Socioemotional wealth (SEW) theory has advanced our understanding of family-firm behavior by highlighting the importance of noneconomic goals such as legacy preservation and family control. However, this literature often assumes that family managers are aligned with these goals and thatnonfamily managers are not. This binary overlooks cases wherein nonfamily managers support SEW objectives and wherein family managers act in self-interest. The few works that acknowledge exceptions to this binary begin to address this complexity, though a more developed theoretical framework remains needed. In this paper, we integrate agency theory and SEW to offer a contingent framework for governance in family firms. We propose that effective governance depends not on family status but on a manager's alignment with the family's dominant coalition and on the choice between formal and informal governance, which together allow firms to balance risk and control while preserving socioemotional value.

Purpose This paper examines whether, when and how non-family managers can appropriate value from socioemotional wealth (SEW) in family firms. While SEW is typically treated as a source of value creation for the owning family, I distinguish between value creation and value appropriation and apply a property rights perspective to examine how ambiguity in SEW's control rights shapes non-family managers' ability to capture its benefits. Design/methodology/approach This study develops a conceptual framework that integrates the property rights theory with the SEW perspective. I theorize SEW as a bundle of property rights and distinguish between dimensions that are broadly accessible to firm stakeholders and those that are primarily reserved for family members. Drawing on prior research on control hazards and governance in family firms, I develop propositions explaining how reliability, egocentrism and succession hazards constrain non-family managers' ability to appropriate SEW value, and how governance mechanisms can mitigate these constraints. Findings I propose that SEW is not a monolithic resource but varies in its appropriability by non-family managers. Universal SEW dimensions, such as firm identification and external stakeholder relationships, are more accessible to non-family managers and associated with greater value appropriation. In contrast, family-focused SEW dimensions, including family control, transgenerational control and intra-family emotional ties, present greater property rights hazards that limit non-family managers' ability to capture value. Governance mechanisms can weaken these hazards and expand non-family managers' access to family-focused SEW. Research limitations/implications This paper considers whether, when and how non-family managers can appropriate value from SEW in family firms. While SEW is typically treated as a source of value creation for the owning family, I distinguish between value creation and value appropriation and apply a property rights perspective to examine how ambiguity in SEW's control rights shapes non-family managers' ability to capture its benefits. Originality/value This study reframes SEW as a contested resource rather than an asset exclusively benefiting family owners. By integrating the property rights theory with the SEW perspective, it offers a novel explanation for variation in non-family manager outcomes across family firms. The paper advances theory by clarifying when SEW can serve as a source of attraction and retention for non-family managers, thereby linking SEW preservation to family firm longevity and survival.

It is well established that family firms are motivated and committed to preserving socioemotional wealth. Accordingly, theory generally employs a defensive approach concentrated on risky strategies that family firms should avoid. We seek to develop a complementary view that considers risky strategies family firms should embrace. We draw from the emerging SEW resource perspective to advance an offensive approach to corporate strategy using alliances. Using a 20-year sample of S&P 500 firms from 1996 to 2015, we find support for our theory. Family firms form more alliances than non-family firms. Moreover, family firm alliances are more likely to outperform. Family firms appear to be selective when choosing partners, managing risk, and achieving ambidexterity across the alliance portfolio.

This article develops a two-part theoretical framework synthesizing the socioemotional wealth (SEW) perspective with image theory to explain the ways in which family decision makers screen and potentially adopt habitual new venture opportunities. The model theorizes that opportunities are initially screened according to their ability to preserve SEW and fit with the family's value images and subsequently explains how SEW willingness interacts with the family entrepreneur's trajectory and strategic images to predict whether the venture will be pursued as a serial or portfolio opportunity. Theoretical implications and directions for future research are also discussed.

Purpose This paper aims to understand the factors that influence employee organizational identification in family firms, and through identification, the willingness to engage in citizenship behaviors. Design/methodology/approach Drawing from the stewardship theory, the authors develop a model to test the relationships between family relatedness and relational identification to the family firm owner, employee-focused stewardship practices, organizational identification and organizational citizenship behaviors. The authors test the hypotheses using regression and the Preacher and Hayes PROCESS macro on a sample of 292 family firm employees. Findings The findings suggest that both relational identification with the family firm owner and employee-focused stewardship practices positively influence organizational identification, and that familial ties to the family firm owner can influence relationships with citizenship behaviors for non-family employees. Originality/value The authors build on existing literature to investigate how employees identify themselves within a family firm and how stewardship practices from the employee's perspective (rather than managers' or founders' perspectives) can influence organizational identification and citizenship behaviors.

Purpose Theory predicts that balancing exploratory and exploitative learning (i.e., ambidexterity) across alliance portfolio domains (e.g. value chain function, governance modes) increases firm performance, whereas balance within domains decreases performance. Prior empirical work, however, only assessed balance/imbalance within and across two domains. The purpose of this study is to determine if theory generalizes beyond specific domain combinations. The authors investigated across multiple domains to determine whether alliance portfolios should be imbalanced toward exploration or exploitation within domains or balanced across domains. The authors also extended prior research by exploring whether the direction of imbalance matters. Current theory only advises managers to accept imbalance without helping with the choice between exploration and exploitation. Design/methodology/approach Hypotheses are tested using fixed-effects generalized least squares (GLS) regression analysis of a large 13-year panel sample of Fortune 500 firms from 1996 to 2008. Findings With respect to the balance between exploration and exploitation within each of the five domains investigated, imbalanced alliance portfolios had higher firm performance. No evidence was found that balance across domains relates to performance. Instead, for four of the five domains, imbalance toward exploration related positively to firm performance. Originality/value An alliance portfolio that allows for exploration in some domains and exploitation in other domains appears more difficult to implement than prior theory suggests. Firms benefit mostly from using the alliance portfolio for exploratory learning.

