Canadian imprisonment rates have not changed appreciably in the past 75 years. Canada has generally left sentencing to judges rather than impose strict directives through legislation. Yet, this stability hides considerable variability in process and objectives across historical eras. Until the turn of the twenty-first century, sentencing reform in Canada was about "doing policy." The primary objective was to make the criminal justice system more effective and fairer by resolving problems in ways that were consistent with guiding principles. More recent policy changes have been predominantly about "doing politics." The Conservative Party promoted populist tough-on-crime legislation that appealed to its political base. Liberals sought to reaffirm core values rooted in the party's agenda and ideology. Despite dramatic differences in legislation promoted by the two parties, the contrast of the past two decades with the previous historical era signals a significant change in Canada's approach to sentencing.

Written by three noted Canadian criminologists, Jane Sprott, Cheryl Webster and Anthony Doob, this chapter examines the problem of the mass incarceration of Indigenous people in this country, underscoring how a singular reliance on sentencing judges to address this problem was misguided. Moreover, they demonstrate that the traditional means of measuring overincarceration fail to tell the entire story and by using imprisonment rates rather than proportions, they reveal some shocking statistics: imprisonment rates for Indigenous persons in 1996 were 510 per 100,000 Indigenous people (compared to 98.6 per 100,000 for non-Indigenous Canadians), whereas in 2017–2018, the numbers were even higher, 677 per 100,000 Indigenous (the numbers for non-Indigenous Canadians fell to 78.6). Thus, over approximately 20 years, while the non-Indigenous prisoner rate decreased by about 20 percent, the Indigenous prisoner rate increased by about 33 percent. During 2020, these alarming statistics for Indigenous people in Canada were also marginally higher than the overall US imprisonment rate, our "mass-incarceration" neighbor to the south. The authors provide a context for understanding these astonishing numbers and conclude with suggestions that go beyond sentencing, occurring earlier in the criminal justice process, to address this seemingly intractable problem.

In 1997, Canada's youth custodial facilities held 3825 sentenced youths. Eighteen years later, this number was 527-an 86 percent reduction. Overall youth imprisonment (sentenced + pretrial detention) decreased by approximately 73 percent. This paper uses Canada's successful decarceration of youths to understand what might be learned about decarceration more broadly. By examining the reforms that transpired in Canada's treatment of young offenders since the 1960s and the political/cultural shifts that occurred since the 1990s, we demonstrate that the decline resulted from changes occurring in various parts of the system. Finally, we contrast this decarceration with more than 60 years of relative stability of Canadian adult imprisonment rates as well as Canada's failure to substantially decrease youth pretrial detention in order to identify those factors seemingly necessary to reduce imprisonment more generally.

Until the early 1970s, the United States and Canada both had relatively stable imprisonment rates. This paper uses Canada’s continued stability in its rate of incarceration since this period to develop two intertwined explanations for the growth in US imprisonment between 1973 and 2010. First, using data on the relative size of the growth in imprisonment of the individual states, it presents findings that suggest that increased imprisonment was intimately linked to underlying social values. For instance, those states with the largest increases in incarceration were, in terms of the values of their citizens, least “Canadian-like.” In addition, high imprisonment states tended to have values favoring social exclusion. Second, we argue that the United States has consistently demonstrated penal optimism—that is, a strong faith in the ability of the criminal justice system to reduce crime. Prior to the mid-1970s, it was broadly believed that the recourse to prison through a rehabilitation model whereby offenders were treated or “cured” could reduce crime. Starting in the mid-1970s, the focus of optimism changed such that crime was now seen as being able to be controlled through the deterrent and incapacitative effects of high imprisonment. In contrast, from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, Canada has never been optimistic that the criminal justice system—through any mechanism—could have a substantial impact on crime rates. By extension, imprisonment was seen as a necessary evil to be minimized as much as possible.

In contrast with many Western nations, the structure of Canadian sentencing and its overall effects on imprisonment did not change dramatically over the past century. To a large extent, Parliament left sentencing to judges. Broadly speaking, imprisonment was seen as a necessary evil to be used sparingly. Sentencing principles legislated in 1996 largely reflected the status quo. However, the period 2006–15 reflected a dramatic break. The Conservative government in power repeatedly attempted to restrict judicial discretion. Prison was touted as the solution to crime. Scores of politically motivated modifications were introduced to sentencing legislation. Perhaps surprisingly, few of these changes had large effects on large numbers of people. There were no appreciable changes to imprisonment rates by the time of the Conservatives’ electoral defeat in October 2015.

From the mid-19th century until 2006, Canadian official policy statements (from both Liberal and Conservative governments) made it clear that offending was seen as largely socially determined and that it was the state’s responsibility to try to reintegrate those who offend back into mainstream society. In this context, imprisonment was seen as a necessary evil, to be avoided wherever possible. The era since 2006 looks considerably more American than Canadian. The policy elite in Canada has taken the position that those who commit offences are inherently ‘bad’ people and qualitatively different from ‘ordinary law abiding’ Canadians. Exclusionary responses are privileged as those who commit offences are seen as having chosen to forfeit their rights of full citizenship. Several broader (cultural and political) ramifications of this punitive shift in the normative orientation expressed by policy-makers in Canada are discussed.

