To address concerns that warfare could extend to space, the national security space community has taken steps to enhance space mission assurance (SMA), leading to an increasing demand for assessments of SMA. The authors describe decisionmaker needs for assessments of SMA, challenges for conducting assessments, the shortfalls that may result from the challenges, and options for addressing the shortfalls.

In this report, the authors assess the state of artificial intelligence (AI) relevant to DoD and address misconceptions about it; conduct an independent and introspective assessment of the Department of Defense's posture in AI; and put forth a set of recommendations for internal actions, external engagements, and potential legislative or regulatory actions that could enhance the Department of Defense posture in AI.

This is a how-to guide for conducting a command-and-control (C2) risk and resilience tabletop exercise, a new wargaming method of assessing metrics for C2 structures. The aim of this method is to enable more-rigorous comparing of C2 structures in a scenario than present-day methods permit. It provides a structured approach to comparison in terms of risks from adversary efforts or the operational environment and resilience to those risks.

The geography of the Pacific can present challenges for command and control (C2) of air operations, especially in the face of attempts to disrupt C2. This report recommends methods for comparing and contrasting alternative organizational concepts for C2 of joint air operations in the Pacific and applies them to a selection of concepts for two different scenarios, humanitarian and disaster relief and a major war with a near-peer competitor.

This report describes steps the U.S. Air Force can take to help ensure that it has the capability needed to provide intelligence analysis support to a broad range of service and combatant commander needs, including support to ongoing irregular warfare operations, and to conventional warfare with a near-peer competitor.

Abstract : The U.S. Air Force s remotely piloted aircraft (RPAs), such as RQ-4 Global Hawk, MQ-1 Predator, and MQ-9 Reaper, have made significant contributions to current operations in Southwest Asia. Although these aircraft primarily provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) to joint warfighters, armed variants are also able to provide rapid precision strike against time-sensitive targets. The planned increase in RPA inventories over the next several years reflects a growing awareness of the value of these aircraft. In addition, new sensor technologies, such as wide-area airborne surveillance (WAAS), will further augment RPAs potential contribution to future warfighting. Given these developments, the time is ripe for the Air Force to consider additional roles for future RPAs, whether to help address capability gaps that are currently unfulfilled or to replace or complement manned systems in current missions. Thoughtful study is needed to identify promising mission areas, to consider potential platform alternatives, and to analyze how different options could contribute to specific missions and to overall campaigns in costeffective ways. This documented briefing discusses a suite of tools and models developed by RAND Project AIR FORCE (PAF) researchers to help the Air Force think through these issues. Figure S.1 depicts the overall methodology for evaluating operational effectiveness. When analyzing alternative force structures, the first step is to identify capability gaps. Sources may include the Air Force Capabilities Review and Risk Assessment and the Multi-Service Force Deployment scenarios. The next step is to develop appropriate mission vignettes that represent a range of ways in which platforms could help fill capability gaps. Next, the trade-offs between different candidate RPAs and other systems (such as manned platforms, satellites, or ground-based systems) should be explored within a series of mission vignettes.

This briefing describes a suite of tools to help the Air Force think through future roles for remotely piloted aircraft, evaluate platform selection and concept of operations development, sensor performance against various targets, weapon effects, environmental factors, platform survivability, computational processing of data, and exploitation of sensor products.

I n June 2005, workers at the Marinette Marine shipyard in Wisconsin laid the keel for the USS Freedom, the Navy’s fi rst Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). Able to achieve speeds of 45 knots and maneuver in waters less than 20 feet deep, the LCS constitutes a new class of fast, agile, and networked warships designed to overcome threats in shallow waters posed by mines, diesel-electric submarines, and “swarm boats” and other fast surface craft. With a modular design, LCSs are a conceptual departure from traditional naval warships. All LCSs will share a hull and superstructure seaframe equipped with common equipment such as self-defense weapons, radar, communications, and unmanned vehicles. But at the same time, each vessel will be able to accommodate interchangeable, 20-foot cargo container–sized mission packages that allow the ship to be reconfi gured for antisubmarine warfare (ASW), mine warfare (MIW), or surface warfare (SUW) missions. In the early years of this decade, the U.S. Navy was considering acquiring upward of 80 LCS seaframes by the year 2025.

