The climate crisis poses an acute threat to humanity. Eco-social policy can help mitigate this threat, but eco-social policy and the green transition are expensive. Our paper contributes to a better understanding of the role that green subsidies play in advancing eco-social politics and policies. We assert that green subsidies increase the political viability of eco-social policies. Green subsidies lead trade unions and business organizations to support eco-social policies, regardless of institutional differences. We illustrate these positive-sum effect dynamics with a most different systems design that compares green subsidies and eco-social policies in Germany (subsidies, qualification and training measures, coal phase-out strategy, green housing) with the United States (climate-related tax credits, Inflation Reduction Act, and green housing). Based on a content analysis of documents and interviews, our comparison of business organizations and unions in both countries reveals strong and broad support for green subsidies in combination with eco-social policies. We also discuss the second Trump administration and suggest that green subsidies help advance the green transformation in the face of significant political adversity.

The treatment of foreign multinational enterprises (MNEs) by populist right-wing governments presents a puzzle: At times, these governments support, at times they take aggressive action against foreign MNEs. Allegorically speaking, rather than using their one hundred hands to slay the Titans like the Centimanes of Greek mythology, right-wing populist governments seem to use fifty hands of the state to support and fifty others to handicap foreign MNEs. How can we explain the ambiguity of populist international business policy adopted by governments that adhere to economically nationalist rhetoric, ideologies, and goals? Our article contributes to these debates by theorising the factors that determine right-wing populist governments' multi-handed approach to MNEs. We empirically discuss these factors based on a mixed methods design by comparing host country cases (Hungary, Poland), home country cases (China/Russia vs. Western countries), and industry cases (finance, manufacturing). We demonstrate that the common denominator of the multi-handed approach by right-wing populist governments is their desire to decrease the presence of foreign multinationals in politically valuable sectors, but that this desire is tempered by political and economic restrictions, notably including their electoral fragility, the need for technology transfer, and limited alternative sources of foreign direct investment (FDI).

Right-wing populist parties who obtain governmental power rely on ethno-nationalist mobilization for domestic legitimacy. They may therefore adopt policies that explicitly seek to disadvantage foreign multinational corporations (MNCs). Understanding what factors increase a foreign MNC's exposure to adverse action by right-wing populists is an understudied question in the field of international business policy. We investigate this question in post-socialist member states of the European Union, which constitute extreme cases of right-wing populist government power. As such, they constitute a fertile ground to further our theoretical understanding of the distinction between calculable political risk and incalculable political uncertainty. Through a case study-based theory-building approach, which draws on existing literature and interview data, we derive a series of propositions and develop a research agenda. We identify factors at the country-, sector-, and firm-level that influence exposure to adverse policy action by host-country governments. We explore when political risk may turn into political uncertainty and provide suggestions to foreign MNCs operating in right-wing populist contexts on how to reduce this uncertainty. Our study provides insights for policy makers too, who should be aware of the impact political shifts towards right-wing populist governments have on political uncertainty for foreign companies.

The Russia–Ukraine war has challenged our understanding of corporate social responsibility (CSR). Whereas CSR is traditionally associated with business self-regulation that benefits business and society, the conflict has revealed new forms of what we call “partisan CSR.” Based on comprehensive data from Fortune Global 500 firms, this study discovers that in particular Western, but also some non-Western, corporations have engaged in partisan CSR activities, ranging from (1) strengthening Ukraine’s economy, to (2) enhancing security and protection for Ukrainian citizens, (3) providing military support, (4) weakening Russia’s economy, and (5) supporting Ukraine in symbolic ways. By comparison, several mostly non-Western firms, e.g. from Asian countries, have chosen to be “neutral”, while, in some cases, exploiting economic opportunities arising from the conflict. This study also discusses major drivers of these CSR responses, including political climate, resource availability and economic dependency, isomorphism, and regulatory requirements. Our findings suggest a shift from political CSR to partisan CSR, which we expect to become more important with growing geopolitical divides and territorial conflicts.

This piece recounts the efforts by NGO Sign of Hope (SoH) to rectify human rights violations in South Sudan, which manifested themselves as drinking water pollution by the oil industry. Committed to exposing and remediating this water contamination, SoH was able to prompt the automobile company Daimler's CSR to engage in extended dialogue with the oil industry stakeholders in Unity State. Despite a tactful use of various methods ranging from cooperation to confrontation, SoH's campaign did not lead the oil producers to reverse the harm inflicted on the people of Unity State. When SoH tried to hold these companies accountable, SoH had the impression that it was hitting an elastic wall. This piece identifies lessons which may help to counter corporate human rights violations and compensate for the weakness of CSR in fragile states and in the face of corporate irresponsibility.