To fulfil a political promise to eliminate the provincial fiscal deficit, the (conservative) Premier of Alberta cut all budgets by roughly 20 per cent in 1993–1994. As an unanticipated by-product, this political solution to a political problem resulted in a 32 per cent decrease in provincial imprisonment between 1993 and 1997. Economic imperatives created the catalyst for changes in imprisonment policies. However, the types of change and the mechanisms for achieving them reflected Canada’s specific history, culture and politico-legal structures. Decarceration was consistent with core Canadian values rooted in the long-standing belief in the need for restraint in the use of imprisonment and a lack of faith in its effectiveness as a crime control strategy. On the surface, this case study is yet another example of decarceration. However, the interactive and multi-factorial explanatory model underlying Alberta’s reduction in its prison population raises questions about not only single factors or simple additive models as explanations for changes in penal policies but also uni-dimensional solutions to jurisdictions in need of fiscal restraint. The historical and cultural embeddedness of Alberta’s decarceration alerts us to its country-specific nature and the need to situate imprisonment in a broader set of concerns.

Cannabis use and driving (CUD) is a growing public health concern. This study’s main objective was to identify distinguishing characteristics associated with high-frequency CUD (HFCUD) activity (i.e., CUD > 12 times) in a multi-site sample of university students who had self-identified as having driven a car within 4 hours of cannabis use in the past year. Participants for the study (n = 248; age 18–28 years) were recruited by mass advertising at five universities in Ontario. Participants were screened for eligibility and assessed by an anonymous interview between April 2005 and March 2006. Bivariate analyses determined factors associated with HFCUD (i.e., > 12 times) vs. a low frequency of CUD (LFCUD); significant factors were subsequently entered into a discriminant function analysis model. HFCUD was associated with several variables, including frequent (i.e., at least weekly) cannabis use; daily driving; perception of own ability to drive not being impaired by cannabis use; and expectation of CUD in the next 12 months (all p < 0.0001). CUD among young drivers is an important health and safety risk requiring effective interventions. Given the strong association of HFCUD with frequent cannabis use, these phenomena need to be addressed conjointly. Furthermore, preventive interventions responsive to the specific socio-cultural contexts of possible CUD need to be developed and implemented.

Criminological Highlights is produced by a group of faculty (at the University of Toronto and at nearby universities), criminology doctoral students, and librarians. To find items appropriate for Criminological Highlights, we scan everything that comes into the Centre of Criminology library and over 100 journals that are available electronically. From time to time, we also consider papers published in journals in related fields. A short list (typically about 20-30 articles per issue) is chosen and the group reads and discusses each of these papers. For a paper to be included in Criminological Highlights it must be methodologically rigorous and it must have some (general) policy relevance.

Criminology & Public PolicyVolume 13, Issue 4 p. 547-559 COMMENTARY Creating the Will to Change: The Challenges of Decarceration in the United States Anthony N. Doob, Corresponding Author Anthony N. Doob University of TorontoDirect correspondence to Anthony N. Doob, Centre for Criminology and Sociolegal Studies, University of Toronto, 14 Queen's Park Crescent West, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5S 3K9 (e-mail: Anthony.doob@utoronto.ca).Search for more papers by this authorCheryl Marie Webster, Cheryl Marie Webster University of OttawaSearch for more papers by this author Anthony N. Doob, Corresponding Author Anthony N. Doob University of TorontoDirect correspondence to Anthony N. Doob, Centre for Criminology and Sociolegal Studies, University of Toronto, 14 Queen's Park Crescent West, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5S 3K9 (e-mail: Anthony.doob@utoronto.ca).Search for more papers by this authorCheryl Marie Webster, Cheryl Marie Webster University of OttawaSearch for more papers by this author First published: 20 October 2014 https://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9133.12096Citations: 8 The preparation of this article was aided by funds from a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council grant to Cheryl Marie Webster. Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume13, Issue4Special Issue: Special IssueNovember 2014Pages 547-559 RelatedInformation

It is frequently suggested that Canadians would have more confidence in the courts, in criminal sentences, and in the justice system more generally if sentences were harsher. Taking advantage of the fact that there is variation across provinces in sentencing practices, this paper demonstrates that there is essentially no relationship between the punitiveness of a province's courts and that province's residents' views of courts, sentences, and the justice system.

