Flooding is an ongoing and predicted impact of climate change in many parts of the world. Previous research shows that many people who have experienced flooding exhibit a greater preparedness to act on climate change, especially when the experience relates to more pronounced emotional responses. However, this research has mainly focused on general negative emotional reactions to flooding. Here, we re-analysed a large UK survey dataset (N = 1997) using mixed-methods to examine discrete emotional responses to flooding, including positive emotions, and their relationship with environmental intentions and policy support. Whilst anxiety, anger, helplessness, and distress, dominate people’s experience, positive emotions were also reported as significantly higher in our flooded group, particularly gratitude and pride in response to the receipt of external and community support; surprise was also observed. Thematic analysis highlighted perceived impacts of flooding, and the experience of positive support, as being key to alleviating distress and anxiety, as well as promoting subsequent positive long-term actions to reduce flooding. Notably indirect experience of flooding was also impactful with a range of emotional responses also reported by observers. Regression analysis indicated that higher levels of anxiety, distress, and gratitude were associated with greater intentions to act environmentally in the future (alongside greater levels of anger and lower levels of indifference), and to support for environmental policies (alongside greater levels of sympathy). We suggest that the provision of support following flooding may promote considerations of morality and climate change and increase the likelihood (of both recipients and observers) to undertake pro social and pro-environmental behaviour themselves in the future.
Recent cross-sectional and experimental research has found measures of climate change related distress to be positively associated with measures of self-efficacy. Authors of some of these studies have interpreted this finding in terms of motivated control, that is, people who experience climate change related distress are motivated to believe that they can help mitigate climate change. We extend this notion of motivated control by assuming that efficacy beliefs flowing from climate change related distress play a role in encouraging climate action. In two cross-sectional studies, we investigate this assumption: Study 1 used data from a multi-country study and found that negative emotions regarding climate change were positively associated with climate action and both individual and collective self-efficacy. Furthermore, we found evidence for an indirect effect of negative emotions on climate action via self-efficacy (individual and collective). Study 2 conceptually replicated this mediation effect, using data from a sample of citizens in Germany and a different measure of distress, focusing on climate change worry. Additional exploratory analyses revealed that associations with self-efficacy and climate action were stronger for more adaptive forms of climate change worry, compared to less adaptive forms. We conclude that our findings provide correlational support for motivated control being one of the psychological processes – and self-efficacy being one of the person-level factors – that account for adaptive behavioral reactions to climate change related distress. Experimental and longitudinal studies are needed to further substantiate this conclusion.
There is growing evidence that climate anxiety is associated with significant effects on the mental health and wellbeing of young people. However, the relative importance of climate anxiety for young people's mental health has hitherto been unclear, as climate anxiety has largely been studied in isolation from other common stressors. This study sought to contextualize the significance of climate anxiety for the mental health of UK young adults relative to other concurrent psychological stressors. We surveyed university students (N = 461) and a general population sample aged 18-25 (N = 400). The results showed that while climate anxiety was significantly associated with poorer mental health and worse insomnia when examined alone, this association became nonsignificant or greatly diminished when other stressors were considered. Loneliness was found to be the most important predictor of mental health, and financial anxiety the most important predictor of insomnia severity. The findings suggest that climate anxiety, while concerning, may not be an especially dominant factor in young people's mental health. Our research highlights the need to consider the broader context of young people's lives, and the complex interplay of various psychological stressors, in efforts to map pathways between climate change and mental health.
Food systems are a major contributor to environmental impacts such as greenhouse gas emissions and biodiversity loss, with widespread dietary changes required to avoid surpassing safe planetary boundaries by 2050. To promote dietary shifts among the public it is crucial to understand how people perceive the environmental impact of food products. However, prior investigations into this topic have covered only a narrow range of product types and elicited perceptions using researcher-imposed, single-item environmental friendliness scales-which might not align with consumers' underlying mental representations. We conducted a card sorting study in which UK participants (n = 168) organised a diverse range of supermarket food products into environmental impact categories that they created and labelled themselves. Participants subsequently viewed product-level scientific impact estimates and reported whether they were surprised by how high or low each impact was. Multidimensional scaling of card sorting data indicated a two-dimensional solution, with participants primarily distinguishing products by animal vs. plant-origin and level of processing. Category labels assigned during the sorting task and participants' self-reported surprise at scientific impact estimates suggested they tended to overestimate the impact of highly processed foods and underestimate the impact of waterintensive products (e.g., nuts). Furthermore, mixed-effects regression analyses indicated that surprise at how high the scientifically estimated impact of a given product was predicted intentions to consume less of that product in the future. Results provide novel insight into consumers' mental representations of food sustainability, with implications for the development of information-provision strategies such as eco-labelling and public awareness campaigns.
