In this paper we discuss the problem of the neural conditions of "we-ness": which neural mechanisms underlie "we-processes"? Neurophysiological and neuropsychological evidence suggests that in different areas of the brain neural representations are shared by several individuals. This situation, on one hand, creates a potential problem for correct attribution. On the other hand, it may provide the conditions for we-ness.

Is it possible to perceive others' mental states? Are mental states visible in others' behavior? In contrast to the traditional view that mental states are hidden and not directly accessible to perception, in recent years a phenomenologically-motivated account of social cognition has emerged: direct social perception. However, despite numerous published articles that both defend and critique direct perception, researchers have made little progress in articulating the conditions under which direct perception of others' mental states is possible. This paper proposes an empirically anchored approach to the observability of others' mentality – not just in the weak sense of discussing relevant empirical evidence for and against the phenomenon of interest, but also, and more specifically, in the stronger sense of identifying an experimental strategy for measuring the observability of mental states and articulating the conditions under which mental states are observable. We conclude this article by reframing the problem of direct perception in terms of establishing a definable and measurable relationship between movement features and perceived mental states.

Seeing mental states [1] poses an ambitious question: Is it possible to perceive the mental states of others? According to the authors, the answer is yes. To that end, they overview some 15 studies showing that observers of a reaching arm can discern the intentions of the reaching, specifically, whether to grasp, to place, to pass, or to pour. The judgments are made before the hand arrives at the glass so the act that observers are predicting is never seen. In addition, they show how the kinematics of the reaching differ for each case, allowing the perceivers judgments. These findings are remarkable given that the kinematic differences among the actions are subtle. The overview cogently, elegantly, and convincingly summarizes the findings and in doing so, addresses criticisms that have been directed at the methods and conclusions. It is impressive how much can be reliably inferred just from the kinematics of a reaching arm. This is a significant set of findings and it is good to have them in one place. However, the distance from discerning whether the intent of a reaching arm is to pour or grasp or place or pass to seeing intentions and mental states in general is vast. Even for this case, why is the person is reaching, for example, to grasp a glass? To drink? To toast? To throw the glass at the host? To distance the glass from a child? To clear the table? To hint to guests that it’s time to leave? Those larger intentions and mental states might not be apparent from the outside and they are often the ones of interest. There are so many possible mental states, some emotional, some strategic, some cognitive. Some are more likely to be expressed in observable actions of the body, the face, the eyes, or the voice, some less likely. Some mental states are unknown to their actors, and even incorrectly interpreted by them [2] (Nisbett and Wilson, 1977). Strong emotional responses are often deliberately and successfully hidden [3] (Gross, 1999); indeed, suppressing expression of emotional states is essential for effective social interactions. Magicians fool us and basketball players fake us. The present methods rely on actions of the body, but so many mental states are not accompanied by actions of the body. The question raised, is it possible to perceive others’ mental states, must be refined, which states and under which circumstances?

The human ability to predict and interpret others' intentions is crucial to social life. The purpose of this chapter is to consider the proposition that intentions can be understood from observing others' movements. To this end, we first focus on experimental evidence showing that individual, social and communicative intentions `shape' movement kinematics. Next, we review recent work suggesting that during action observation humans are capable of picking up intention information and using it to predict others' behavior. In the third section, we address the neural mechanisms that mediate the ability to read intention from movement observation. Based on preliminary data, we argue that mirror neuron areas are sensitive to intention information conveyed by movement kinematics. Finally, we discuss the hypothesis that a deficit in this ability might account for the difficulties in social interaction reported in autism spectrum disorders.

A philosopher and a neuroscientist, stuck in an elevator, exchange views on ontology and realism. When the elevator door opens, the dialogue stops. But many interesting open problems in the philosophical and neuroscientific filed have been raised.

Social objects have been at the centre of philosophical discussion and debate over the last decade. So far, however, little empirical work has been conducted on social objects and we are still at the very early stages of understanding how the brain permits us to represent, recognize, and constitute a social reality. In this chapter, we consider five core questions for a neuroscience of social objects: Are social objects a category of objects in the brain? When we use money or see it being used, do we employ similar representations as those of concrete tools such as screwdrivers? How do status functions emerge? Do social objects depend on a uniquely human ability to share goals and intentions? Do social objects influence the sensory-motor system? We speculate on ways in which these questions might be addressed combining behavioural, developmental, neuropsychological, and neuro-imaging approaches.

