This paper argues that temporary migration projects of the kind discussed by Ottonelli and Torresi could pose problems for the democratic character of the states where those temporary migrants work, even if it were the case that denying political rights to those migrants were not an injustice to them.The denial of such rights might yet be an injustice to existing citizens both because of their entitlement to live in a democratic society and because demographic changes resulting from migration can change the balance of forces within the citizen body.Even if temporary migrant workers have no claim in justice to political rights, there is a case for granting them such rights because of the protective effects of democracy.

Philosophical argument about migration justice, as with any such argument about applied policy, faces difficult methodological choices. On the one hand we can start from some preferred value or set of values and then try to apply those values to the human activity in question, perhaps delineating the institutions that might best realise those values; on the other, we can take something like our existing institutions as given and ask about how we might justify realistic policies that make things better than they are. Between these poles of moralism and realism lies a range of possibilities and approaches, such as, for example, John Rawls's idea of a ‘realistic utopia’ (Rawls 1999, p. 6), that try to find a sweet spot that optimally combines moral critique with a relevance to our practical concerns. Gillian Brock's Justice for People on the Move sets out an approach to justice in the...

This chapter argues that internal bordering practices such as the UK's 'hostile environment' have the effect of undermining the equal status both of citizens and more generally of those subject to the law on the territory to instead produce a proliferation and differentiation of statuses running from full citizen through various forms of semi-citizenship to subordinate outsider. The chapter draws upon speech-act theory and Jeremy Waldron's analysis of hate speech to argue that such internal bordering practices can be understood as acts of communication that subordinate and exclude some people whilst assuring others, typically in the majority ethnic core of the population, both of their superior position and of the centrality of an ethnic understanding of national identity. Such bordering practices can be seen as being in themselves a form of hate speech. The chapter will enumerate and draw upon many of the specific details of UK policy.

This paper looks at a recent challenge to the liberal inclusivist view that everyone on the state’s territory should have a path to citizenship. Economists have argued that giving immigrants an inferior legal status would persuade wealthy countries to admit more, with beneficial consequences for global justice. Whilst this trade-off might seem appealing from the impersonal perspective of the policymaker it generates incoherence from the perpective of the collective of democratic citizens, since it requires them to treat their own unjust attitudes as an objective constraint. The paper also rejects the idea that a voluntary choice to migrate can be taken as consent to an inferior status.

This chapter explores some general considerations about Jean-Jacques Rousseau's understanding of public reason, explaining how public reason is always relative to a particular public. It discusses the central case of public reason that of the general will of a state and Rousseau's idea that the general will must both come from all citizens via a process of public decision-making which generates valid laws, and applies to all citizens and be justifiable to each of them. The chapter expresses some skepticism about how successful Rousseau's project is in achieving these aims. Returning to the theme of the relativity of public reason, it looks at Rousseau's use of this idea as he tracks the way in which the collective will of the magistrates comes to dominate over the general will of citizens as the state loses its legitimacy over time. Finally, the chapter looks at Rousseau's anticipation of Rawlsian thoughts on overlapping consensus and religious pluralism with his doctrine of civil religion.

Joseph Carens has written what is sure to be the definitive text on the ethics of immigration and citizenship for many years to come. The work is the product of over three decades of work on this topic, following Carens's first contributions which initiated discussion of migration as a set of issues within political philosophy. It is therefore aptly thought of as ‘long awaited'. The book contains comprehensive discussions of citizenship, integration, the status of temporary workers, irregular migration, criteria for admission and the right of states (or not) to control movement and settlement across borders. It also addresses questions in the methodology of political philosophy. The book is remarkable for its clarity of expression and Carens has succeeded, to a degree that may be without precedent, in writing a book that is both stimulating and challenging for professional philosophers and accessible to policy makers and ordinary citizens. Carens is known as an early advocate of open borders and this book follows earlier articles in arguing that individuals have the moral right to freedom of movement and that states have, correspondingly, a duty not to impose exclusionary immigration controls. Nevertheless, as he recognizes, the advocate of such a position is arguing for a view that is a political non-starter and that many of his readers will struggle to accept. Partly for this reason, he divides the book into two parts. In the first, he concedes, for the sake of argument, the conventional view that states have a right to control their borders. In the second, he removes that concession and argues for his maximal position.