This study aimed to investigate the impact of death salience on perceived responsibility toward future generations and pro-environmental attitudes across generations. Using a sample of 1243 participants from Generation Z, Millennials, Generation X, Baby Boomers, and Silent Generation, an experimental manipulation of death salience resulted in lowered responsibility toward future generations among participants in the death salience condition compared with the control condition. Generation Z had a lower perceived responsibility toward future generations than Generation X and Baby Boomers. Silent Generation had lower pro-environmental attitudes than Generation Z, Millennials, and Generation X. Baby Boomers had lower pro-environmental attitudes than Generation Z and Millennials. The interaction between death salience and generation showed no significant effect on the dependent variables. These findings suggest that leveraging responsibility toward future generations for climate action is promising, but making death salient may undermine this approach.
This study investigates the role of emotions in predicting sustainable food purchase intentions. A national representative sample from Norway (N = 785) was randomly assigned to rate their emotional response to specific food categories: livestock, capture fishery, aquaculture, and hunting. Emotional responses to each food category were of moderate intensity but there were no significant differences between specific animal-sourced foods. Findings from a series of regression analyses showed that egoistic values positively predict the intensity of positive and negative emotions for all food categories. Additionally, it was shown that individual differences in biospheric values (when strong) and hedonic values (when weak) predicted stronger negative emotions. Further analysis showed that negative emotions are the most consistent predictor of willingness to pay for sustainable animal-sourced food. These findings suggest that negative emotions can potentially be leveraged to enhance sustainable animal-sourced food consumption intentions.
This study utilizes national survey data from Norway to explore public views on flight shame, measured between 2020 and 2022. Answers to open-ended and closed-ended questions are integrated to explore various perspectives on flight shame, including its function as a persuasive call to action and its normative underpinning. Most display ambiguous, vague, or neutral attitudes towards the concept, with favourable attitudes being more common when it is construed as relating to infection control. Perceived norms show stronger associations with self-reported flight shame than with an expressed willingness to accept increased travel time or higher financial costs. This supports assertions that changes in the availability and feasibility of alternatives to flying could be needed to break up entrenched travel habits.
Social norms are strongly associated with pro-environmental behaviour, and social norm-based intervention is a popular strategy for promoting environmentally friendly behaviour. Recent body of knowledge has distinguished two types of social norms: injunctive norms (what most people should do or ought to do) and descriptive norms (what most group members do). However, Africa researchers in sub-Saharan Africa have scarcely investigated the dynamic relations of injunctive norms and descriptive norms with pro-environmental behaviour. We examined the contributions of descriptive norms and injunctive norms to pro-environmental behaviour in the sub-Saharan African context. Data was obtained from 581 students at a public university in Nigeria. They provided socio-demographic information and completed measures of social norms regarding negative emotional responses to climate change and sustainable consumption behaviours. Results showed descriptive norms were not a significant predictor of pro-environmental behaviour, but injunctive norm increase in injunctive norms was associated with reductions in pro-environmental behaviour. We also found a suppression effect (change of the original relationship), such that by itself, descriptive norms did not substantially predict pro-environmental behaviour but the inclusion of injunctive norms in the analytic model increased its positive association with pro-environmental behaviour. Similar suppressor effects were also found for the inverse association between injunctive norms and pro-environmental behaviour. This idea of mutual suppression suggests that social policies that promote pro-environmental behaviour due to shifts in descriptive norms will foster development in injunctive norms. Acknowledging this mutuality is informative for normative theory and can facilitate the efficient application of social norms as a tool for environmental behaviour policy.