A key component of social understanding is the ability to read intentions from movements. But how do we discern intentions in others’ actions? What kind of intention information is actually available in the features of others’ movements? Based on the assumption that intentions are hidden away in the other person’s mind, standard theories of social cognition have mainly focused on the contribution of higher level processes. Here, we delineate an alternative approach to the problem of intention-from-movement understanding. We argue that intentions become “visible” in the surface flow of agents’ motions. Consequently, the ability to understand others’ intentions cannot be divorced from the capability to detect essential kinematics. This hypothesis has far reaching implications for how we know other minds and predict others’ behavior.

Is it possible to understand the intentions of others by merely observing their movements? Current debate has been mainly focused on the role that mirror neurons and motor simulation may play in this process, with surprisingly little attention being devoted to how intentions are actually translated into movements. Here, we delineate an alternative approach to the problem of intention-from-movement understanding, which takes “action execution” rather than “action observation” as a starting point. We first consider whether and to what extent, during action execution, intentions shape movement kinematics. We then examine whether observers are sensitive to intention information conveyed by visual kinematics and can use this information to discriminate between different intentions. Finally, we consider the neural mechanisms that may contribute to intention-from-movement understanding. We argue that by reframing the relationship between intention and movement, this evidence opens new perspectives into the neurobiology of how we know other minds and predict others’ behavior.

Does the human mind allow for self-locating at more than one place at a time? Evidence from neurology, cognitive neuroscience, and experimental psychology suggests that mental bilocation is a complex, but genuine experience, occurring more frequently than commonly thought. In this article, we distinguish between different components of bilocated self-representation: self-localization in two different places at the same time, self-identification with another body, reduplication of first-person perspective. We argue that different forms of mental bilocation may result from the combination of these components. To illustrate this, we discuss evidence of mental bilocation in pathological conditions such as heautoscopy, during immersion in virtual environments, and in everyday life, during social interaction. Finally, we consider the conditions for mental bilocation and speculate on the possible role of mental bilocation in the context of social interaction, suggesting that self-localization at two places at the same time may prove advantageous for the construction of a shared space.

An aspect of gaze processing, which so far has been given little attention, is the influence that intentional gaze processing can have on object processing. Converging evidence from behavioural neuroscience and developmental psychology strongly suggests that objects failing under the gaze of others acquire properties that they would not display if not looked at. Specifically, observing another person gazing at an object enriches that object of motor, affective and status properties that go beyond its chemical or physical structure. A conceptual analysis of available evidence leads to the conclusion that gaze has the potency to transfer to the object the intentionality of the person looking at it.

Empirical studies on intention have so far focused on intention-in-action. Much less work has been done on prior intention. In this paper, we focus on the relation between prior intention and action and the mechanisms underlying the representations of prior intention in the brain. The conventional view separates prior intention from action, assuming that the very same action may serve different prior intentions. Here, in contrast with this view, we discuss recent findings suggesting an involvement of the motor system in representing and understanding prior intentions. Bridging the gap between prior intentions and actions, these findings help us to understand how from the observation of another person's actions we can trace back to her prior intention.

Temporality enters our immediate experience as passage and becoming: the role time plays in the construction of a world of enduring entities tends to go unnoticed. This paper examines the relation between time and ontology in the context of unilateral neglect, a neuropsychological syndrome in which patients fail to perceive or respond to stimuli in the contralateral hemifield, behaving as if that half of space does not exist. Traditional models characterize neglect exclusively in spatial terms. Based on recent investigations suggesting abnormal temporal dynamics, here we highlight the impact of time factors on the presentation of the disorder. Neglect patients do not simply miss the presence of stimuli on the left: they also ignore the past as well as the future of neglected stimuli. We claim that, if this occurs, it is because time, and not only space, is impaired. (c) 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Temporality enters our immediate experience as passage and becoming: the role time plays in the construction of a world of enduring entities tends to go unnoticed. This paper examines the relation between time and ontology in the context of unilateral neglect, a neuropsychological syndrome in which patients fail to perceive or respond to stimuli in the contralateral hemifield, behaving as if that half of space does not exist. Traditional models characterize neglect exclusively in spatial terms. Based on recent investigations suggesting abnormal temporal dynamics, here we highlight the impact of time factors on the presentation of the disorder. Neglect patients do not simply miss the presence of stimuli on the left: they also ignore the past as well as the future of neglected stimuli. We claim that, if this occurs, it is because time, and not only space, is impaired.

In the present paper we present a short review of some recent neurophysiological and neuropsychological findings which suggest that self-generated actions and actions of others are mapped on the same neural substratum. Since this substratum is neutral with respect to the agent, correctly attributing an action to its proper author requires the co-activation of areas specific to the self and the other. A conceptual analysis of the empirical data will lead us to conclude that from a neurobiological point of view the problem is not ' how is it possible to share the intentions of others ', but rather ' how one can distinguish one ' s own action/intention from those of other people '.