstrate that both linguistic and simulation systems make complementary contributions to the timecourse of successful and unsuccessful interpretation. Results support the ECCo theory's account of conceptual combination.

Unifying Deduction, Induction, and Analogy by the AMBR Model Georgi Petkov (gpetkov@cogs.nbu.bg) Ivan Vankov (i.i.vankov@gmail.com) Boicho Kokinov (bkokinov@nbu.bg) Central and East European Center for Cognitive Science, Department of Cognitive Science and Psychology, New Bulgarian University, 21 Montevideo Street Sofia 1618, Bulgaria 2001, Grinberg & Kokinov, 2003; Petkov & Kokinov, 2009), analogy and perception (Petkov & Shahbazyan, 2007, Petkov & Kokinov, 2009; Kokinov, Vankov & Bliznashki, 2009), analogy and judgement (Petkov & Kokinov, 2006). In this paper we return to the initial idea to model the three traditionally considered separate types of reasoning (since the time of Aristotle) by the same mechanisms. Meanwhile other models of analogy started to explore the relations between analogy and induction (schema generalization). The SME has been used in the generalization of structurally similar situations (Kuehne, Forbus, Gentner, & Quinn, 2000; Lovett, Lockwood, Dehghani, & Forbus, 2007). The LISA model and its close relative DORA have been specifically addressing the generalization problem and its integration with the analogical mapping (Hummel & Holyoak, 2003; Doumas, Hummel, & Sandhofer, 2008). There are not that many attempts to integrate analogy and deduction with the exception of PI (Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, & Thagard, 1986) and of integrating the SME and qualitative reasoning (Forbus, 2001). The current paper describes an attempt to demonstrate that deduction, induction, and analogy can be produced by a common pool of simple mechanisms (those postulated in the DUAL architecture) and that only the context and the specific interplay between these mechanisms will determine which of these processes will emerge out of the computational process. Thus this is an attempt to model examples of these three processes in a single simulation experiment – without tuning the parameters or changing the mechanisms for each of the cases. Abstract This paper presents a series of simulations performed with the AMBR model that demonstrate how deduction, induction, and analogy can emerge from the interaction of several simple mechanisms. First, a case of deductive reasoning is demonstrated when a problem is solved based on general knowledge. The system represents the target in different ways depending on the goal, and different solutions are generated. Second, the constructed solutions of the problems are remembered and later on used as a base for remote analogy. Finally, on the basis of the analogy made, a generalized solution of the class of problems is induced. One important characteristic of the model is that representation of the task, problem-solving, and learning are not viewed as separate modules. Instead, they are different aspects of one and the same joined work of the basic mechanisms of the architecture. Keywords: cognitive generalization. modeling, analogy, deduction, Introduction It has been suggested that analogy is the core of human cognition (Hofstadter, 2001; Holyoak, Gentner, & Kokinov, 2001). The reason is that “relational reasoning” can be found in a variety of cognitive processes. Traditionally, however, models of analogy-making have been isolated from and contrasted to models of deductive reasoning (Gentner, 1983, 1989; Holyoak & Thagard, 1989, Hummel & Holyoak, 1997, Hofstadter, 1995). Somehow gradually analogy-making became a separate and important domain of study (Gentner, Holyoak, Kokinov, 2001). When the AMBR model was first launched (Kokinov, 1988) it was suggested as a unified model of deduction, induction, and analogy. It has been claimed that deduction, induction, and analogy “are not separate cognitive mechanisms, but rather a slightly different manifestations of the same basic mechanisms” (Kokinov, 1988). A few experiments have been run to demonstrate that deduction, induction, and analogy have common properties – being primed by recent experience (Kokinov, 1990), and transferred knowledge being evaluated on the basis of the structural correspondence between the target and the memorized base (Kokinov, 1992). Even though AMBR was suggested as a unified model of these three “kinds” of reasoning, the line of its further development has gone in different directions like exploring the relations between analogy and memory (Kokinov, 1994a, Kokinov & Petrov, Brief description of the DUAL architecture The DUAL architecture was launched (Kokinov, 1994b, 1994c) as a general cognitive architecture that will provide mechanisms for modeling various cognitive processes. The knowledge in DUAL is represented by a huge number of interconnected micro-agents. Each agent‟s symbolic aspect represents a small piece of knowledge while its level of activation represents the relevance of this piece of knowledge to the current context. The activation spreads through the network as in connectionists networks. There are two sources of activation – INPUT and GOAL nodes. Each agent may also have a residual activation that

