In the wake of the pandemic, many financial firms rushed to change their business strategies, at times exposing deep structural weaknesses. This article examines an insurance company that attempted a change in business model and growth without the necessary governance and competence. The study details how supervisors shifted from passive monitoring to intrusive engagement, ultimately halting new business to force a rebuild of internal controls. This study bridges the gap between abstract theory of regulation and the applied day-today mechanics and challenges of supervising the implementation of regulation in practice to achieve the desired consumer protection and financial system integrity outcomes. It reaffirms that where critical situations arise a financial supervisor must quickly shift supervisory approach from a passive monitor to intrusive supervisory engagement.

This paper proposes a strategic shift in European Union (EU) financial regulation, advocating for the EU Financial Data Act (EU FDA) as the superior mechanism for reducing regulatory burden and strengthening supervision. The root cause of industry inefficiency lies in the fragmented data collection architecture, not a deficit of supervisory authority. Despite significant efforts by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to standardise reporting fields (eg Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation [MiFIR], European Market Infrastructure Regulation [EMIR], Securities Financing Transactions Regulation [SFTR]), the obligation to ‘report many times, differently’ persists, imposing substantial IT and compliance costs. The EU FDA would execute the ‘report once’ principle by mandating a single EU Reporting Data Dictionary and centralising submission to an ESMA central data reporting and storage facility, a single reporting mechanism. The paper proposes a streamlined data utility, coupled with ESMA-centralised advanced data analytical tools housed within a Sovereign EU Data Centre (SEDAC), which would achieve three critical outcomes: (1) measurable burden reduction for companies through elimination of duplicative reporting and the use of artificial intelligence (AI) for pre-submission error validation; (2) robust supervisory convergence by standardising analytical methodology across all national competent authorities (NCAs) and enabling real-time, cross-sectoral risk analysis (eg linking MiFIR and EMIR data); and (3) constitutional safeguarding and digital sovereignty by ensuring sensitive financial intelligence is legally and operationally protected on EU soil. Critically, this approach is fundamentally superior to current calls for broad centralised supervision. Centralised data fixes the foundational inefficiency, empowering existing supervisors with high-quality intelligence, whereas centralising authority risks creating a new layer of bureaucracy without enhancing the quality of supervision itself. The EU FDA is thus the essential legislative foundation for an intelligence data-driven and efficient European supervision, and sovereign future for the European Capital Markets and Savings and Investments Union (CMU SIU). This article is also included in The Business & Management Collection which can be accessed at https://hstalks.com/ business/.

This article analyses the structural transformation of European retail banking driven by Online Deposit Platforms (ODPs), intermediaries classified by the European Banking Authority as "comparison plus" platforms that dismantle traditional geographic and administrative frictions. While ODPs offer smaller credit institutions, such as Maltese Less Significant Institutions, a vital strategic mechanism to access deep foreign retail liquidity without physical branch networks, they fundamentally alter the underlying behavioural profile of retail liabilities. By converting granular retail savings into highly rate-sensitive balances, ODPs impart to these deposits the velocity and volatility typically associated with short-term wholesale funding. Consequently, existing micro prudential frameworks raise questions as to whether standard runoff assumptions always capture the behavioural characteristics of platform-mediated deposits under conditions of stress. Furthermore, layered intermediation models, such as fiduciary "For Benefit Of" omnibus accounts, obscure depositor visibility, fragment compliance responsibilities like Customer Due Diligence and Suspicious Activity Reporting across multiple entities, and heighten exposure to financial crime and cross-border regulatory arbitrage. To reconcile the disconnect between nominal legal classifications and actual systemic risk, European regulatory authorities must transition from traditional entity centric models towards an activity-based supervisory paradigm.

This article analyses the European Union’s regulatory evolution regarding Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) in financial markets, tracing the journey from the inception of Regulation (EU) 2022/858 to the transformative Market Integration and Supervision Package (MISP). It explores the foundational value proposition of tokenisation, namely atomic settlement and fractionalisation, while contrasting institutional successes like Project Guardian with systemic failures such as the ASX CHESS replacement. The study identifies the ‘ceiling on success’ inherent in the initial DLT Pilot Regime (DLTR), characterised by restrictive capitalisation thresholds and a lack of native cash leg integration. The analysis further evaluates the 2025 ESMA recommendations and the Commission’s subsequent MISP proposal, which seeks to establish a permanent, scalable architecture through unbundled CSD services introducing DLT Notaries and Account Keepers, and significantly elevated aggregate thresholds of €100 billion. The article concludes by arguing that the framework’s ultimate success depends on securing European technological sovereignty and maintaining an agile, national-level supervisory model rather than succumbing to premature centralisation.