Background Research on the nature and prevalence of phenomena like climate anxiety (or eco-anxiety) is increasing rapidly but there is little understanding of the conditions under which climate change worry becomes more or less likely to significantly impact mental wellbeing. Here, we considered two plausible moderators of the relationship between climate change worry and mental wellbeing: neuroticism and efficacy beliefs. Methods Analysis was conducted with survey data gathered in six European countries in autumn 2019. Participants were recruited from universities in the participating countries using opportunity sampling. Results We found that climate change worry is negatively related to mental wellbeing at any level of perceived efficacy. In contrast, climate change worry is only significantly related to mental wellbeing at low and average levels of neuroticism. High neuroticism appears to have a masking, rather than amplifying, role in the relationship between climate change worry and mental wellbeing. Limitations The cross-sectional design of the study precludes verification of causal relationships among variables. The brief measure of neuroticism employed also did not allow for nuanced analysis of how different facets of neuroticism contribute to the observed interaction with climate change worry. Findings cannot be indiscriminately generalised to less privileged groups facing the worst impacts of the climate crisis. Conclusion Our findings lend to a view that harmful impacts of climate change worry on mental wellbeing cannot simply be ascribed to dispositional traits like neuroticism. We advocate for interventions that tackle negative climate-related emotions as unique psychological stressors.
To get an understanding of drivers of animal-sourced protein consumption, we explored laypeople's affective images of animal-sourced food. A national representative sample of the Norwegian population (N = 783) provided free associations to six food products originating either from livestock, capture fishery, aquaculture, or hunting. Subsequently, participants evaluated their own free associations as either positive, negative, or neutral. We found that people show different associative patterns for animal-sourced food from land than from sea. Livestock and hunting are mostly related to traditions and food, whereas capture fishery relates to production, consequences, and evaluations. People reported to have little knowledge about food products in the aquaculture category. Livestock was the most positively evaluated category, followed by hunting and capture fishery; aquaculture elicited the most negative associations. The current findings suggest a need to consider different strategies to encourage consumption of specific categories of food products.
Some argue that complementing climate change mitigation measures with solar radiation management (SRM) might prove a last resort to limit global warming to 1.5 °C. To make a socially responsible decision on whether to use SRM, it is important to consider also public opinion, across the globe and particularly in the Global South, which would face the greatest risks from both global warming and SRM. However, most research on public opinion about SRM stems from the Global North. We report findings from the first large-scale, cross-cultural study on the public opinion about SRM among the general public (N = 2,248) and students (N = 4,583) in 20 countries covering all inhabited continents, including five countries from the Global South and five ‘non-WEIRD’ (i.e. not Western, Educated, Industrialised, Rich, and Democratic) countries from the Global North. As public awareness of SRM is usually low, we provided participants with information on SRM, including key arguments in favour of and against SRM that appear in the scientific debate. On average, acceptability of SRM was significantly higher in the Global South than in the ‘non-WEIRD’ Global North, while acceptability in the ‘WEIRD’ Global North was in between. However, we found substantial variation within these clusters, especially in the ‘non-WEIRD’ Global North, suggesting that countries do not form homogenous clusters and should thus be considered individually. Moreover, the average participants’ views, while generally neither strong nor polarised, differed from some expert views in important ways, including that participants perceived SRM as only slightly effective in limiting global warming. Still, our data suggests overall a conditional, reluctant acceptance. That is, while on average, people think SRM would have mostly negative consequences, they may still be willing to tolerate it as a potential last resort to fight global warming, particularly if they think SRM has only minor negative (or even positive) impacts on humans and nature.
The term climate anxiety has increasingly appeared in the academic literature and popular discourse since 2019, typically when discussing young people’s negative emotional responses to climate change. This paper reports results from a nationally representative survey of the Norwegian public (N = 2040) that investigated whether people respond differently to descriptions of young people “having climate anxiety”, compared with being “concerned” or “worried” about climate change. Results from the survey experiment showed stronger support for politicians taking young people’s climate concern or climate worry into consideration when designing new climate policy as compared with young people’s climate anxiety. Analyses of an open-ended question asking what people think of when they hear or read the term “climate anxiety” showed that most respondents (52%) provided neutral descriptions (e.g., worry about climate change impacts), 27% viewed climate anxiety as unfounded, irrational, or excessive, and equal proportions of respondents critiqued the term specifically for contributing to such negative associations (6%) or referred to climate anxiety as a reasonable and rational reaction (6%). These findings indicate that among some audiences, using the term climate anxiety may provoke reactance and be perceived as distracting from political actions to mitigate climate change. Our results give important insights into the potential consequences of the terms we use when reporting on climate distress.