Relational Versus Attributional Mode of Problem Solving? Svetoslav Bliznashki (valsotevs@gmail.com) New Bulgarian University, 2 Montevideo Street Sofia 1618, Bulgaria Boicho Kokinov (bkokinov@nbu.bg) New Bulgarian University, 2 Montevideo Street Sofia 1618, Bulgaria Abstract We argue that the concept of relational priming (e.g. Schunn 1996, Day 2007) can be extended from priming of specific relations to generating a cognitive state during which subjects are particularly likely to encode and use relations. We conducted an experiment in which three groups of subjects did different tasks before a target matching to sample task was introduced which contrasted a relationally versus an attributionally similar alternative. Subjects in one condition were asked to solve tasks involving relational reasoning while subjects in another condition were asked to tasks involving only attributes. As expected subjects in the first condition were more likely to pick up the relationally similar alternative while in the second condition the results reversed relative to a control group. In conclusion we argue that this study shows that encoding of relations can be a subject to unconscious context influence. Keywords: relational priming; context dependence; encoding of relations, cognitive state Introduction Since Gentner’s Structure Mapping theory (Gentner 1983) a great deal of research has been concentrated upon analogical reasoning in terms of mapping of higher-order relations. Although the mechanisms employed by the mapping process have been extensively studied little is currently known about the nature of the processes involved in relational encoding. This study attempts to scratch the surface of this complex matter by asking the question of whether the process of relational encoding is subject to certain external and internal context influences. While the answer to this question certainly would not reveal the nature of the encoding process it would hopefully tell us something about certain specific aspects of its functioning. Currently there is some agreement that the phenomenon of relational priming exhibits a somehow automatic (i.e. not subjected to voluntary control, external influence and conscious experience) nature (e.g. Kokinov 1996, Schunn 1996, Day 2007, Hristova 2009) 1 . The abovementioned studies employ different methodologies ranging from naturalistic-like settings (Schunn 1996) to Stroop-like interference Reaction Time paradigms (Hristova 2009). But see Spellman et al. (2001) whose results indicate that relational priming took place only when participants were explicitly instructed to pay attention to the relations existing between the stimuli (words) involved in the studies. There is however a common thread among these research projects – the use of specific relations. In other words all these (and other) studies concentrated on exploring the relational priming by using concretely represented, nameable relations. The same naturally holds true for relational priming in psycholinguistic research (e.g. Gagne 2005, Estes 2006). Instead of continuing this well established line of research we concentrated on the question of whether a global cognitive state can be induced in which people are more likely to encode relations in general. It can be said that we are still concerned with relational priming but we employ a rather broad, holistic and abstract definition of the phenomenon. We hypothesized that subjects confronted with tasks explicitly involving relational reasoning will subsequently be more likely to continue this style of reasoning when dealing with completely different tasks. We also hypothesized that subjects forced to encode and use attributes of objects will be considerably less likely to encode (and use) relations in subsequent tasks. In other words we argue that not only specific relations can be primed with similar other relations but also a “relational mode of thinking” can be induced by use of specific task requirements. Thus we claim that relational priming (and consequently “attributional priming”) is a much more complicated and abstract phenomenon than currently conceived by traditional research in the area. Another hypothesis related to the current study concerns the subjects’ ability to cope with the particular priming task. Since we argue that task requirements can possibly induce a particular cognitive state it follows that the degree to which this actually happens should depend upon a subject’s particular ability to successfully cope with the task at hand (the priming task). Experiment In the current experiment we tested three different groups of subjects in order to see whether prior tasks influence significantly relational and attributional reasoning during a target task. In the first condition subjects solved six different mental rotation tasks, in the second condition subjects solved six items from Raven Progressive Matrices test (e.g. Raven 2003) and in a third condition no task preceded the target task. The three groups are called attributional, relational and control conditions respectively.

This paper presents an experimental study of the influence of state-anxiety on relational encoding. It demonstrates that induced state anxiety enhances encoding of relations. Participants in the anxiety group were faster and more accurate in recognizing identical relations in two successive stimuli than the participants in the non-anxiety group.

The term objecthood is used to convey the degree of image regularity in terms of properties such as closure, symmetry and parallelism. The notion of objecthood is evaluated in the light of the existing psychological data on sensory-driven biases of attentional selection. Extending the biased competition for selection framework, we tested if higher objecthood of the image modulates its salience and exerts influence on the efficiency of its processing. In a series of three experiments, it is demonstrated that the presence of closure significantly impacts processing efficiency of the presented visual stimuli.

This paper raises the question whether analogical mapping is embodied in real and/or simulated actions. An experiment is designed in which participants have to verify analogies between pairs of sentences. In half of the pairs the arguments are spatially (vertically) aligned and in the other half the arguments are spa- tially misaligned. Our assumption is that if mapping is embodied the participants will have to mentally simulate a spatial re-arrangement of the arguments during the mapping process. To test this prediction a moving dot was pre- sented on the screen during the analogy verifi- cation task which should impede the eye movements needed for the mental simulation of spatial manipulation of the arguments. In half of the cases the dot was moving horizon- tally and in the other half - vertically. It turns out that the horizontally moving dot impedes to a greater extent the spatially misaligned analogical mappings than the aligned ones, supporting the hypothesis that in these cases people do simulate spatial re-arrangement.

There is growing evidence that even the most abstract capacities of human cognition are not entirely amodal and disembodied. The present study presents two empirical studies which aim to demonstrate that relational reasoning is grounded in our sensory-motor experience. Experiment 1 shows that the affordances of tool-like objects have an effect on comparing functional relations. Experiment 2 makes sure that this finding can not be explained by an automatic activation of motor systems. The results are interpreted as evidence that at least certain functional relations are perceived by simulating interactions with the environment. It is also asserted that the process of comparing such relations is constrained by the properties of the human body such as hand-dominance.

This paper presents an experimental study of the influence that the anxiety state may have on analogical mapping. Contrary to the well-known study of Tohill & Holyoak (2000), where the anxiety state impeded the analogical mapping, in this study participants in the anxiety state were significantly more inclined to produce a relational choice which is structurally consistent with the target, even though this alternative was more superficially dissimilar to the target. This result was obtained in a match-to-sample paradigm. The implications for the theory of how anxiety influences analogy-making are discussed and it is argued in favor of a more detailed and specific approach to studying the influence of anxiety on each component mechanism of analogy-making.

We argue that the concept of relational priming (e.g. Schunn 1996, Day 2007) can be extended from priming of specific relations to generating a cognitive state during which subjects are particularly likely to encode and use relations. We conducted an experiment in which three groups of subjects did different tasks before a target matching to sample task was introduced which contrasted a relationally versus an attributionally similar alternative. Subjects in one condition were asked to solve tasks involving relational reasoning while subjects in another condition were asked to tasks involving only attributes. As expected subjects in the first condition were more likely to pick up the relationally similar alternative while in the second condition the results reversed relative to a control group. In conclusion we argue that this study shows that encoding of relations can be a subject to unconscious context influence.