Classified transuranic material that cannot be shipped to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico is stored in Greater Confinement Disposal boreholes in the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site on the Nevada Test Site. A performance assessment was completed for the transuranic inventory in the boreholes and submitted to the Transuranic Waste Disposal Federal Review Group. The performance assessment was prepared by Sandia National Laboratories on behalf of the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office using an iterative methodology that assessed radiological releases from the intermediate depth disposal configuration against the regulatory requirements of the 1985 version of 40 CFR 191 of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. The transuranic materials are stored at 21 to 37 m depth (70 to 120 ft) in large diameter boreholes constructed in the unsaturated alluvial deposits of Frenchman Flat. Hydrologic processes that affect long- term isolation of the radionuclides are dominated by extremely slow upward rates of liquid/vapor advection and diffusion; there is no downward pathway under current climatic conditions and there is no recharge to groundwater under future ''glacial'' climatic conditions. A Federal Review Team appointed by the Transuranic Waste Disposal Federal Review Group reviewed the Greater Confinement Disposal performance assessment and found that the site met the majority of the regulatory criteria of the 1985 and portions of the 1993 versions of 40 CFR 191. A number of technical and procedural issues required development of supplemental information that was incorporated into a final revision of the performance assessment. These issues include inclusion of radiological releases into the complementary cumulative distribution function for the containment requirements associated with drill cuttings from inadvertent human intrusion, verification of mathematical models used in the performance assessment, inclusion of dose calculations from collocated low-level waste in the boreholes for the individual protection requirements, further assessments of engineered barriers and conditions associated with the assurance requirements, and expansion of documentation provided for assessing the groundwater protection requirements. The Transuranic Waste Disposal Federal Review Group approved the performance assessment for Greater Confinement Disposal boreholes in 2001 and did not approve the Application of the Assurance Requirements. Remaining issues concerned with engineered barriers and the multiple aspects of the Assurance Requirements will be resolved at the time of closure of the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site. This is the first completion and acceptance of a performance assessment for transuranic materials under the U.S. Department of Energy self-regulation. The Greater Confinement Disposal boreholes are only the second waste disposal configuration to meet the safety regulatory requirements of 40 CFR 191.

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration of the Nevada Operations Office (NNSA/NV) operates and maintains two active facilities on the Nevada Test Site (NTS) that dispose defense-generated low-level radioactive waste (LLW), mixed radioactive waste, and ''classified waste'' in shallow trenches and pits. The operation and maintenance of the LLW disposal sites are self-regulated by the DOE under DOE Order 435.1. This Order requires formal review of a performance assessment (PA) and composite analysis (CA; assessment of all interacting radiological sources) for each LLW disposal system followed by an active maintenance program that extends through and beyond the site closure program. The Nevada disposal facilities continue to receive NTS-generated LLW and defense-generated LLW from across the DOE complex. The PA/CAs for the sites have been conditionally approved and the facilities are now under a formal maintenance program that requires testing of conceptual models, quantifying and attempting to reduce uncertainty, and implementing confirmatory and long-term background monitoring, all leading to eventual closure of the disposal sites. To streamline and reduce the cost of the maintenance program, the NNSA/NV is converting the deterministic PA/CAs to probabilistic models using GoldSim, a probabilistic simulation computer code. The output of probabilistic models will provide expanded information supporting long-term decision objectives of the NTS disposal sites.

The performance objectives of the U. S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Operations Office (NNSA/NV) Low-level Radioactive Waste (LLW) disposal facilities located at the Nevada Test Site transcend those of any other radioactive waste disposal site in the United States. Situated at the southern end of the Great Basin, 244 meters (800 feet) above the water table, the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) has utilized a combination of engineered shallow land disposal cells and deep augured shafts to dispose a variety of waste streams. These include high volume low-activity waste, classified radioactive material, and high-specific-activity special case waste. Fifteen miles north of Area 5 is the Area 3 RWMS. Here bulk LLW disposal takes place in subsidence craters formed from underground testing of nuclear weapons. Earliest records indicate that documented LLW disposal activities have occurred at the Area 5 and Area 3 RWMSs since 1961 and 1 968, respectively. However, these activities have only been managed under a formal program since 1978. This paper describes the technical attributes of the facilities, present and future capacities and capabilities, and provides a description of the process from waste approval to final disposition. The paper also summarizes the current status of the waste disposal operations.

