We generalize Wirl’s (JEEM, 2009) “oligopoly meets oligopsony” model of a permit market for the case of heterogeneous players. Both oligopolists and oligopsonists reduce welfare by restricting trade. Having both in the market reinforces this. However, oligopolists seek to increase the price whereas oligopsonists seek to decrease the price. Having both in the market leads to ambiguous results for the permit price, and hence for the trading positions of individual agents. We apply the model to the so-called Swedish market, on which non-ETS emission allowances are traded between the 27 EU Member States. The numerical results are partly as expected: Market power restricts total trade and reduce total welfare, regardless of whether there are strategic buyers, strategic sellers, or both. The impact on the permit price is ambiguous. Strategic buyers primarily affect the welfare of strategic sellers, and vice versa, whereas fringe agents may well benefit from having both strategic buyers and sellers (relative to having either). JEL Classification: D43, Q54

This article presents a model of development, civil war and climate change. There are multiple interactions. Economic growth reduces the probability of civil war and the vulnerability to climate change. Climate change increases the probability of civil war. The impacts of climate change, civil war and civil war in the neighbouring countries reduce economic growth. The model has two potential poverty traps – one is climate-change-induced and one is civil-war-induced – and the two poverty traps may reinforce one another. The model is calibrated to sub-Saharan Africa and a double Monte Carlo analysis is conducted in order to account for both parameter uncertainty and stochasticity. Although the IPCC Special Report on Emission Scenarios (SRES) is used as the baseline, thus assuming rapid economic growth in Africa and convergence of African living standards to the rest of the world, the impacts of civil war and climate change (ignored in SRES) are sufficiently strong to keep a number of countries in Africa in deep poverty with a high probability.

This paper investigates the economic implications of disruptions of one to ninety days to the supply of natural gas in Ireland. We assess the impact of a hypothetical gas supply disruption in both winter and summer in 2008 (with observed market characteristics) and in 2020 (with projected market characteristics). The cost of a natural gas outage includes the cost of natural gas being unavailable for heating and other purposes in the industrial and commercial sectors, lost consumer surplus in the residential sector, the cost of lost electricity in all sectors and lost VAT on the sale of gas and electricity. Ireland generates much of its electricity from natural gas and the loss of this electricity accounts for the majority of the cost of a natural gas outage. Losing gas-fired electricity would cost 0.1–1.0 billion euro per day, depending on the time to the week, the time of year and rationing. Industry should be rationed before households to minimise economic losses, but current emergency protocols do the opposite. If gas-fired electricity is unavailable for three months, the economic loss could be up to 80 billion euro, about half of Gross Domestic Product. Losing gas for heating too would add up to approximately 8 billion euro in economic losses. We also discuss some options to increase Ireland’s security of supply, and find that the cost is a small fraction of the avoided maximum damage.

This paper evaluates the likely effect of REFIT, the Irish scheme to support renewable electricity generation, on the wholesale price of electricity. The cost of REFIT is passed on to Irish consumers. Here we calculate that, when there are 4,071MW of on-shore wind in the Republic of Ireland, the cost of the REFIT scheme is between 5 per cent and 10 per cent of the gross wholesale price of electricity. Off-shore wind has higher levels of support than on-shore wind, as do technologies that are still in development such as wave and tidal. When off-shore wind, wave and tidal are added to the system, the cost of REFIT increases significantly. We argue that wave and tidal should be sustained with a different scheme that provides capital grants, and that off-shore wind that is channelled to exports should not be supported by Irish consumers.

This paper evaluates the likely effect of REFIT, the Irish scheme to support renewable electricity generation, on the wholesale price of electricity. The cost of REFIT is passed on to Irish consumers. Here we calculate that when there are 4071MW of on-shore wind in the Republic of Ireland the cost of the REFIT scheme is between 5 per cent and 10 per cent of the gross wholesale price of electricity. Off-shore wind has higher levels of support than on-shore wind, as do technologies that are still in development such as wave and tidal. When off-shore wind, wave and tidal are added to the system, the cost of REFIT increases significantly. We argue that wave and tidal should be sustained with a different scheme that provides capital grants, and that off-shore wind that is channelled to exports should not be supported by Irish consumers.

In this paper we analyse the 2008 electricity price in the Irish All-Island Market. We test whether this price is ‘efficient’ by comparing it to the electricity price in Great Britain. This analysis suggests that around €16 per MWh of the difference in wholesale prices between Ireland and Britain is due to differences in generating technology. The new wholesale electricity market for the island of Ireland appears to be working well – it is producing a wholesale price that approximates the long run marginal cost that would apply in a large liquid competitive market. In the British market the wholesale price appears to be below the long run marginal cost of producing electricity. Retail margins in Great Britain are high, especially for households. Only some of this margin compensates vertically integrated utilities for the low wholesale price. In the Republic of Ireland the retail margin was probably also higher than it should have been.

This paper evaluates the likely effect of REFIT, the Irish scheme to support renewable electricity generation, on the wholesale price of electricity. The cost of REFIT is passed on to Irish consumers. Here we calculate that when there are 4071MW of on-shore wind in the Republic of Ireland the cost of the REFIT scheme is between 5 per cent and 10 per cent of the gross wholesale price of electricity. Off-shore wind has higher levels of support than on-shore wind, as do technologies that are still in development such as wave and tidal. When off-shore wind, wave and tidal are added to the system, the cost of REFIT increases significantly. We argue that wave and tidal should be sustained with a different scheme that provides capital grants, and that off-shore wind that is channelled to exports should not be supported by Irish consumers.

Like most countries Ireland faces the double target of decreasing emissions and keeping energy costs low to maintain competitiveness of the economy. The two goals are not always compatible. This study measures the effect of increasing wind in electricity generation on the total electricity costs for the Island of Ireland for the year 2020 under a variety of scenarios on fuel and carbon costs, generating plant portfolio mixes and electricity demand growth. We find that with high levels of interconnection 6000MW of installed wind capacity are likely to reduce overall costs, especially if the price of natural gas stays high. The sensitivity of the results to the level of interconnection suggests that it is important for interconnection to be operated and governed as efficiently as possible. We also find that the deregulated all-island system will face major challenges moving into the future since returns to traditional fossil-fuelled plants might not be sufficient to create new (needed) investment when wind penetration is high.