The article analyses governance difficulties at Fagor Electrodomésticos, for decades the world’s largest industrial cooperative, and sheds light on how the cooperative model and governance might have contributed to the firm’s bankruptcy. The case study examines how the cooperative model influenced the speed and quality of decision making. The roles of the main cooperative governing bodies (the General Assembly, Governing Council and Social Council) are evaluated and their limitations to effectively supervise and work with management to make difficult strategic decisions. Several governance improvement measures are proposed in order to help other large cooperatives combine democratic control and economically sound governance.

In an era when the recent financial crisis has raised questions about the morality and sustainability of the economic system, and austerity measures have led to funding challenges for many charitable and voluntary organisations, hybrid organisational forms such as social enterprise offer a promising alternative: an ethical form of business able to address social issues and reduce the dependence on donations and government funding. However, history suggests that it can be difficult for social enterprises to maintain their social goals in the face of commercial pressures and that consequently they may succumb to mission drift. Organisational governance is important in helping to manage these competing pressures, and this chapter examines some of the main choices and challenges that social enterprises face in designing their governance structures, systems and processes. One of the challenges facing hybrid organisations, such as social enterprises, is how to combine different logics; for example, many social enterprises have to combine a commercial logic necessary for operating in the market with a 'charitable'1 logic of pursuing a social mission (Ebrahim et al., 2014). It has been suggested that combining different logics can result in long-term instability, where one logic comes to dominate (Young et al., 2012). Indeed, traditional left-wing critiques of co-operatives and other forms of employee ownership suggested that these organisations would simply degenerate into being no different from capitalist forms of business as they succumbed to pressures from the marketplace (Mandel, 1975). This process whereby an organisation gradually loses its social mission is often called mission creep or mission drift (Minkoff and Powell, 2006; Jones, 2007). While social enterprises are not the only types of organisation to be susceptible to mission drift, they face the particular challenge of trying to manage being both a business and pursuing a social mission.

Based on research in worker co-operatives in the UK this paper analyses some of the problems that democratic or self-managed enterprises face concerning decision-making. It is argued that many of these problems arise because too simple a model of decision-making is adopted within the enterprise. The paper presents a more complex model which can be used to plan decision-making structures and processes within the self-managed enterprise so that some of these problems may be lessened or overcome.

Decentralization policy in English education has resulted Multi-Academy Trusts (MATs)-groups of schools governed and led by trustees. Research illustrates that many of these organizations are failing to connect with the school communities they serve. This paper uses documentary analysis and interviews with 30 MAT Board Members to examine this key area. The paper reveals that although there are some strategies in place to overcome this issue, that failure to implement fundamental processes such as communication strategies are leading to fragmentation and feelings of disconnect, and this raises questions as to the extent to which MATs are in touch with and serving their school communities.

Given the complexity of many social, environmental, and economic problems facing communities, nonprofit organizations are increasingly collaborating with public authorities—but the power dynamics of such arrangements can be extremely complex and fraught with institutional interests, as representatives of the various collaborating parties shift over time with changing political and other realities. The literature on such collaborations often does not do justice to what this means for the governance and life cycles of these efforts. In this article, we propose a conceptual framework that seeks to explain the formation, governance, and life cycle of public–nonprofit collaborations. As is noted by Melissa Stone and Jodi Sandfort, “research on nonprofit organizations does not fully consider how the policy environment shapes organizational operation and performance and shapes how actors act strategically to advance their organizational interests.” And, in 2006, David Renz suggested that, in fact, many governance decisions are made at a meta level—above the realm of any single nonprofit board—in the funding and policy environments. Thus, Renz writes, understanding governance as merely board activity is shortsighted and limiting; he advocates a new focus on interorganizational governance processes that occur as organizations work together to address social problems. Such collaborations can be relatively long or short term, and they ordinarily contain power dynamics that must be worked out. But when the collaboration mixes public and private organizations, other issues often emerge having to do with changing institutional interests and tenures. This leads us to consider what the factors are that lead to the formation of public–nonprofit partnerships, how they are governed, and the influences on their life cycle. We base our observations here, in part, on a longitudinal case study of a public nonprofit collaboration in the United Kingdom. This partnership was aimed at neighborhood regeneration in deprived areas of one United Kingdom city. The head of the regeneration team, an employee of the city council, initiated the collaboration and acted as a key coordinator. The research examined the development of the collaboration from its inception, focusing particularly on an attempt by the team director to redesign its governance structure.