There is a dearth of empirical evidence on the coping strategies of UK ethnic minority (UKEM) healthcare workers during the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic despite evidence of their increased risk of infection and less protection, disproportionate redeployment, and gross work-life imbalance. The present study explored UKEM healthcare workers’ coping strategies during the COVID-19 pandemic. A qualitative design comprising individual and joint interviews, and a focus group was used. Participants were 15 UKEM healthcare workers (11 females; age range: 26–58 [43.3 ± 9.4] years). Data were analyzed using thematic analysis. Participants navigated the pandemic using three key coping strategies: problem-focused coping (active and restraint coping), emotion-focused coping (positive reframing, reflective acceptance, and religiosity/spiritual bypass), and social coping and support-seeking. They particularly underscored the importance of religiosity/spiritual bypass as a coping strategy. The pandemic challenged our sample of UKEM healthcare workers to deploy a variety of coping strategies. Religiosity/spiritual bypass was particularly important in navigating the challenges of the pandemic. Coping strategy enhancement interventions among UKEM healthcare workers and the UKEM community during and post hyper-precarious conditions such as pandemics may benefit from targeting the identified coping strategies.
There are differences across Europe in elements of climate citizenship, including climate concern, perceived responsibility, and willingness to support and take climate action. This paper examines how individual-level climate perceptions correspond to a country's contribution to climate change and its ability to develop climate policies. Data from the European Social Survey Round 8 (23 European countries, n = 44,387) was used to explore how national-level factors (affluence as per capita GDP, carbon emissions as per capita CO2 emissions, and democracy as electoral democracy index) are related to individual-level climate perceptions (climate concern, perceived climate responsibility, climate policy support, and personal climate action). The analysis shows that the studied individual-level perceptions are all linked, and that perceived climate responsibility is a factor that helps in understanding how individual-level climate views are connected. Further, national-level affluence and democracy are connected to stronger individual-level perceptions both directly and through mediating their connections. Our results suggest that achieving ambitious climate policy targets in Europe could benefit from focusing on the role of perceived climate responsibility in boosting policy support and action. Moreover, the connection between national-level (democratic and economic) factors and public climate perceptions emphasises the need to place climate policies in a wider context.
•We are concerned about JEVP's decision not to accept pure qualitative research.•Qualitative research provides important insights for environmental psychology.•Excluding this method limits opportunities for research with minority populations.•The decision may negatively impact scholars from minoritised backgrounds.•It may also limit interdisciplinary approaches to environmental psychology.
Understanding people's perceptions of climate change and associated environmental risks is paramount in assessing how individuals respond to climate change. Awareness of the consequences of climate change determines the present and future behaviours and expectations, as well as the actions taken to mitigate the likely impacts. We surveyed the perceived and expected climate change consequences of experts and community members in the Lake Victoria basin in East Africa, compared them with hydro-meteorological observations and projections, and established that some perceived trends, such as increasing temperature or rainfall intensity, correspond with meteorological observations. However, the perceived increase in drought occurrence (believed to be a recent consequence), was not substantiated by the meteorological data. It was only in the northwestern region that drought frequency increased since the year 2000, while the rest of the basin did not experience such a trend. Community members were concerned about the already noticeable consequences of climate change on their livelihoods through agriculture or fishing, while experts were mainly focused on the amplification of hazards such as floods and droughts. This divergence may imply that experts underestimate the consequences that society is already facing. Nevertheless, both groups expect that climate change will undoubtedly lead to the deterioration of human well-being by affecting food security, increasing poverty, and increasing the incidence of disease. This is a serious concern that requires immediate attention. Such insights into people's climate change perceptions can help policy-makers, researchers, and community members to better tailor adaptation solutions acceptable to the local context. Effective governance is essential to enable people to adapt to climate change and other challenges, including those resulting from the impacts of globalisation, demographic trends, and the degradation and scarcity of resources.