This article distinguishes between three methodologies for thinking about justice: principle-based, model-based and ‘realist’, concentrating mainly on the differences between the first two. Both model-based and realist approaches pride themselves on taking institutions seriously and argue that institutions make a fundamental difference to justice. This claim is at best not proven, and it may be possible to account for the difference that institutions make to what justice requires while retaining a non-institutional account of what justice is.

Scholars have been sharply divided over the relevance of Genevan politics and history to Rousseau's political philosophy. In this article, I try to achieve a coherent view of Rousseau's engagement with Geneva, one that rejects the idea that Geneva is simply irrelevant to his core political doctrines, but that also rejects the view that essentially reads everything as a political intervention in Genevan politics. Neither of these views seem accurate. Rather, Geneva (as Rousseau thought of it) is a constant presence that informs his thinking in different ways. Rousseau was not so naive as to think that Geneva incarnated his principles, but neither did he see its true nature as a hereditary oligarchy. He judged it flawed but remediable, a judgement perhaps informed by a loathing of civil conflict, at least until Genevan reality collided with his illusions.

RESUMO:Os estudiosos vêm se dividindo acirradamente sobre a relevância da política e da história de Genebra na filosofia política de Rousseau. Eu busco chegar a uma visão coerente do compromisso de Rousseau com Genebra, uma que rejeita tanto a ideia de que ela é simplesmente irrelevante ao núcleo das doutrinas políticas do autor, quanto a que essencialmente lê tudo como uma intervenção na política genebrina. Nenhuma dessas concepções parece correta. De fato, Genebra, como Rousseau a concebeu, é uma presença constante que informa seu pensamento de modos diferentes. Rousseau não foi tão ingênuo a ponto de pensar que Genebra encarnava seus princípios, mas também não viu a verdadeira natureza da cidade como uma oligarquia hereditária. Ele a julgou defeituosa, porém remediável, uma avaliação talvez marcada pela aversão ao conflito civil, ao menos até que a realidade genebrina colidisse com suas ilusões.

In Democratic Justice and the Social ContractAlbert Weale endorses the principle that producers should receive the full fruits of their labour (net of some deductions). This article argues that the fact that producers in some pre-capitalist societies would endorse the principle gives us little reason to do so and that operationalising such a principle for a complex modern society is impractical and undesirable.

Many accounts of justice and migration focus on the spatial exclusion of migrants. This article argues that two modes of exclusion, one spatial and the other social, are of normative interest. It explores the merits and demerits of territorial and social boundary exclusion from the point of view of justice. Territorial exclusion offends against freedoms of movement and association; social boundary exclusion undermines status equality among those subject to the same laws. Explicit awareness that modern states use both modes of exclusion is a prerequisite for clear thinking about migration justice.

This essay attempts to clarify the distinction between property and sovereignty, and to bring out the importance of that distinction to a liberal nationalism. Beginning with common intuitions about what distinguishes our rights to our possessions from the state's rightful governance over us, it proceeds to explore some historical sources of these intuitions, and the importance of a sharp distinction between ownership and governance to the rise of liberalism. From here, the essay moves into an exploration of group ownership, and the ways in which group ownership can in practice turn into an illiberal kind of sovereignty The point is to shed new light on problems that nationalist states states purporting to represent or foster a particular group identity characteristically face. Examples of these problems, from the Israel/Palestine conflict, are put forth in the conclusion.

This chapter demonstrates that Rousseau sets out no systematic moral theory of his own but rather a series of theories about other matters (political, educational, religious) which contain remarks and opinions relevant to ethics, beginning with a discussion of his theory of psychological development. It then explores a number of possible answers to the questions: what, according to Rousseau is morality, and why should we be moral? Next, the chapter explains the meaning of Rousseau's natural goodness thesis. It presents two main accounts of how individuals can achieve a flourishing and satisfied life, the first of which is Rousseau's educational theory, as articulated in Emile; the second is the political philosophy he advances in the Social Contract.

AbstractThis paper explores the contrast between two conceptions of the general will to be found in Rousseau's work, especially in theSocial Contract. The first of these identifies the general will with the decisions of the sovereign people as they legislate together; the second conceives of the general will as a transcendent fact about the society which may or may not be reflected in actual legislative decisions. Though these conceptions may be capable of reconciliation in Rousseau's own work, the tension remains and is reflected both in Rousseau's own ambivalence towards democracy and in the different ways his thought has been received and adapted in philosophy and politics.