The role of the money-laundering reporting officer (MLRO) has become increasingly complex and crucial in the face of evolving regulatory frameworks and rapid technological advancements. This paper examines the expanding responsibilities of MLROs, particularly within the context of the European Union’s new anti-money laundering (AML) supervisory framework and the proliferation of financial technology. It explores the multifaceted challenges faced by MLROs, including the need for technical expertise, regulatory compliance and proactive risk management in an era of heightened personal liability. The paper also highlights the transformative potential of artificial intelligence and data-driven solutions in enhancing AML/countering the financing of terrorism (CFT) processes, while emphasising the irreplaceable role of human judgement in addressing emerging risks. Furthermore, it underscores the ethical and legal considerations associated with the adoption of advanced technologies, particularly in relation to data privacy and civil liberties. Ultimately, this paper argues that the successful navigation of these dynamic challenges by AML/CFT professionals is essential to maintaining the integrity and resilience of the global financial system in an increasingly complex and high-stakes environment. This article is also included in The Business & Management Collection which can be accessed at https://hstalks.com/business/.

This article reflects on 25 years of experience in financial regulation and supervision, emphasising key lessons for future professionals. It underscores that effective supervision requires adaptability, independence, accountability, proactive intervention, and international cooperation. The evolution from principles-based to rules-based, and now outcomes-based regulation, highlights the need for regulators to be flexible amidst global crises, technological advances, and emerging asset classes like crypto assets. Independence is vital to resist political and industry pressures, ensuring long-term stability and credibility. Accountability and due process, supported by comprehensive audit trails and collective decision-making, reinforce transparency and public trust. Proactive intervention is essential in detecting and addressing market malpractice early, preventing systemic crises. Lastly, international cooperation is indispensable given the interconnectedness of today's financial markets, requiring trust, knowledge sharing, and coordinated oversight across borders. The article advocates for a professional and ethical approach among regulators, emphasising that integrity builds confidence in the system. These lessons aim to guide upcoming professionals in navigating complexities, fostering resilience, and maintaining the integrity and competitiveness of the global financial landscape. The overarching message is that adaptability, independence, accountability, proactive action, and international collaboration are fundamental to robust financial supervision in an ever-evolving environment.

This paper explores the European Union’s (EU) approach to regulation and supervision in the field of banking following the 2008 Great Financial Crisis (GFC). The GFC exposed significant deficiencies in the EU’s financial regulatory framework, leading to a series of unprecedented reforms. Central to these changes was the de Larosière report, which advocated for a higher degree of harmonisation of regulation and the establishment of new supervisory agencies to enhance oversight and prevent future crises. Referred to by the authors as the “de Larosière Doctrine,” these reforms emphasise cross-border supervision, unified regulatory standards, and macroprudential oversight. The analysis focuses on how the de Larosière Doctrine has reshaped EU banking regulation, fostering trends like regulatory harmonisation, centralised supervision and supervisory convergence. While these developments have increased the resilience of the EU’s financial system, the paper argues that they may also have, in certain instances, resulted in excessive regulation, potentially stifling competition, innovation, and consumer choice. This argument is supported by a comprehensive review of literature and insights from discussions with banking officials, enriched by the authors’ extensive experience in financial regulation. The paper makes a number of proposals for the refinement of the de Larosière Doctrine and is structured in three parts, examining the European Single Rulebook, macroprudential oversight, and centralised supervision, concluding with a collective assessment of the current regulatory landscape.

This paper contributes to the ongoing debate at the European level regarding the possible centralisation of supervision for Crypto-Asset Service Providers (CASPs), highlighting concerns about regulatory efficiency, governance structures, and the preservation of national supervisory diversity. It contends that the push toward centralisation risks destabilising the crucial balance between harmonisation and subsidiarity embedded within the EU’s constitutional framework, as articulated in Articles 5(3) and 5(4) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and interpreted through case law such as the Working Time Directive (C-84/94). Moving beyond mere administrative considerations, the paper explores fundamental constitutional principles, examining the opportunities for supervisory convergence under the Markets in Crypto Assets Regulation (MiCAR). It also discusses the risks of conflating CASPs with traditional banking institutions—systems that have undergone centralised supervision within the Eurozone—and emphasises the importance of localised, tailored supervision for CASPs. The paper addresses practical issues related to centralisation, underscores the necessity of stakeholder engagement, and proposes pathways for achieving supervisory convergence that retain the benefits of national oversight. Central to this discussion is the advocacy for a framework for “knowledge sharing in financial supervision” as a viable alternative to centralisation—focusing on enhanced cooperation and collaborative convergence among national authorities, leveraging existing resources to build a more integrated, resilient supervisory environment across the EU.