This article contributes to debates on business power, noisy politics, and right-wing populism. The populist right weakens strategies of quiet politics, which many suggest has led to a steep decline of business power. I challenge this view and argue that a combination of innovative strategies and ample financial resources allow business associations to exercise power in this environment. Drawing on new empirical evidence, the article makes three central contributions. First, I suggest that the failure of Remain business advocacy in the 2016 Brexit referendum resulted from the constraints of administrative legislation (the PPERA), weaknesses in campaigning strategies, and the CBI leadership's decision to not register as a campaign organization. Second, while my regression analysis provides some support for Culpepper's quiet politics argument, the Swiss business federation Economiesuisse has won 90% of the referendum campaigns it has led, including many referendums with high issue salience against right-wing populists. Third, Economiesuisse shows that business strategies of 'loud voice' can be successful. With money and innovative public-facing campaigning strategies, business organizations can win in noisy environments and against right-wing populists.

Abstract Right-wing populists present a difficult challenge for business associations. This chapter discusses business association responses to the populist right, beginning with the rationales for support and opposition. The interests of business associations and right-wing populists overlap in certain ways. However, right-wing populists threaten the interests of trade-dependent firms and weaken or undermine the lobbying strategies upon which business associations have long relied. Because some of their policy positions are attractive to business while others are problematic, right-wing populists can lead to growing divisions and disunity in business associations. The chapter provides case studies of business association responses to right-wing populism in Germany, France, and Switzerland. German business associations have been loud and outspoken critics of the AfD. The Swiss People’s Party is a formidable force in Swiss politics, yet Swiss business associations have found a campaign strategy to win trade, EU, and immigration-related referenda in the Brexit-Trump era. French business associations are struggling to find an effective mode of engagement with the National Rally and its small-business supporters. While there is considerable variation across and within cases, business associations have a tense and difficult relationship with right-wing populists.

Abstract Revolving door dynamics are pervasive in the United States. There are vast literatures on the revolving door and on Donald Trump, but so far, no attempts to bring these literatures together. This paper represents a first attempt to do so and answer the following questions: Can Trump’s rise be understood as a culmination of revolving door dynamics, under which managers become politicians and politicians become lobbyists? What motivated Trump to revolve, and how has Trump’s presidency affected the revolving door? The paper places Trump into the context of the revolving door and compares him with previous presidents and presidential candidates. In recent decades, revolving door activity has increased. While this suggests that the revolving door paved the way for Trump, a close examination of the evidence reveals a more complex picture. Many American businesspeople have unsuccessfully run for president. Like the businessmen-turned-presidents who preceded him, Trump is a family businessman, not a manager or a CEO of a listed company. A multitude of additional factors contributed to Trump’s 2016 win including his status as a reality TV celebrity, his charisma, and his right-wing populism: Trump is from business but not from the business establishment. In addition, Trump revolved from business into politics, rather than from Capitol Hill to K Street. Candidate Trump railed against the revolving door and pledged to drain the swamp. President Trump swamped the drain and precipitated one of the most serious crises and threats to American democracy in the country’s history.

This paper discusses the threats faced by today's democracies and the threat that business collusion with authoritarian forces provides to democracy's survival. Can businesspeople play a constructive role and help to protect democracy from authoritarian threats? Drawing on Levitsky and Ziblatt and Müller, the paper deliniates warning signs and hard borders of democracy that must be defended. The paper then makes a number of specific recommendations for business people who want to take action to defend democracy. Since these actions may not offer any immediate economic benefits, these actions must be guided by democratic values.

This article examines the responses of the US Chamber of Commerce and state- and local-level chambers of commerce to Black Lives Matter (BLM). The US Chamber of Commerce's Equality of Opportunity Initiative stresses the business case for racial equity and the economic benefits that can be attained by overcoming race-related inequalities. Many chambers are adopting racially progressive positions, often at some cost to themselves. This article contributes a typology of stances and actions and draws on interviews with American business leaders to characterize American business organization responses to BLM. There is some movement beyond a progressive neoliberal vision of nondiscrimination to acknowledge that it is necessary to "level the playing field." And the Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) initiatives of state- and regional-level chambers suggest that they are making genuine and, in some cases, bold and meaningful attempts to advance the cause of racial equity. The evidence suggests that popular mobilization and social pressure following George Floyd's brutal murder played a critical role in enabling this progress. However, the parallels and similarities between current chamber and business DEI efforts and business stances in the tumultuous 1960s and 1970s raise the question: Can current efforts succeed where previous efforts have failed?

What impact does authoritarian capitalism have on business? In this essay, I inquire into the relationship between authoritarian capitalism and business and set out to answer the following questions: what happens to the business environment under authoritarian leadership? Is there a trade-off between authoritarianism and the climate for business? Does democratic recession in liberal democracies have any notable downsides for business? To answer these questions, I draw on indicators measuring civil and political liberties and corruption on one hand, and the ease of doing business, global competitiveness, and innovation on the other hand. The empirical evidence suggests two key findings. First, key business indicators in China and Singapore have improved significantly despite these countries’ persistent authoritarianism. Second, key business indicators in Hungary and Poland have stayed constant or improved, despite growing authoritarianism in these two countries during the past decade. In short, the authoritarian capitalist model does not appear to be dysfunctional or have significant drawbacks for large segments of business. Supporters of liberal democracy should not argue that liberal democracy is preferable because it is better for business than authoritarian capitalism, since it is far from obvious that that is correct. Supporters of democracy will need to make a stronger case for its intrinsic, rather than its instrumental value.

