In 1997, Canada's youth custodial facilities held 3825 sentenced youths. Eighteen years later, this number was 527-an 86 percent reduction. Overall youth imprisonment (sentenced + pretrial detention) decreased by approximately 73 percent. This paper uses Canada's successful decarceration of youths to understand what might be learned about decarceration more broadly. By examining the reforms that transpired in Canada's treatment of young offenders since the 1960s and the political/cultural shifts that occurred since the 1990s, we demonstrate that the decline resulted from changes occurring in various parts of the system. Finally, we contrast this decarceration with more than 60 years of relative stability of Canadian adult imprisonment rates as well as Canada's failure to substantially decrease youth pretrial detention in order to identify those factors seemingly necessary to reduce imprisonment more generally.

Until the early 1970s, the United States and Canada both had relatively stable imprisonment rates. This paper uses Canada’s continued stability in its rate of incarceration since this period to develop two intertwined explanations for the growth in US imprisonment between 1973 and 2010. First, using data on the relative size of the growth in imprisonment of the individual states, it presents findings that suggest that increased imprisonment was intimately linked to underlying social values. For instance, those states with the largest increases in incarceration were, in terms of the values of their citizens, least “Canadian-like.” In addition, high imprisonment states tended to have values favoring social exclusion. Second, we argue that the United States has consistently demonstrated penal optimism—that is, a strong faith in the ability of the criminal justice system to reduce crime. Prior to the mid-1970s, it was broadly believed that the recourse to prison through a rehabilitation model whereby offenders were treated or “cured” could reduce crime. Starting in the mid-1970s, the focus of optimism changed such that crime was now seen as being able to be controlled through the deterrent and incapacitative effects of high imprisonment. In contrast, from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, Canada has never been optimistic that the criminal justice system—through any mechanism—could have a substantial impact on crime rates. By extension, imprisonment was seen as a necessary evil to be minimized as much as possible.

In contrast with many Western nations, the structure of Canadian sentencing and its overall effects on imprisonment did not change dramatically over the past century. To a large extent, Parliament left sentencing to judges. Broadly speaking, imprisonment was seen as a necessary evil to be used sparingly. Sentencing principles legislated in 1996 largely reflected the status quo. However, the period 2006–15 reflected a dramatic break. The Conservative government in power repeatedly attempted to restrict judicial discretion. Prison was touted as the solution to crime. Scores of politically motivated modifications were introduced to sentencing legislation. Perhaps surprisingly, few of these changes had large effects on large numbers of people. There were no appreciable changes to imprisonment rates by the time of the Conservatives’ electoral defeat in October 2015.

The organization and funding of almost any area of research might be described, in the aggregate, as falling somewhere along a continuum from a highly planned, unitary, focused research program to an unplanned laissez-faire--even anarchistic-situation without an identifiable focus. Any single portion of this aggregate, for example, within a research institution or within a funding agency, might be expected to be located closer to the focus end of the continuum than would be the aggregate. The issue that I explore in this essay will relate largely to the possibility of shifts in the aggregate, in Canada, in the direction of a more unitary focus.

From the mid-19th century until 2006, Canadian official policy statements (from both Liberal and Conservative governments) made it clear that offending was seen as largely socially determined and that it was the state’s responsibility to try to reintegrate those who offend back into mainstream society. In this context, imprisonment was seen as a necessary evil, to be avoided wherever possible. The era since 2006 looks considerably more American than Canadian. The policy elite in Canada has taken the position that those who commit offences are inherently ‘bad’ people and qualitatively different from ‘ordinary law abiding’ Canadians. Exclusionary responses are privileged as those who commit offences are seen as having chosen to forfeit their rights of full citizenship. Several broader (cultural and political) ramifications of this punitive shift in the normative orientation expressed by policy-makers in Canada are discussed.

To fulfil a political promise to eliminate the provincial fiscal deficit, the (conservative) Premier of Alberta cut all budgets by roughly 20 per cent in 1993–1994. As an unanticipated by-product, this political solution to a political problem resulted in a 32 per cent decrease in provincial imprisonment between 1993 and 1997. Economic imperatives created the catalyst for changes in imprisonment policies. However, the types of change and the mechanisms for achieving them reflected Canada’s specific history, culture and politico-legal structures. Decarceration was consistent with core Canadian values rooted in the long-standing belief in the need for restraint in the use of imprisonment and a lack of faith in its effectiveness as a crime control strategy. On the surface, this case study is yet another example of decarceration. However, the interactive and multi-factorial explanatory model underlying Alberta’s reduction in its prison population raises questions about not only single factors or simple additive models as explanations for changes in penal policies but also uni-dimensional solutions to jurisdictions in need of fiscal restraint. The historical and cultural embeddedness of Alberta’s decarceration alerts us to its country-specific nature and the need to situate imprisonment in a broader set of concerns.