The purpose of the article is to briefly examine the MFSA's CSP reform, highlighting its objectives, implementation, and the positive outcomes for Malta's financial sector. The central argument of the article is that the comprehensive reform of the Company Service Providers sector by the MFSA has significantly strengthened Malta's financial system by enhancing regulatory oversight, ensuring compliance with international standards, and fostering a risk-based and proportionate regulatory framework.

This article examines the December 2023 report by the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) titled “Supervisory Practices to Address Greenwashing,” alongside the European Union’s regulatory framework aimed at curbing greenwashing in sustainable finance disclosures. Greenwashing—defined as the misrepresentation of sustainability credentials to attract investors—poses significant threats to investor protection and market integrity, potentially leading to a loss of trust in financial providers. Despite efforts by IOSCO and the EU to improve transparency, the persistence of greenwashing is fueled by fragmented regulations, complex disclosure requirements, and the rapid growth of Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) investing. This article argues for greater international harmonization, proportionate regulation, and effective enforcement of oversight mechanisms to preserve the credibility of sustainable finance. It highlights the crucial role of global cooperation and national initiatives, specifically those by the Malta Financial Services Authority (MFSA), in addressing these challenges. Structured into four sections—covering the role of IOSCO in the ESG regulatory landscape, EU initiatives for sustainable finance, supervision and enforcement against greenwashing, and MFSA’s local efforts—the article provides a comprehensive review of current ESG investment practices and the ongoing struggle for enhanced transparency and accountability in financial markets.

The paper critically analyses the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA) within the European Union (EU) with respect to challenges such as supervision and the oversight framework coordination. It delves into the adequacy of the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) in ensuring compliance with this regulation, highlighting issues of fragmented supervision at national level and inconsistent approaches. The main argument suggests that while the DORA Regulation is a positive step for harmonising digital operational resilience regulation, it brings about challenges in supervisory convergence and cooperation due to the existing fragmented supervisory architecture. The authors propose potential solutions like a more centralised supervision model to address these challenges. The paper follows a structured format with an overview of the DORA Regulation, discussion on identified challenges, and a concluding section.

The COVID-19pandemich as posed challenges to financial supervision and regulation at a global level.Supervisorshadtoquicklyadoptconvergencemeasuresandaligntheirsupervisoryprioritiesandpractices.This article aims at analysing and discussing the response of financial supervisors to the COVID-19pandemic,with a special focus on Europe. It finds that, at the backdrop of the COVID-19pandemic,therewas a high degree of supervisory convergence amongst European supervisors, particularly regarding alignment of supervisory priorities(e.g. digitalisation)and practices(e.g. supervisory flexibility).Thisshowsthatsupervisionisnotastaticphenomenonbutrathersomethingthatconstantlyadaptstoachangingenvironment.That being stated, given that these changes were triggered by the pandemic, they were reactive in nature. Therefore, although financial policy is not static, it can often be reactive.

623 The traditional view on regulatory capture focuses on capture as a distortion of public purpose through a malicious relationship, corruption and possible collusion between the regulator and the industry (hard capture). This paper argues that regulatory capture can arise from political and institutional conditions which do not allow or favour the supervisory independence of authorities from both the industry and the government (soft capture). This paper’s argument is illustrated through a case-study on the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority’s (BaFin) handlining of the Wirecard AG case. The basis for the analysis are the findings from the Committee of Inquiry of the German Bundestag and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) Fast Track Peer Review (FTPR) through three lines of inquiry: (1) lack of balance sheet control; (2) the short selling ban; and (3) Wirecard AG’s stock trading by BaFin’s employees. This paper concludes that BaFin was not hard captured in the Wirecard AG case as de facto influence cannot be proven. Instead, its de jure dependency vis-à-vis the MoF (as implicitly endorsed by German law) might have contributed to a case of soft regulatory capture – especially in the aspect of the short selling ban. The paper then analyses the reforms enacted by Germany and promoted by Europe in post-Wirecard case.