Accountability is a crucial element of governance. Nonprofit organizations are typically accountable to multiple stakeholders and often “do” accountability in multiple ways. But what happens when a nonprofit organization is highly dependent on a single source of funding? This article provides an empirical exploration of this issue. It draws on a longitudinal case study of one nonprofit organization in the United Kingdom that is highly dependent on a single funder to examine how accountability is constructed and enacted, with a focus on the board. It critically examines accountability processes through direct observation of board and committee meetings and in-depth interviews with board members. The analysis shows how board members work to construct broader forms of accountability beyond accountability to the funder, but then struggle to enact them. This article provides in-depth insight into the challenges that nonprofit board members face and offers a rare example of observational research on board behavior.

Copyright and Moral Rights for the articles on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. For more information on Open Research Online's data policy on reuse of materials please consult the policies page. Abstract This paper examines some of the main limitations of research on the governance of nonprofit organisations. It argues that there are limitations in both the way governance has been conceptualised and the ways in which it has been researched. It suggests that research has focussed too narrowly on the boards of unitary organisations, and ignored both the wider governance system and the more complex multi-level and multi-faceted governance structures that many organisations have evolved. It also argues that the dominant research designs employed have been cross-sectional and positivist in orientation. As a result too little attention has been paid to board processes and change and how they are influenced by contextual and historical factors. Based on this analysis some new directions for nonprofit governance research are briefly mapped out.

Copyright and Moral Rights for the articles on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. For more information on Open Research Online's data policy on reuse of materials please consult the policies page. Abstract As many of the challenges facing society are too complex to be addressed by single organizations working alone, nonprofit organizations are increasingly working in collaboration with public authorities. The governance of nonprofit-public collaborations is important for their effectiveness, yet it remains poorly understood. Drawing on case study research this article examines and develops an extant conceptual model developed by Takahashi and Smutny (2002) that seeks to explain the formation and demise of nonprofit collaborations in terms of 'collaborative windows' and the inability to adapt initial governance structures. The research finds that while initial governance structures are an important constraint on development they can be adapted and changed. It also suggests that the development of collaborations is not only influenced by changes in the collaborative window, but by how key actors in the collaboration respond to important internal tensions.

For guidance on citations see FAQs. c [not recorded] Version: Accepted Manuscript Copyright and Moral Rights for the articles on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. For more information on Open Research Online's data policy on reuse of materials please consult the policies page. Abstract This paper examines some of the main limitations of research on the governance of third sector organisations. It argues that there are limitations in both the way governance has been conceptualised and the ways in which it has been researched. It suggests that research has focussed too narrowly on the boards of unitary organisations, and ignored both the wider governance system and the more complex multi-level and multi-faceted governance structures that many organisations have evolved. It also argues that the dominant research designs employed have been cross-sectional and positivist in orientation. As a result too little attention has been paid to board processes and change and how they are influenced by contextual and historical factors. Based on this analysis some new directions for third sector governance research are briefly mapped out.

The relationship between chairs and chief executive officers (CEOs) has been largely neglected in research on nonprofit governance. Yet, a growing body of research on corporate governance in the private and public sectors suggests that this relationship is crucial both to the effective functioning of the board and the leadership of the organization. Much of the research on chair–CEO relationships has used cross-sectional research designs ignoring the fact that these relationships will evolve over time. This article responds to some of these challenges. It presents the results from longitudinal research examining the relationship between the chair and chief executive in a nonprofit organization. It shows how this relationship is “negotiated” and develops over time in response to contextual changes.

This article addresses the governance of cross-sector, inter-organizational collaboration in the context of public administration and management. It conceptualizes the governance of collaborations in terms of structures and processes that enable actors to direct, coordinate and allocate resources for the collaboration as a whole and to account for its activities. It argues that the need to pay attention to considerations of 'collaborative governance' and 'governing collaboration' in cross-sector collaborations gives rise to a number of challenges and tensions that need to be addressed if the governance form is to be sustained and the collaboration is to yield advantage.

