Abstract Chapter 13 examines the important question of whether international environmental law is effective in solving environmental problems. It begins by outlining different meanings of effectiveness—distinguishing between legal effectiveness, behavioral effectiveness, and problem-solving effectiveness—and explaining the different ways in which the effectiveness of international environmental regimes can be measured. The chapter then discusses the extent to which international environmental regimes have been effective, suggesting that while progress is being made, the problem-solving effectiveness of international environmental law is still limited. The chapter end by discussing factors that help explain why some agreements have been more effective than others, distinguishing between exogenous factors that are outside the control of treaty negotiators (such as the nature of the problem) and endogenous factors that can be addressed through better treaty design.

Abstract To understand the functioning of international environmental law, it is necessary to look beyond individual environmental regimes and study how multiple regimes and institutions—often involving different types of actors, operating at several scales, with different subject matter focuses—interact in addressing environmental issues. Chapter 8 does so by exploring the architecture of international environmental law. It first examines the reasons underlying the growing complexity of international environmental governance. The chapter then examines the consequences of the growing complexity of international environmental law, including its costs and benefits. This is followed by a discussion of various approaches for navigating complexity, such as establishing a normative goal or organizational hierarchy, institutional coordination, and orchestration.

Abstract Nonstate actors are playing an increasingly important role in the development of international environmental law. Chapter 7 discusses the main types of nonstate actors, including environmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), business, epistemic communities, and affinity groups (e.g., indigenous peoples, women, youth), as well as subnational authorities. The chapter examines the roles these actors play in the making, implementation, and enforcement of international law. It explains why nonstate actors are in some cases able to influence outcomes; how they are able to influence states, international institutions, and other nonstate actors; how they are beginning to affect environmental outcomes as independent actors in their own right; and what effects they are bringing about. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how international environmental law applies indirectly to nonstate actors.

Abstract The second edition of this leading work on international environmental law investigates the ways in which international environmental law is developed, implemented, and enforced. Rather than focusing on only some aspects of the international environmental process, it examines the process as a whole, from beginning to end, synthesizing recent research on international environmental negotiations, treaty design, social norms, policy implementation, and effectiveness. The book sketches the context of contemporary international environmental law, including its history, the causes of global environmental problems, and proposed policy solutions. The book also reviews the nature of international environmental norms, offering detailed accounts of both treaty-based norms and nontreaty norms. In addition, the book explores the growing complexity of international environmental law, discussing the changing roles of states and nonstate actors in its development. It further examines how and why states implement and comply with international environmental law, and how international environmental norms can be enforced. The book is a sophisticated yet highly readable introduction to how international environmental law works (and sometimes doesn’t work), for both specialists and the general reader.

Abstract Chapter 1 reviews the constituent elements of international environment law, and explains the three main approaches—doctrinal, policy, explanatory—through which the subject can be analyzed. The chapter also examines the problems underlying international environmental cooperation, explaining why states may be either inclined to cooperate or reluctant to do so. Against this backdrop, the chapter identifies the various functions of international environmental law in promoting cooperation among states and other international actors, influencing behavior, and helping to ameliorate international environmental problems. The chapter concludes by reflecting on the (limited) role that international environmental law plays in solving global environmental problems.

Abstract Chapter 9 explores negotiated instruments as a means of addressing international environmental problems. From its inception, international environmental law has consisted primarily of treaties and other forms of negotiated instruments, which offer several advantages over more informal mechanisms of international cooperation. Traditionally, treaties were comparatively static arrangements, memorializing the rights and duties of the parties as agreed at a particular point in time. Today, environmental agreements are usually dynamic arrangements, establishing ongoing regulatory processes. The chapter introduces the basic types of international instruments, and analyzes why states negotiate and accept them. It then describes the process by which agreements are created, from the inception of negotiations to the adoption and entry into force of the resulting instrument. The chapter also explores the various design issues in developing international environmental agreements. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the role of private standard-setting—that is, instruments involving business, NGOs, and other nonstate actors.

Abstract Through national implementation, international environmental norms get translated into action. Chapter 11 examines which actors are primarily responsible for implementing international environmental law, focusing particularly on the important role that states have in giving effect to international norms. The chapter then turns to the ways in which states can implement international obligations, distinguishing between the roles of legislative, executive/administrative, and judicial branches of government in implementation. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the factors that help explain why states implement their international commitments, including calculations of self-interest, a sense of normative commitment, bureaucratic routines, and pressure by environmental groups.

Combine and conquer. That was the strategy of those seeking to develop an international regime to address marine biological diversity found in areas beyond national jurisdiction—areas that constitute half of the world's surface and a much greater proportion of its habitable volume. States had quite different visions for the regime. On the one hand, the European Union and other developed countries such as Australia and New Zealand wanted a conservation-oriented regime providing for the establishment of marine protected areas and setting rules for environmental impact assessments; on the other hand, developing countries wanted a resource-oriented regime that would allow them to get what they consider their fair share of the benefits of marine genetic resources and would assist them with capacity building and technology transfer. Only by combining these disparate topics in a single package was agreement possible.