Most transuranic (TRU) wastes are destined for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). However, the TRU wastes from the cleanup of U.S. nuclear weapons accidents are classified for national security reasons and cannot be disposed in WIPP. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) sought an alternative disposal method for these "special case" TRU wastes and from 1984 to 1987, four Greater Confinement Disposal (GCD) boreholes were used to place these special case TRU wastes a minimum of 21 m (70 ft) below the land surface and a minimum of 200 m (650 ft) above the water table. The GCD boreholes are located in arid alluvium at the DOE's Nevada Test Site ( NTS). Because of state regulatory concerns, the GCD boreholes have not been used for waste disposal since 1989. DOE requires that TRU waste disposal facilities meet the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) requirements for disposal of TRU wastes, which are contained in 40 CFR 191. This EPA standard sets a number of requirements, including probabilistic limits on the cumulative releases of radionuclides to the accessible environment for 10,000 years. The DOE Nevada Operations Office (DOE/NV) has contracted with Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) to conduct a performance assessment (PA) to determine if the TRU waste emplaced in the GCD boreholes complies with the EPA's requirements.

A panel of independent scientists was convened by the Department of Energy to assess the performance impacts of disposal of low-level radioactive waste from the Fernald Environmental Management Project. This waste stream was involved in a transportation incident in December 1997. A resulting outgrowth of investigations of the transportation incident was the recognition that the waste was transported and disposed in stress- fractured metal boxes and that some of the waste contained excess moisture (high volumetric water contents). The panel was charged with determining whether disposal of this waste in the Area 5 radioactive waste management site on the Nevada Test Site has impacted the conclusions of the completed performance assessment. Three questions were developed by the panel to assess performance impacts: 1) What are the performance impacts of reduced container integrity? 2) What is the impact of reduced container integrity on subsidence of waste in the disposal pits? and 3) What are the performance impacts of excess moisture? No performance or subsidence impacts were noted from disposal of the Fernald waste. The impacts of excess moisture were assessed by modeling the movement of moisture in the vadose zone, assuming high water contents ("wet waste") for various percentages of the waste inventory. No performance impacts were noted for either the base-case scenario (ambient conditions) or a scenario involving subsidence and flooding of the waste cells. The absence of performance impacts results

Intermediate depth disposal operations were conducted by the United States (U.S.) Department of Energy (DOE) at the DOE's Nevada Test Site (NTS) from 1984 through 1989. These operations emplaced high-specific activity low-level wastes (LLW) and limited quantities of classified transuranic (TRU) wastes in 37 m (120-ft) deep, Greater Confinement Disposal (GCD) boreholes. The GCD boreholes are 3 m (10 ft) in diameter and founded in a thick sequence of arid alluvium. The bottom 15 m (50 ft) of each borehole was used for waste emplacement and the upper 21 m (70 ft) was backfilled with native alluvium. The bottom of each GCD borehole is almost 200 m (650 ft) above the water table. The GCD boreholes are located in one of the most arid portions of the U.S., with an average precipitation of 13 cm (5 inches) per year. The limited precipitation, coupled with generally warm temperatures and low humidities results in a hydrologic system dominated by evapotranspiration. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) 40 CFR 191 defines the requirements for protection of human health from disposed TRU wastes. This EPA standard sets a number of requirements, including probabilistic limits on the cumulative releases of radionuclides to the accessible environment for 10,000 years. The DOE Nevada Operations Office (DOE/NV) has contracted with Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) to conduct a performance assessment (PA) to determine if the TRU wastes emplaced in the GCD boreholes complies with the EPA's 40 CFR 191 requirements. This paper describes DOE's actions undertaken to evaluate whether the TRU wastes in the GCD boreholes will, or will not, endanger human health. Based on preliminary modeling, the TRU