Public confidence in the police is obviously important and is likely to vary across racial/cultural groups and across Canada. However, when national data are being used, differences in views are generally examined through the lens of visible minorities as a composite group compared to non-visible minorities. Using data from the 2009 General Social Survey on Victimization, we argue that it is an oversimplification to talk about the views of visible minorities in relation to the police. Such broad categories of people hide the more nuanced manner in which some groups differ from others on some questions in some locations.

Criminology & Public PolicyVolume 13, Issue 4 p. 547-559 COMMENTARY Creating the Will to Change: The Challenges of Decarceration in the United States Anthony N. Doob, Corresponding Author Anthony N. Doob University of TorontoDirect correspondence to Anthony N. Doob, Centre for Criminology and Sociolegal Studies, University of Toronto, 14 Queen's Park Crescent West, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5S 3K9 (e-mail: Anthony.doob@utoronto.ca).Search for more papers by this authorCheryl Marie Webster, Cheryl Marie Webster University of OttawaSearch for more papers by this author Anthony N. Doob, Corresponding Author Anthony N. Doob University of TorontoDirect correspondence to Anthony N. Doob, Centre for Criminology and Sociolegal Studies, University of Toronto, 14 Queen's Park Crescent West, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5S 3K9 (e-mail: Anthony.doob@utoronto.ca).Search for more papers by this authorCheryl Marie Webster, Cheryl Marie Webster University of OttawaSearch for more papers by this author First published: 20 October 2014 https://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9133.12096Citations: 8 The preparation of this article was aided by funds from a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council grant to Cheryl Marie Webster. Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume13, Issue4Special Issue: Special IssueNovember 2014Pages 547-559 RelatedInformation

This book has addressed female juvenile offending and the justice system's response to girls in Canada and the United States. It has examined the social and legal developments in the two countries to find out whether there were shared or different histories and whether the comparative approach helped in unraveling the puzzles of girl crime and justice. The more wholehearted recent legislative efforts in Canada have had at least twice the impact of their American parallels in reducing girls' incarceration rates. This concluding chapter discusses similarities between Canada and the United States with respect to the treatment of girls, focusing on the historical development of juvenile justice. It also discusses reforms after 1970 designed to chip away at status offenses, gaps between perceived and actual trends in criminality by girls, and status offenses as a justice policy problem for girls and young women. The United States and Canada differ in the treatment of delinquent girls in terms of levels of government responsible for juvenile justice, policy changes and stabilities that influenced juvenile and criminal justice, and net impact of reforms on girls in the two countries.

It is frequently suggested that Canadians would have more confidence in the courts, in criminal sentences, and in the justice system more generally if sentences were harsher. Taking advantage of the fact that there is variation across provinces in sentencing practices, this paper demonstrates that there is essentially no relationship between the punitiveness of a province's courts and that province's residents' views of courts, sentences, and the justice system.

Canada officially abolished status offenses for young people in 1984 when it replaced the Juvenile Delinquents Act with the Young Offenders Act. Prior to 1984, two major status offenses that were controversial were sexual immorality (or any similar form of vice) and incorrigibility. Like the United States, Canada had to deal with the conflicting goals of treating youths who committed offenses in a manner consistent with due process concerns and the desire to intervene in positive ways towards youths. And similar to the United States, this tension was most pronounced with status offenses and girls. This chapter explores how incorrigibility and sexual immorality were handled by the courts during the 1950s and 1960s. The data were used to examine the youth court processing of juvenile status offenders during a period well before the law was replaced. Specifically, trends in bringing these two types of cases into court, adjudicating the offenders delinquent, and sentencing them to custody are compared. The chapter also looks at the incarceration of girls in Canada and the United States.

The last forty years of the twentieth century were a turbulent period for youth justice in both Canada and the United States. The 1974 Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act was the first substantial piece of federal juvenile justice legislation that affected juvenile justice in the individual states. One of the main goals of this act was to deinstitutionalize status offenders. The deinstitutionalization goal, however, could be seen as conflicting with intervention. This chapter explores how the tension between wanting to intervene and wanting not to incarcerate youths for non-criminal behaviors played out, focusing on the youth court processing (for example, bringing the juvenile into court, adjudicating the delinquent, and sentencing the offender to custody) of status offenses. It looks at two types of relatively minor offending — obstructing justice and disorderly conduct — in order to see if there are any consistencies in how these status-type offenses are handled for boys and girls.

