An examination of the Iranian philosopher Reza Negarestani's development of political theology. Considered within the context of his involvement with a strand of contemporary philosophical thinking known as speculative realism, it examines Negarestani's use of Islamic referents in Cyclonopedia, a multi-layered frame story belonging to the genre of theory fiction, and in more technical-philosophical treatises. Focusing on his deployment of dissenting interpretations of the notions of taqiyya (concealment, dissimulation) and qiyama (resurrection), the resulting spatiotemporal implications are assessed by putting Negarestani in conversation with classical and contemporary Islamic and non-Muslim thinkers, theologians, and philosophers.

This chapter examines Hamid Dabashi’s position within the academy and his interactions with other scholars with Muslim backgrounds. In particular, it examines Dabashi’s notion that the world no longer has east and west or metropole and colony, and that this has fundamentally changed that the discussion of Islam can operate. He conceives of this as a liberation, which breaks down the reified distinction between a religious ‘Islamic world’ and a secularised ‘West’. And it defends Dabashi from Shahab Ahmed’s accusation that his thought remains trapped into a binary of secular/religion: Dabashi argues that Muslims in the past have been perfectly capable of distinguishing state, religion and society, and have done so in ways that have been varied and innovative.

This chapter examines the intertwining and interpenetration of philosophical hermeneutics with epistemes derived from Islamicate contexts, with the purpose of establishing the potential for better mutual understanding between Muslim and non-Muslim ways of thinking. In this regard, the investigation is not only concerned with the academic rigour of the hermeneutical labours involved. Working toward a tentative answer to the question whether dialogical and dialectical interfaces grounded in a shared intellectual history imply cultural or conceptual transfers, or both, it is accepted that such philosophical projects are not value-free. With that mind, I have selected two contemporary Muslim intellectuals who have translated their epistemological concerns as hermeneuticians into ethico-political agendas presented under the heading 'Islamic liberation theology'.

This chapter analyses blasphemy in the Indonesia-specific setting, with emphasis on three cases, against a Christian top politician, the Ahmadiyya minority and a self-proclaimed prophetess. The surge of blasphemy cases in post-authoritarian Indonesia is linked to the new political importance of national Islamic organisations. We also see how blasphemy tends to be construed as a form of purity violation.

This chapter offers a broad perspective on the ideological use of Islam in a global context. It begins by challenging the perception of the political use of religion in the Muslim world as an Islamic resurgence, because this obscures the continued and continuing political relevance of religion to Muslims throughout history. The chapter surveys the political significance of Islam’s universality claim, both institutionally and symbolically; the conflation and deconflation of religion and statehood; and the post-Cold War role of Islamism on the global stage. To capture the wide variety in which Islam features in public life and international relations, the chapter introduces an alternative taxonomy for categorizing different ways of engaging politically with religion, distinguishing between traditional, reactionary and progressive approaches. It also examines how Sunni-Shi’a polarization features in the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran for control of the Persian Gulf and wider Middle East. The chapter’s scope extends beyond the Middle East to include the most populous Muslim country in the world: Indonesia and the unique dynamics of Islam in this second largest democracy in Asia. It also addresses counter-narratives, such as Post-Islamism and Moderatism.

In the first two decades of the twenty-first century inter-faith encounters have become a casualty of a paradigm shift in the thinking about the global order from the political-ideological bi-polar worldview of the Cold War era to a multipolar world marred by the prospect of culture wars along civilisational fault lines shaped by religiously-informed identity politics. On the back of 9/11 and other atrocities perpetrated by violent extremists from Muslim backgrounds, in particular relations with Muslims and the Islamic world are coined in binary terms of us-versus-them. Drawing on earlier research on cosmopolitanism, cultural hybridity and liminality, this article examines counter narratives to such modes of dichotomous thinking. It also seeks to shift away from the abstractions of collective religious identity formations to an appreciation of individual interpretations of religion. For that purpose, the article interrogates the notions of cultural schizophrenia, double genealogy and west-eastern affinities developed by philosophers and creative writers, such as Daryush Shayegan, Abdelwahab Meddeb, and Navid Kermani.

One of the biggest stumbling blocks to a proper understanding of politics in the contemporary Islamic world is the sheer and utter ignorance on the part of most commentators. Terms—undetermined and overdetermined in equal measure—such as “Wahhabi,” “Salafi,” and “Islamist” are bandied about and in such a manner that they lead to the “inevitable” conclusion that Islam and democracy cannot possibly mix well with one another. To garner proof for this mutual hostility, the disappointing afterlife of the Arab Spring of 2011, particularly its fate under al-Sisi’s 2013 crackdown in Egypt, is held up as a prime example of this failure. Orientalist assumptions abound in such formulations. “Islam is not compatible with Western forms of governance” or, just as problematic, “Muslims threaten the West with their nameless and faceless unity.” In this welcome study, Andrew F. March sheds important light on Islamic theories of governance. Following his American Academy of Religion award-winning Islam and Liberal Citizenship (2009), he seeks to explore the little-studied notion of popular sovereignty in Islam through an examination of the topic in the writings of Muslim intellectuals. Though it is a theoretical work, the specter of the Arab Spring looms large in his analysis. He relies on an impressive array of political thinkers, both Muslim and non-Muslim, to show the richness and the complexity of Islamist theories of state.

s Indonesia's Islamic Revolution is not about the perceived religious resurgence of Islam in the Muslim world during the final decades of the twentieth century, an idea expanding onto a global scale and becoming even more pronounced since the start of the new millennium.The Islamic

"The making of a gay Muslim: religion, sexuality and identity in Malaysia and Britain." Religion, State & Society, 47(1), pp. 169–170

The caliphate as an institution for governing the Muslim community can be traced back to the time immediately after the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 ce. With its humble origins in the parochial settings of an Arabian desert oasis, the caliphate provided the structure for the shepherding of a community of believers organized around prophetic teachings calling for return to the true religion of Abraham, Moses, Jesus, and other prophets, a religion that came to be known as Islam. Despite internal dissent and even civil war, the caliphate not only survived but even expanded far beyond the Arabian Peninsula. Between the 8th and 10th centuries the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates ruled an empire stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Indus River. After that, the challenges of sustained political control proved too formidable to be exercised from a single center, leading to political fragmentation. Although it functioned only for a few centuries as an effective form of Islamic governance, for many Sunni Muslims the caliphate’s political and symbolic significance has outlasted its administrative and institutional fragmentation. Its appeal even continued after its formal abolition in 1924 by the founding president of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (1881–1938). Since then the caliphate has not just remained a nostalgic memory. Throughout the 20th century and into the new millennium, some proponents of political Islam continue to advocate the restoration of a caliphate as a rallying point for Muslims worldwide, in some instances making concrete efforts toward re-establishing the institution or even proclaiming a new caliph.