An assessment of options to mitigate the effects of subsidence at low-level radioactive waste disposal sites on the Nevada Test Site was conducted using an informal method of expert judgment. Mitigation options for existing waste cells and future waste cells were identified by a committee composed of knowledgeable personnel from the DOE and DOE-contractors. Eight ranking factors were developed to assess the mitigation options and these factors were scored through elicitation of consensus views from the committee. Different subsets of the factors were applied respectively, to existing waste cells and future waste cells, and the resulting scores were ranked using weighted and unweighted scores. These scores show that there is a large number of viable mitigation options and considerable flexibility in assessing the subsidence issue with a greater range of options for future waste cells compared to existing waste cells. A highly ranked option for both existing and future waste cells is covering the waste cells with a thick closure cap of compacted native alluvium.

This report synthesizes the results of volcanism studies conducted by scientists at the Los Alamos National Laboratory and collaborating institutions on behalf of the Department of Energy's Yucca Mountain Project. An assessment of the risk of future volcanic activity is one of many site characterization studies that must be completed to evaluate the Yucca Mountain site for potential long-term storage of high-level radioactive waste. The presence of several basaltic volcanic centers in the Yucca Mountain region of Pliocene and Quaternary age indicates that there is a finite risk of a future volcanic event occurring during the 10,000-year isolation period of a potential repository. Chapter 1 introduces the volcanism issue for the Yucca Mountain site and provides the reader with an overview of the organization, content, and significant conclusions of this report. The risk of future basaltic volcanism is the primary topic of concern including both events that intersect a potential repository and events that occur near or within the waste isolation system of a repository. Future volcanic events cannot be predicted with certainty but instead are estimated using formal methods of probabilistic volcanic hazard assessment (PVHA). Chapter 2 describes the volcanic history of the Yucca Mountain region (YMR) and emphasizes the Pliocene and Quaternary volcanic record, the interval of primary concern for volcanic risk assessment. The distribution, eruptive history, and geochronology of Plio-Quaternary basalt centers are described by individual center emphasizing the younger postcaldera basalt (<5 Ma). The Lathrop Wells volcanic center is described in detail because it is the youngest basalt center in the YMR. The age of the Lathrop Wells center is now confidently determined to be about 75 thousand years old. Chapter 3 describes the tectonic setting of the YMR and presents and assesses the significance of multiple alternative tectonic models. The Crater Flat volcanic zone is defined and described as one of many alternative models of the structural controls of the distribution of Plio-Quaternary basalt centers in the YMR. Geophysical data are described for the YMR and are used as an aid to understand the distribution of basaltic volcanic centers. Chapter 4 discusses the petrologic and geochemical features of basaltic volcanism in the YMR, the southern Great Basin and the Basin and Range province. Geochemical and isotopic data are presented for post-Miocene basalts of the Yucca Mountain region. Alternative petrogenetic models are assessed for the formation of the Lathrop Wells volcanic center. Based on geochemical data, basaltic ash in fault trenches near Yucca Mountain is shown to have originated from the Lathrop Wells center. Chapter 5 synthesizes eruptive and subsurface effects of basaltic volcanism on a potential repository and summarizes current concepts of the segregation, ascent, and eruption of basalt magma. Chapter 6 synthesizes current knowledge of the probability of disruption of a potential repository at Yucca Mountain. In 1996, an Expert Elicitation panel was convened by DOE that independently conducted PVHA for the Yucca Mountain site. Chapter 6 does not attempt to revise this PVHA; instead, it further examines the sensitivity of variables in PVHA. The approaches and results of PVHA by the expert judgment panel are evaluated and incorporated throughout this chapter. The disruption ratio (E2) is completely re-evaluated using simulation modeling that describes volcanic events based on the geometry of basaltic feeder dikes. New estimates of probability bounds are developed. These comparisons show that it is physically implausible for the probability of magmatic disruption of the Yucca Mountain site to be > than about 7 x 10{sup {minus}8} events yr{sup {minus}1} . Simple probability estimates are used to assess possible implications of not drilling aeromagnetic anomalies in the Amargosa Valley. The sensitivity of the disruption probability to the location of northeast boundaries of volcanic zones near the Yucca Mountain sit