Great power competition has long been theorised by international relations scholars as a contest for supremacy across multiple domains. But where do great powers compete? What makes a place a critical domain of great power competition? What motivates great powers to compete – and potentially fight – over one domain but not others? This article uses an emerging theory called “neo-offensive realism” to examine how conflicting national interests are currently driving the US and China to intensely compete and potentially fight over Taiwan. By empirically surveying the defence, economic, ideological, and world-order interests of the US and China over Taiwan, this article develops a theoretical framework for mapping the different national interests that structure great power competition over states and quasi-states. The neo-offensive realist analysis of US–China rivalry in Taiwan provides important theoretical and practical insights for the international community.

In the current era of US-China rivalry, a major theme in international relations scholarship is the study of how Washington is aligning its allies and partners to compete against Beijing. Yet, within this bourgeoning 'competition-oriented literature,' we are now witnessing a growing co-existence of competition with cooperation: On the one hand, US allies and partners are aligning with Washington to compete with China; On the other hand, US allies and partners are seeking cooperation against China. What drives this emerging trend of 'coopetition'? Armed with a novel theoretical framework, this special issue demonstrates that the contemporary patterns of coopetition result from a complex interplay of system- and unit-level forces: while system-level forces dispose US allies and partners to maintain alignment with Washington, unit-level forces drive them to chart their own balance of cooperation and competition with Beijing. Theorising the twenty-first century global politics as a multi-faceted phenomenon, this special issue seeks to re-orient scholarly attention from one-dimensional conception of competition to co-existence of cooperation and competition.

Studying great power war (GPW) in the twenty-first century presents a paradox. On the one hand, GPW thus far remains a relic of the past, not a contemporary phenomenon available for empirical research because it has not yet occurred in this century. On the other hand, the risk of GPW appears to be escalating in recent years, especially in the Indo-Pacific region. Its risk is becoming so real and imminent that scholars must do more to study its potential in a theoretical, empirical way. This paradox must be confronted and addressed. This special issue advances the literature by studying “great power war flashpoints” (GPWFs) through a “Multiple War Streams Framework” (MWSF). Synergising the diversified literature on the causes of war, the MWSF seeks to guide empirical investigation of GPWFs in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond. By shifting the unit of analysis from “GPW” (which is only available for empirical analysis after the war outbreak) to “GPWF” (which is available for empirical analysis regardless of whether a war will be ultimately broken out or not), this special issue opens up a new arena for studying great power politics.

Traditionally, geopolitical scholars focus on how great powers compete for influence over small states and how small states navigate such competition. This special issue endeavors to transcend the "great power-small state" framework and to reorient both states and quasi-states as critical actors of contemporary great power competition, using the Indo-Pacific and Eurasia as the research sites. It advances a comparative typology that encompasses the dynamics of great power competition across different ideal types of states and quasi-states, including small states, associated states, contested states, and territorial autonomies. By doing so, this special issue opens up a new agenda of investigating the interaction of states and quasi-states in international relations scholarship.

US-China competition in the Indo-Pacific is setting the stage for a new tale of alliance politics. To contain Beijing's expanding power and influence in the Indo-Pacific, Washington is currently leading several coalitions, namely the US-Japan Alliance, Quad, Squad, and AUKUS; To counter US balancing efforts, Beijing is now strengthening its own alliances especially the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the China-Russia partnership. Using an integrative review approach, this article synergises the existing system- and unit-level theories into a "Power-Balancing Coalition Framework" (PBCF) for investigating the 21st century alliance politics. This framework hypothesises that system-level forces (i.e., relative power distribution across states/blocs of states) will dispose countries to "behave similarly" in terms of engaging a power-balancing coalition in a similar direction, on the one hand; it also hypothesises that unit-level forces (i.e., state's geopolitical position, political-economic systems, and ideology) will domestically shape states to drive countries to "behave differently" in terms of engaging a power-balancing coalition in a different pace, on the other hand. Such a framework has the potential to shed light on state alliance behaviours not only in the Indo-Pacific but also all over the world.

This chapter charts the alternative futures of US-China competition in the Indo-Pacific, using neo-offensive realism theory. Drawing on scenario-building methods, this chapter charts multiple scenarios according to different assumed patterns of relative power distribution, including unbalanced multipolarity, bipolarity, balanced multipolarity and unipolarity. It concludes with a discussion of the prescriptive implications of such multiple scenario analysis on real-world foreign policy-making.

This chapter develops a ‘neo-offensive realism theory’ both for this book and future analysis. It aims to achieve three theoretical aims. First, it reviews the major realist theories, with a focus on John Mearsheimer’s offensive realism theory. Second, it develops a neo-offensive realist framework by proposing several conceptual add-ons that refine—but not to replace—John Mearsheimer’s offensive realism theory. Third, it spells out the arguments of this book in respect of US-China competition in the Indo-Pacific, using the lens of neo-offensive Realism; Offensive Realism; Neo-Offensive Realism.

This chapter explains the fall and rise of Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) as a balancing coalition in the Indo-Pacific, using neo-offensive realism theory. Tracing the transformation of the Quad since its inception in 2007, this chapter explains why Japan, Australia, India and South Korea have quite different degree of engagement with the Quad according to their different unit-level forces.

This chapter explains the dynamics of US-China competition in Hong Kong, using neo-offensive realism theory. It empirically surveys the diplomatic and economic tug-of-war between US and China in Hong Kong within the broader geopolitical context of the Indo-Pacific. This chapter concludes with an analysis of the fall of Hong Kong as a geopolitical buffer zone following the US-China showdown in 2019-20.

This chapter explains the dynamics of US-China competition in the Pacific Islands region, using neo-offensive realism theory. It empirically surveys the economic and military tug-of-war between US and China in the Pacific Islands region within the broader geopolitical context of the Indo-Pacific. The analysis of this chapter focuses on several critical small states, associated states, and territorial autonomies in the region, where US and China find their national interests conflicting against each other.

This chapter explains the dynamics of US-China competition in South Asia, using neo-offensive realism theory. It empirically surveys the economic and military tug-of-war between US and China in South Asia within the broader geopolitical context of the Indo-Pacific. The analysis of this chapter focuses on several critical small states in the region, where US and China find their national interests conflicting against each other.

This chapter explains the fall and rise of US-China competition in the Indo-Pacific region since the end of the Cold War in 1991, using neo-offensive realism theory. It traces the system-level and unit-level forces that drives the dynamics of US-China competition in two different time periods, namely 1992-2007 and 2008-2024. This chapter will empirically validate the values of neo-offensive realism in forcefully explaining the changing level of contemporary great power competition.

This book advances a new theory—neo-offensive realism—for mapping the dynamics of great power politics today. Synthesising quantitative and qualitative data, this book offers a holistic analysis of why, where, how, and whither the US-China rivalry is unfolding in the Indo-Pacific region from 1992 to 2024. This book is a precious resource for all people who want to understand the twenty-first great power competition and US-China relations.