Climate justice is increasingly prominent in climate change communication and advocacy but little is known about public understanding of the concept or how widely it resonates with different groups. In our global survey of 5,627 adults in 11 countries spanning the global north and south, most participants (66.2%) had never heard of climate justice. Nonetheless, endorsement of climate justice beliefs was widespread (for example, acknowledging the disproportionate impact of climate change on poor people and the underpinning roles of capitalism and colonialism in the climate crisis). Climate justice beliefs were also associated with various indices of climate action and policy support. These associations tended to be stronger in countries with high GHG emissions and where social inequality is also more politically salient. The results highlight the value of climate justice as a motive for climate action across diverse geographical contexts. Little is known about public understanding of climate justice, despite its increasing prominence in climate change communication. Here a global survey reveals that, although awareness of climate justice is low, beliefs in climate justice are widely supported across countries.
Based on national survey data from Norway, this study assesses if exposure to the IPCC special report on global warming of 1.5 °C can be associated with support for climate protests and mitigation policies. Respondents were asked if they had heard about the report (closed-ended question) and what they had learned from or about the report (open-ended question). Analyses of the closed-ended question showed that those who had heard about the report were also more likely to express their support for, as well as to plan on engaging in, protest for increased action by the government against climate change. A similar pattern was observed with respect to support for policy changes that can assist in mitigating climate change. Complementary analyses of the open-ended question revealed that evaluative statements formed the largest category of responses. This category included both references to the seriousness of the evolving climate crisis and comments questioning the credibility of the presented information, with the former being the most frequent response. The findings from this study are discussed in the context of public engagement with climate change, with a particular scope on the potential impacts of making the insights from scientific reports known to the general public.
People around the world are worried about the climate crisis and increased attention is being drawn to the implications that this can have for mental wellbeing. While research on the nature and prevalence of phenomena like climate anxiety (or eco-anxiety) is increasing rapidly, there is still very little understanding of the conditions under which people’s worries about climate change become more or less likely to significantly impact their mental wellbeing. Here, we considered two plausible moderators of the relationship between climate change worry and mental wellbeing: neuroticism and efficacy beliefs. Our findings show that climate change worry is negatively related to mental wellbeing at any level of perceived efficacy. In contrast, climate change worry is only significantly related to mental wellbeing at low and average levels of neuroticism. High neuroticism appears to have a masking, rather than amplifying, effect on the relationship between climate change worry and mental wellbeing.
We present a study of emotional reactions to climate change utilizing representative samples from France, Germany, Norway, and the United Kingdom (UK). Drawing on appraisal theories of emotion, we examine relations between appraisals, emotions, and behavioral intentions in the context of climate change. We compare the four countries concerning emotional differences and commonalities and relate our findings to pertinent models of cultural values. Five distinct emotions were measured: worry, hope, fear, outrage, and guilt. In addition, the survey asked respondents to appraise a set of climate-related statements, such as the causality of climate change, or the efficacy of mitigation efforts. Also, a set of climate-relevant actions, such as willingness to reduce energy consumption or support for climate policies, was assessed. Findings show that appraisals of human causation and moral concern were associated with worry and outrage, and appraisals of efficacy and technological solutions were associated with hope. Worry and outrage are associated with intentions to reduce one's energy consumption, whereas hope and guilt are related to support for policies such as tax and price increases. A country comparison shows that French respondents score high on outrage and worry and tend to engage in individual behaviors to mitigate climate change, whereas Norwegian respondents score high on hope and show a tendency to support policies of cost increase. Generally, worry is the most and guilt the least intense emotion. Moral concerns and perceived collective efficacy of one's country in addressing climate change are relatively strong in France, while beliefs in human causation and in negative impacts of climate change prevail in Germany, and confidence in technological solutions are prevalent in Norway. In sum, findings reveal typical patterns of emotional responses in the four countries and confirm systematic associations between emotions and appraisals as well as between emotions and behaviors. Relating these findings to models of cultural values reveals that Norway, endorsing secular and egalitarian values, is characterized by hope and confidence in technological solutions, whereas France and Germany, emphasizing relatively more hierarchical and traditional values, are rather characterized by fear, outrage, and support for behavioral restrictions imposed by climate change policies.