The past decade and a half have witnessed two clearly interconnected global trends, the decline of democracy and the rise of populist, majoritarian authoritarianism.According to the Democracy Index, published by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), and the Freedom House Democracy Scores, democracy is not only in steady retreat but its quality in traditional democratic strongholds like the United States and Japan is also in decline.Both countries are now rated as flawed democracies. 1 In my view there are three driving forces behind these trends: (1) Economic inequity; globalization has generated winners and losers, even in rich developed nations, causing discontent with the political order resulting in strife 1 The Democracy Index can be found here on the world wide web: https:// www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracyindex-

Why do some business associations mobilize, engage in collective action, and take public stands against the populist right while others do not? This article examines business mobilization against the populist right in Germany, which is heavily export-oriented and reliant on the European and global market order. Drawing on interviews with three business associations, the article presents three key findings. First, economic self-interest is a powerful driver of business mobilization: perceived threats and vulnerability spurred two German associations to act collectively against right-wing populism. However, mobilization is driven not by declining revenues or profits but by a mixture of values and material interests. Second, business associations that mobilize stress the need to reform the system, democratize the European Union, and address those who feel “left behind.” Third, medium-size, export-oriented manufacturers are the core business constituency supporting liberal democracy and the European Union. The article shows that some business factions can play a role in defending the liberal international order against right-wing populism.

Do countries with high corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance support more stringent supranational regulation? Following this logic, existing scholarship claims that Nordic countries push for tougher regulations to sharpen their competitive advantage. On the basis of an examination of the negotiations over the EU Directive 2014/95/EU, a corporate transparency law that requires firms to report on their social, environmental, and human rights impacts, this paper argues that strong CSR performance does not necessarily entail strong support for regulation. Nordic companies perform well when it comes to sustainability, but except for Denmark, Nordic governments' support for the Directive was lukewarm. To explain why, I examine the dynamics between CSR leaders, business associations, and party politics. I find that business associations are key for explaining this outcome. While some Nordic CSR leaders provided support, business associations, in which SMEs with lower CSR performance comprise the bulk of the members, were forceful opponents of regulation, unless domestic regulations are in place, in which case these associations support supranational regulations to level the playing field. I also stress the importance of partisan politics and extend the analysis to mandatory human rights due diligence. In sum, Nordic countries are much more heterogeneous than what the literature often suggests.

It is a truism that capitalism and democracy are intertwined. Some say that democracy is the product of competitive enterprise. Others warns that big business seeks power at the expense of democracy. What roles have segments of the business community taken in the struggle between authoritarianism and democracy? Should we expect big business, business associations, and small business to take different sides? Needless to say, political systems differ and there are no monoliths at any level of the business world. However, businesses of various kinds are critical actors and segments may mobilize their constituencies openly and legitimately or covertly and corruptly to secure their ends. We have the historic examples of the Southern Bourbons in the US who maintained their power through vote suppression and Jim Crow and the big businesses in Germany who threw their support to the Nazis.

The global spread of corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices is widely explained in institutional-isomorphic terms: Corporations worldwide adopt CSR in reaction to isomorphic pressures exerted on them by a pro-CSR global environment, including normative calls for CSR, activist targeting, civil regulation frameworks, and educational activities. By contrast, this article considers the proactive agency of corporations in CSR diffusion, which is informed by nonmarket strategies that seek to instrumentally reshape the political and social environment of corporations. Applying a "channels-of-diffusion" perspective, we show that in the initial phase of CSR's transnational diffusion-as exemplified by the cases of Venezuela (1962-1967) and Britain (1977-1981)-CSR traveled through learning exchanges between business elite "exporters" and "importers" whose engagement in diffusion addressed crisis-enhanced political threats and opportunities in the receiving country. The focal agents established national CSR business associations, which disseminated among local corporations CSR practices adapted to confront the challenges at hand. We identify the features of such "business-led cross-national diffusions of CSR"; formulate propositions regarding their conditions, dynamics, and effects; and suggest that further research of this mode of diffusion would advance a more nuanced and balanced understanding of CSR's globalization.

Right-wing populism is transforming the relationship between business and politics in capitalist democracies. “F*ck business” – Boris Johnson’s remark makes bluntly clear that the era when business and big banks were said to run the world is over. With the advent of Brexit and Trump, interest in populism has surged, but relatively little is known about how businesses are navigating populist politics. This contribution aims to enhance our understanding of European business responses to the populist right.