The preliminary inquiry has existed as a procedural protection in our criminal justice system for well over a century. Despite its longevity, this procedural option has not been without controversy. Particularly over the last several decades, there has been considerable debate surrounding its continuing value. Recently, a 2012 press release by the federal, provincial, and territorial ministers responsible for justice and public safety suggests that reform (and quite possibly abolition) of the preliminary inquiry is again being considered. The present article provides an empirical context in which to think about preliminary inquiry reform. Using a detailed and comprehensive national data set, developed in 2003 and specifically tailored to examine this criminal procedure, we do not find a clear case for re-opening the debate. The preliminary inquiry appears to have value in reducing the use of expensive court resources, either by altering the course of cases destined for Superior Court or by eliminating weak charges. Its costs in terms of court delay and valuable resources are significantly limited by its infrequent use and few court appearances. At a minimum, this article suggests that a more detailed empirical examination is justified (if not required) before any changes are made to the preliminary inquiry.

Canada does not fit easily into the typology of political economies and their penal tendencies proposed by Cavadino and Dignan (2006a; 2006b). Based on a study of penal systems in twelve contemporary capitalist countries (not including Canada), these scholars demonstrate a relationship between a nation's political economy on the one hand and the punitiveness of its penal culture (particularly as expressed by its rate of imprisonment) on the other hand. Indeed, they suggest that certain political regimes (e.g. neoliberalism, conservative corporatism, etc.) have distinct penal landscapes (i.e. more or less punitive penal policies).

Abstract Although Canada's overall and violent crime rate dropped dramatically between the early 1990s and 2007 and its overall imprisonment rate has been relatively stable for the past 50 years, the portion of all prisoners who have not yet been sentenced (largely remand prisoners) has increased dramatically. The remand rate tripled between 1978 and 2007. Various explanations for this increase are explored in this article. In the end, we conclude that Canada's growing remand population is largely the product of an increasing culture of risk aversion which is permeating the entire criminal justice system.

Abstract Video remand court was largely introduced as a strategy to increase bail court efficiency by reducing the time and costs associated with the transportation of prisoners from police stations/detention centres to courthouses in order to determine whether they should be released on bail or formally detained until trial. Ironically, this article presents findings from a large courthouse in Ontario, Canada which suggest that video remand actually contributes to lengthy case processing. Potentially by distancing the accused from the bail process, as well as encouraging the perception that video appearances are cost-free for the system, repeated adjournments are the norm in this court. Further, they are often requested without the presence of defence counsel (through duty counsel), and reasons given to justify them largely suggest the absence of any productive activity toward the resolution of the bail process. These practices are discussed in light of the principles of justice underlying bail as well as the practical ramifications of bail inefficiency on the wider criminal justice system.

There are conflicting claims about whether women's imprisonment in Canada has followed the trend toward increasing punitiveness observed in a number of other western nations. This paper provides a detailed description of the scope of women's imprisonment in Canada since the early 1980s to adjudicate between these claims. Using different measures of imprisonment and data from federal and provincial prisons for women, the paper shows that we do not have convincing national evidence that there has been substantial growth in women's imprisonment Canada over the past few decades. There are however, some important gaps in the existing data that make it impossible to describe the full extent of the imprisonment of women and, more importantly, trends in the size of the population of women in prison. At the same time data from one province – Ontario – describe an important and disconcerting shift in the nature of women's imprisonment that has gone largely unnoticed by scholars: a large and growing proportion of the imprisoned female population is made up of women who are not serving sentences. The paper concludes with a call for more attention to the increase in the remand population and to what it means for theories of punitiveness.

Criminology & Public PolicyVolume 7, Issue 3 p. 473-487 AMERICA IN A LARGER WORLD: THE FUTURE OF THE PENAL HARM MOVEMENT* CHERYL MARIE WEBSTER, CHERYL MARIE WEBSTER Associate professor at the Department of Criminology, University of Ottawa.Search for more papers by this authorANTHONY N. DOOB, ANTHONY N. DOOB Professor at the Centre of Criminology, University of Toronto.Search for more papers by this author CHERYL MARIE WEBSTER, CHERYL MARIE WEBSTER Associate professor at the Department of Criminology, University of Ottawa.Search for more papers by this authorANTHONY N. DOOB, ANTHONY N. DOOB Professor at the Centre of Criminology, University of Toronto.Search for more papers by this author First published: 10 September 2008 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-9133.2008.00522.xCitations: 3 † *Direct correspondence to Cheryl Marie Webster, Department of Criminology, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Canada K1N 6N5 (e-mail: Cheryl.Webster@uottawa.ca). AboutPDF ToolsExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume7, Issue3August 2008Pages 473-487 RelatedInformation

The stability of Canada's level of imprisonment from 1960 to 2005 contrasts with the increased incarceration rates experienced by Canada's most obvious comparators-the United States and England and Wales. Canada is not immune to pressure for harsher practices and policies, but at least until the end of 2005 it countered or balanced these trends with other moderating forces. Canadians have largely minimized the impact of risk factors at the root of higher imprisonment levels elsewhere. Certain protective factors have limited the extent to which Canada has adopted the same punitive policies documented in the United States and England and Wales. Several potentially ominous signs on the Canadian horizon, however, could erode the balanced approach that has characterized Canada's response to wider punitive trends over the past forty-five years.