Purpose - Research suggests family businesses often pursue risky or aggressive strategies despite the desire to preserve socioemotional wealth (SEW), which is thought to lead to conservativism in family firm strategic decision making. The purpose of this paper is to resolve this apparent contradiction by presenting a model that describes the screening criteria used by family business decision-makers when evaluating strategic opportunities. Design/methodology/approach - The conceptual model relies on insights derived from image theory to resolve apparent contradictions inherent in the SEW perspective's implications for family firms' risky strategic decisions. Findings - The proposed model suggests new strategic opportunities in family firms are evaluated through an unconscious, schema-driven decision process and that the preservation of SEW does not preclude risky strategic directions, but instead serves as an unconscious screening criteria for strategic opportunities. Originality/value - This paper contributes to the literature by expanding the understanding of family-firm strategic decision-making to include considerations of the decision's fit with the family's principles, goals and strategic plan rather than solely to overall risk to SEW. Thus, the paper presents a detailed model of family-firm strategic decision-making that relies on insights from image theory.

Alliance portfolio diversity (APD) helps firms access diverse capabilities and knowledge. APD can also increase transaction costs, but it is unknown whether and how transaction cost theory’s (TCT’s) insights about hierarchical integration operate at the portfolio level. We adapt TCT to the portfolio level to suggest that the transaction costs from APD encourage integration into alliance partners’ industries, and we introduce the concept of shared‐specific investments to pinpoint one source of transaction costs within portfolios and predict which industries will be integrated. Using data from 1996–2013 on S&P 500 firms, we find evidence in support of our theorising. Juxtaposing results with other theoretical perspectives suggests that TCT offers complementary insights about which activities to perform in the firm versus the alliance portfolio.

Managers often use their alliance portfolios to learn. Learning generally involves balancing exploration and exploitation. However, within the alliance portfolio context, literature suggests that balancing exploration and exploitation alliances is problematic, and a focus in either exploration or exploitation alliances is more beneficial for learning. However, it is not clear which conditions favour one approach over the other, and how these conditions may change over time. Drawing from niche theory, I offer an evolutionary approach which suggests that, with respect to a focus on exploration or exploitation alliances, the correct choice depends on the environment. I propose two types of alliance portfolio orientations - generalist, where the firm develops general-alliance capabilities and engages in exploration and specialist, where the firm develops domain-specific capabilities and engages in exploitation. I compare the two orientations' strategic implications and theorise how and why an alliance portfolio orientation evolves over time.

As family firms begin to professionalize, they face an important crossroads in deciding whether to employ non-family managers. To preserve socioemotional wealth and minimize agency costs, family owners may resist employing non-family managers. However, industry sector may play a role that influences the employment of non-family managers. We argue that the family's reluctance will be stronger in industries where information asymmetries make monitoring managers more difficult. For industries where monitoring is easier, the benefits of employing non-family managers may offset the loss in socioemotional wealth and increase in agency costs. Results based on a sample of 965 small and medium-sized retail and manufacturing firms confirm our predictions.

By explaining processes through which familiness affects innovation, Carnes and Ireland take an important step toward explaining prior mixed findings. Their research also underscores the heterogeneity of families in that different family firms have different innovative outcomes. We adapt the circumplex model from family science research to help explain which families might innovate. Our larger purpose, however, is to offer a small example of the kind of theory building that we believe will be necessary for family businesses researchers to fully leverage insights from family science.

Understanding the nature of family representation in public firms has been an important topic for entrepreneurship research. Because CEO compensation is a key tool that boards use to align the interests of shareholders and managers, researchers have taken steps toward understanding how family representation affects CEO compensation. Prior research has painted family-member CEOs as stewards who accept lower compensation. Based on agency theory, we describe a different scenario wherein family representatives engage in strategic control that reduces family-member CEOs' compensation. Thus, family-member CEOs accept lower compensation only when additional family members are represented in management or on the board. In comparison with CEOs at nonfamily firms, we find that family-member CEO compensation is 13% lower when multiple family members are involved, but 56% higher when the CEO is the lone family member.

Alliance portfolio diversity has emerged as a topic of considerable researchinterest. Two central questions remain: why are some firms are better at managingalliance portfolio diversity than others, and does the form of alliance portfoliodiversity matter? I develop a framework using dominant logic theory to explorethese questions. I distinguish related alliance portfolio diversity from unrelatedalliance portfolio diversity, and argue that when a firm engages in related allianceportfolio diversity strategy that matches its dominant logic(s), it will experiencegreater performance. I expect that firms lacking a prominent dominant logic willengage in unrelated alliance portfolio diversity. I also argue that if firms engage inrelated alliance portfolio diversity in an area(s) that does not match its dominantlogic(s), there will be a mismatch, triggering a reduction in firm performance and thedevelopment of a new dominant logic. Finally, I offer directions for future research.