Bien que le Canada n'ait jamais réussi à atteindre une grande cohérence en matière de détermination de la peine, pendant plus d'un siècle, les taux d'incarcérations y sont demeurés constants, alors que d'autres pays, notamment les États-Unis, ont vu leurs niveaux d'emprisonnement augmenter considérablement. Une explication partielle de cette stabilité réside dans la tradition canadienne de scepticisme à l'égard des bénéfices de l'emprisonnement – une position qui fut jusqu'en 2006 partagée par les gouvernements fédéraux libéraux et conservateurs. Toutefois, les juges chargés de prononcer les peines n'ont jamais reçu de directives claires du Parlement sur les objectifs qui devraient être concrètement associés aux décisions portant sur les sentences. Les politiques de détermination de la peine basées sur des principes clairs ont connu un rapide déclin à partir de 2006 avec l'introduction par les Conservateurs de nombreux projets de lois pénales modifiant l'économie de la punition. Dans son ensemble, cette activité législative représente l'antithèse d'une réforme de la justice pénale réfléchie et fondée sur des principes. En 1999, Jean-Paul Brodeur décrivait les valeurs qui sous-tendaient les politiques de détermination de la peine comme « rien de moins qu'une catastrophe morale ». Il ne fait aucun doute sur la manière dont il aurait qualifié la période qui s'est amorcée en 2006.

Bien que le Canada n'ait jamais réussi à atteindre une grande cohérence en matière de détermination de la peine, pendant plus d'un siècle, les taux d'incarcérations y sont demeurés constants, alors que d'autres pays, notamment les États-Unis, ont vu leurs niveaux d'emprisonnement augmenter considérablement. Une explication partielle de cette stabilité réside dans la tradition canadienne de scepticisme à l'égard des bénéfices de l'emprisonnement – une position qui fut jusqu'en 2006 partagée par les gouvernements fédéraux libéraux et conservateurs. Toutefois, les juges chargés de prononcer les peines n'ont jamais reçu de directives claires du Parlement sur les objectifs qui devraient être concrètement associés aux décisions portant sur les sentences. Les politiques de détermination de la peine basées sur des principes clairs ont connu un rapide déclin à partir de 2006 avec l'introduction par les Conservateurs de nombreux projets de lois pénales modifiant l'économie de la punition. Dans son ensemble, cette activité législative représente l'antithèse d'une réforme de la justice pénale réfléchie et fondée sur des principes. En 1999, Jean-Paul Brodeur décrivait les valeurs qui sous-tendaient les politiques de détermination de la peine comme « rien de moins qu'une catastrophe morale ». Il ne fait aucun doute sur la manière dont il aurait qualifié la période qui s'est amorcée en 2006.

Criminology & Public PolicyVolume 10, Issue 3 p. 781-790 POLICY ESSAY American imprisonment and prison officers’ unions Anthony N. Doob, Anthony N. Doob University of TorontoSearch for more papers by this authorRosemary Gartner, Rosemary Gartner University of TorontoSearch for more papers by this author Anthony N. Doob, Anthony N. Doob University of TorontoSearch for more papers by this authorRosemary Gartner, Rosemary Gartner University of TorontoSearch for more papers by this author First published: 19 July 2011 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-9133.2011.00746.xCitations: 2 Anthony N. Doob, Centre for Criminology and Sociolegal Studies, University of Toronto, 14 Queen's Park Crescent West, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5S 3K9 (e-mail: [email protected]). The Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada provided support for writing this essay through grants to Anthony N. Doob and Rosemary Gartner. Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume10, Issue3Special Issue: Special Issue on Mass IncarcerationAugust 2011Pages 781-790 RelatedInformation

Canada does not fit easily into the typology of political economies and their penal tendencies proposed by Cavadino and Dignan (2006a; 2006b). Based on a study of penal systems in twelve contemporary capitalist countries (not including Canada), these scholars demonstrate a relationship between a nation's political economy on the one hand and the punitiveness of its penal culture (particularly as expressed by its rate of imprisonment) on the other hand. Indeed, they suggest that certain political regimes (e.g. neoliberalism, conservative corporatism, etc.) have distinct penal landscapes (i.e. more or less punitive penal policies).