Abstract : In June 2005, workers at the Marinette Marine shipyard in Marinette, Wisconsin, laid the keel for the USS Freedom, the Navy's first Littoral Combat Ship. The LCS constitutes a new class of fast, agile, and networked warships designed to overcome threats in shallow waters posed by mines, diesel-electric submarines, fast-attack craft, and fast inshore attack craft. LCSs will be key components in a proposed family of next generation surface combatants that also includes the much larger DDG-1000 destroyer and a future CG(X) cruiser. LCSs will be able to deploy independently to overseas littoral regions; remain on station for extended periods of time, either with a carrier strike group or an expeditionary strike group or through a forward-basing arrangement; operate independently and/or with other LCS units; and be replenished while under way.

: In 1994, the U.S. Navy initiated a program to transform America's surface combatant fleet by developing a new family of ships intended to project power more rapidly, wage war more effectively, and operate less expensively, compared with vessels currently in the fleet. The centerpiece of this new family of ships is a destroyer, currently designated DD(X). After several years of study of alternative system concepts, design proposals for the DD(X) were solicited from two industry teams. In April 2002, one of those teams, led by Northrop Grumman Ship Systems (NGSS), was selected winner of the competition and awarded a $2.9 billion contract to manage a 3-year risk-reduction phase and to act as the lead design agent for the program. The Navy also specified that the shipyard member of the other industry team, Bath Iron Works (BIW), should participate in ship design and production activities. Detail design of the lead ships is now scheduled to start in 2006, with fabrication commencing in 2007. Acquisition and contracting decisions that the Navy makes during that next phase of the program will have important implications not only for the U.S. industrial base involved in manufacturing and equipping surface combatants, but also for options available in subsequent phases of the DD(X) acquisition. In 2003, the Navy asked the RAND Corporation to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of different acquisition and contracting strategies that defense officials could employ on the DD(X) program to achieve three objectives: make the best use of competition throughout the detail design and production phases; maintain a strong industrial base capable of building surface combatants; and achieve program cost, schedule, and performance objectives. RAND conducted and documented this research before U.S. defense officials significantly changed the program in 2005. Thus, this study is a snapshot of the program as it existed in 2003 and 2004, before those changes were put in place.

Abstract : In 1994, the U.S. Navy initiated a program to transform America's surface combatant fleet by developing a new family of ships intended to project power more rapidly, wage war more effectively, and operate less expensively, compared with vessels currently in the fleet. The centerpiece of this new family of ships is a destroyer, currently designated DD(X). After several years of study of alternative system concepts, design proposals for the DD(X) were solicited from two industry teams. In April 2002, one of those teams, led by Northrop Grumman Ship Systems (NGSS), was selected winner of the competition and awarded a $2.9 billion contract to manage a 3-year risk-reduction phase and to act as the lead design agent for the program. The Navy also specified that the shipyard member of the other industry team, Bath Iron Works (BIW), should participate in ship design and production activities. Detail design of the lead ships is now scheduled to start in 2006, with fabrication commencing in 2007. Acquisition and contracting decisions that the Navy makes during that next phase of the program will have important implications not only for the U.S. industrial base involved in manufacturing and equipping surface combatants, but also for options available in subsequent phases of the DD(X) acquisition. In 2003, the Navy asked the RAND Corporation to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of different acquisition and contracting strategies that defense officials could employ on the DD(X) program to achieve three objectives: make the best use of competition throughout the detail design and production phases; maintain a strong industrial base capable of building surface combatants; and achieve program cost, schedule, and performance objectives. RAND conducted and documented this research before U.S. defense officials significantly changed the program in 2005. Thus, this study is a snapshot of the program as it existed in 2003 and 2004, before those changes were put in place.