As many of the challenges facing society are too complex to be addressed by single organizations working alone, nonprofit organizations are increasingly working in collaboration with public authorities. The governance of nonprofit–public collaborations is important for their effectiveness, yet it remains poorly understood. Drawing on case study research, this article examines and develops an extant conceptual model developed by Takahashi and Smutny that seeks to explain the formation and demise of nonprofit collaborations in terms of “collaborative windows” and the inability to adapt initial governance structures. The research finds that while initial governance structures are an important constraint on development, they can be adapted and changed. It also suggests that the development of collaborations is not only influenced by changes in the collaborative window but also by how key actors in the collaboration respond to important internal tensions.

Purpose– The aim of this paper is to develop a better understanding of the pressures that can cause mission drift among social enterprises and some of the steps that social enterprises can take to combat these pressures.Design/methodology/approach– The paper is conceptual in nature. It draws on resource dependency theory, institutional theory and various extant empirical studies to develop an understanding of the causes of mission drift. This analysis is then used to examine the practical steps that social enterprises can take to combat mission drift.Findings– The paper highlights how high dependence on a resource provider and the demands of “competing” institutional environments can lead to mission drift. Based on this analysis, the paper sets out various governance mechanisms and management strategies that can be used to combat mission drift.Practical implications– The paper sets out practical steps social enterprises can take to try to prevent mission drift. While governance mechanisms provide important safeguards, there is still a danger of mission drift unless active steps are taken to manage the tensions that arise from trying to achieve both commercial and social goals. These strategies can be divided into two broad types. Those that seek to compartmentalise the different activities into separate parts of the organization and those that seek to integrate them. Integrative strategies include careful selection and socialization, compromise and “selective coupling”.Originality/value– The paper will be of value to other researchers attempting to understand the dynamics of social enterprises and, in particular, the processes that can lead to mission drift and to managers of social enterprises keen to combat these processes.

This article reports on the results of a multi-year, multi-phase international quantitative research investigation into perceptions of board chair leadership impact in nonprofit and voluntary organizations in Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Specifically, this research tests four hypotheses and a hypothesized model derived from theoretical perspectives on chair leadership effectiveness that emerged when the results of a prior grounded theory research investigation were reviewed ex post facto through the lens of leadership literature (see Harrison and Murray, NPML, accepted). The purpose of this phase of the research is to determine: (a) whether there is empirical support for the theoretical perspectives advanced; and (b) which perspective offers the best explanation for why some board chairs are perceived as having more impact in the role than others. The results suggest chair leadership effectiveness is best understood as a multi-dimensional theoretical construct explained by more than one leadership theory. The article concludes with a discussion of the findings and directions for further research.

This article examines some of the main limitations of research on the governance of nonprofit organizations. It argues that there are limitations in both the way governance has been conceptualized and the ways in which it has been researched. It suggests that research has focused too narrowly on the boards of unitary organizations, and ignored both the wider governance system and the more complex multilevel and multifaceted governance structures that many organizations have evolved. It also argues that the dominant research designs employed have been cross-sectional and positivist in orientation. As a result, too little attention has been paid to board processes and change and how they are influenced by contextual and historical factors. Based on this analysis, some new directions for nonprofit governance research are briefly mapped out.

A number of factors are driving the growth of new hybrid forms of organizations in the third sector. Government policy has increasingly sought to create a mixed economy of welfare, by encouraging both private and third sector organizations to engage in public service delivery. Indeed government has invested heavily in capacity building and infra-structure in the sector to help make TSOs better able to take on this new role. At the same time many TSOs have been looking to diversify their income streams, and have seen trading as an important way to do this. Figures from the Voluntary Sector Almanac in 2006 showed earned income of voluntary organizations growing from 33% in 1994/5 to 47% in 2003/4, to become the largest single source of income (Wilding et al, 2006) and in 2005/6 the earned income of general charities rose to over 50% for the first time (Reichart et al, 2008).