Abstract International environmental regimes have developed a wide variety of institutions and mechanisms to promote implementation and compliance with international environmental norms. Chapter 12 begins by investigating the reasons why states may not comply, including bad faith, changed circumstances, poor planning, domestic politics, and lack of capacity. The chapter then explains the possible goals of international implementation mechanisms, suggesting that international environmental law generally seeks to promote future compliance rather than to remedy past noncompliance. The chapter then contrasts different responses to noncompliance, distinguishing between the enforcement model and the managerial model. It explains how reporting and review, financial and technical assistance, dispute settlement, and multilateral compliance procedures can help to promote implementation and compliance, and highlights the role of different actors, including states, international institutions, and nonstate actors, in this regard.

Abstract Chapter 6 introduces two main actors in international environmental law: states and international institutions. The chapter explains how international environmental law remains state-centric but challenges some common presumptions, including that states are unitary entities, that states have sovereignty over activities within their borders is often assumed, and that all states are equal. The chapter then turns to international institutions, including conferences of the parties to multilateral environmental agreements and environmental bureaucracies. Although international environmental institutions vary in terms of their degree of autonomy from states, many have become actors in their own right, and as such have been able to exert influence on the development and implementation of international environmental law.

Abstract In contrast to treaties, the two generally recognized types of non-treaty norms—customary law and general principles—are not created through formal acts of lawmaking and do not have a canonical form. Chapter 10 explores the processes through which such norms emerge. Although there is limited evidence that international environmental norms are customary in nature, environmental non-treaty norms are emerging, first, in the form of international common law shaped by judicial decisions, and second, as general principles. The chapter also examines whether—and if so, how and why—non-treaty norms have an effect on behavior. While non-treaty law does not directly guide behavior, it sets boundary conditions for the development of more precise behavioral rules through courts and international negotiations.

Abstract Chapter 5 investigates the nature of international environmental norms. The chapter begins by exploring their central features, and identifying how and why they might influence the behavior of states and nonstate actors. Following an overview of relevant international environmental norms, including treaties, customary international law, and judicial decisions, the chapter turns to the issue of what it means to characterize a norm as legally binding, and examines the contested nature of so-called soft law. The chapter also examines a number of important dimensions along which international environmental norms vary, including their precision, mandatory quality, and the accompanying mechanisms for implementation.

This article provides a retrospective assessment of the United Nations climate change regime at age thirty. It begins by reviewing the four key stages in the development of the regime. It then discusses how, despite considerable changes in the world, the climate change regime has stayed much the same, and analyzes why the issue has been so intractable. It introduces three models of how international law might address the climate change problem—a prescriptive, contractual, and facilitative/catalytic model—and argues that the facilitative/catalytic approach reflected in the Paris Agreement is best suited to address the climate change problem. It concludes with a report card on how the regime is doing on its 30th anniversary.

The recent requests for advisory opinions from the International Court of Justice, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights are understandable, given the slow pace of the climate change negotiations. But are they a good idea? Will an advisory opinion by an international tribunal be likely to strengthen the international response to climate change and, if so, in what ways? Will it complement or compete with the United Nations climate change negotiations? What are the risks, both to the negotiations and to the court's own legitimacy, and do the potential benefits of an advisory opinion justify these risks? To what extent should international climate change law be developed through negotiations or adjudication, by States or by courts? Before jumping on the advisory opinion bandwagon, this article poses some questions to consider.

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Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 13, Climate Action, is an anomaly among the SDGs. Although combating climate change is critical to achieving the SDGs and vice versa, SDG 13 itself is of relatively little consequence. When the SDGs were developed, it had to be included, given the importance of the climate change issue. But it needed to be a placeholder in order to ensure that it did not interfere with the Paris Agreement on Climate Change negotiations, which were underway concurrently. As a result, the importance of the interlinkages between climate and the SDGs is reflected less in SDG 13 than in non-climate SDGs, including those addressing energy, industry, infrastructure, consumption and production, and cities.

AbstractGiven the close physical interconnections between the ocean and climate change, should the legal regimes governing them be more closely tied? Could climate change law do more to address ocean issues and, if so, in what ways? The chapter argues that, in general, the current division of labor between climate change and ocean law makes sense: the UN climate change regime should focus on mitigating climate change, which is the most important way it can help the ocean; conversely, ocean law is better equipped to address how the ocean might adapt to the impacts of climate change. However, the chapter suggests two ways that a stronger focus by the climate change regime on ocean issues might help it both limit climate change and better protect the ocean. First, it should do more to encourage the conservation and enhancement of ocean sinks, including potentially in areas beyond national jurisdiction, if that proves legally and technically feasible. Second, it should give extra consideration to reducing co2 emissions relative to other greenhouse gases, given their role in causing ocean acidification

International implementation mechanisms suffer from the present limitations of the international state system. While international pressure sometimes induces a state to improve its human rights performance, this depends on the sensitivity of the target state to such pressure and does not produce systematic results. The problem with relying on domestic courts to protect human rights, of course, is that the government whose courts would hear a human rights claim is often the one that is committing the violation. Recently, human rights activists have begun to explore another impletation technique: using the judicial system of one country to redress human rights violations in another country. As a matter of international law, there are many more restrictions on a state's exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction than on its exercise of adjudicatory jurisdiction.