The macroeconomic literature assumes that sectoral labor income shares and output per person are uncorrelated across countries. This paper shows that the data reject this assumption for a large set of countries. The labor shares of the manufacturing and market services sectors systematically increase with output per person relative to those of other sectors, leading to a shift of labor income across sectors with economic development. The empirical evidence suggests that capital deepening and cross-sector differences in the degree of capital-labor substitutability may be important for understanding these patterns. Researchers can directly use the provided dataset of labor shares to calibrate macroeconomic models.

Abstract Payroll data from Great Britain reveal that men are paid more than women upon entry into firms. Although this hiring wage gap has narrowed over the past two decades, it still accounts for over two‐thirds of the steady‐state gender pay gap—the wage gap that would eventually prevail under constant employment levels. A significant part of this hiring wage gap is not explained by men and women working in different firms and occupations. Even when hiring men and women into the same job, there remains an unexplained hiring wage gap that favors men by 2.4 log points.

We investigate how the incompleteness of an employment contract-discretionary and noncontractible effort-can affect an employer's decision about cutting nominal wages. Using matched employer-employee payroll data from Great Britain linked to a survey of managers, we find support for the main predictions of a stylized theoretical framework of wage determination: nominal cuts are at most half as likely when managers believe that their employees have significant discretion over how they do their work, although the involvement of employees, via information sharing, reduces this correlation. We also describe how contract incompleteness and wage cuts vary across different jobs. These findings provide the first observational quantitative evidence that managerial beliefs about contractual incompleteness can account for their hesitancy over nominal wage cuts. This has long been conjectured by economists based on anecdotes, qualitative surveys, and laboratory and field experiments.

National payroll earnings data reveal that men are generally paid more than women when they enter firms. Although this hiring wage gap has narrowed over the past two decades, it still accounts for over half of the overall gender pay gap in Great Britain. Even when firms hire men and women into the same specific occupation at roughly the same time, and accounting for previous work experience, there remains an unexplained hiring wage gap within jobs that favours men by 2.6%. These findings suggest that gender pay gap reporting laws that focus exclusively on the overall gaps within employers miss an important margin. Mandating employers to additionally disclose their wage gaps among newly hired workers could be highly informative.

We develop a model of incomplete employment contracts such that employees have some discretion over effort, which depends on their work morale. Nominal wage cuts have a strong negative effect on morale, while employee involvement in workplace decision-making tends to increase morale. We derive predictions on how these two mechanisms affect the decisions of firms to cut nominal wages. Using matched employer-employee and manager survey data from Great Britain, we find support for our model: nominal wage cuts are only half as likely when managers think that employees have some discretion over how they perform their work, but this reduced likelihood recovers partially when employees are involved in the decision-making process at their workplace

We use over a decade of representative payroll data from Great Britain to study the nominal wage changes of employees who stayed in the same job for at least one year. We show that basic hourly pay drives the cyclicality of marginal labour costs, making this the most relevant measure of wages for macroeconomic models that incorporate wage rigidity. Basic hourly pay adjusts much less frequently than previously thought in Britain, particularly in small firms. We find that firms compress wage growth when inflation is low, which indicates that downward rigidity constrains firms' wage setting. We demonstrate that the empirical extent of downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR) can theoretically cause considerable long-run output losses. Combined, our results all point to the importance of including DNWR in macroeconomic and monetary policy models.

We use representative payroll data from Great Britain to document novel facts about nominal wage adjustments, focusing on workers who stayed in the same firm and job from one year to the next. The richness of these data allows us to analyse basic pay and the other components of earnings, such as overtime and incentive pay, while accounting for hours worked. Weekly and hourly basic pay show signs of downward nominal rigidity, but non-basic pay components adjust more commonly. Unusually, these payroll-based data also report the wage rates of hourly-paid employees. A quarter of these workers typically see no change in their wage rates from one year to the next in the same job, and very few experience wage cuts. We exploit the employer-employee link in the data and find evidence of state-dependent pay setting, depending on the business cycle and whether firms are shrinking or expanding. Finally, we show that the basic and non-basic wages of new hires and existing employees are similarly flexible.

Using a dataset covering a large sample of employees and their mostly very large employers, we study the dynamics of British wage inequality over the past two decades. Contrary to other studies, we find little evidence that recent increases in inequality have been driven by differences in the average wages paid by firms. Instead greater dispersion within firms can account for the majority of changes to the wage distribution. After controlling for the changing occupational content of employee wages, the role of average firm residual differences is approximately zero; the modestly increasing trend in between-firm wage inequality is explained by a combination of changes in between-occupation inequality and the occupational specialisation of firms. It is possible that previous studies, which assign some of the importance of changes in the between-firm component to industry, have misrepresented a significant role for occupations. These results are robust across measures of hourly, weekly and annual wages.

Using UK employer-employee panel data, we present novel facts on how wages and working hours respond to the business cycle within jobs. Firms reacted to the Great Recession with substantial real wage cuts and by recruiting more part-time workers. A one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate led to an average decline in real hourly wages of 2.6 percent for new hires as well as for job stayers. Hiring hours worked were substantially procyclical, while job-stayer hours were acyclical. These results show that real wages are not rigid and that the labor costs of new hires are especially flexible.

Using a linked employer-employee dataset covering large firms, we present new evidence on British wage inequality trends over the past two decades. Differences between firms in the average wages they paid did not drive these trends. Between 1996 and 2005, greater wage variance within firms accounted for eighty-six percent of the total increase in wage variance among employees. In the following decade, wage inequality between firms continued to increase, whereas overall wage dispersion decreased. Approximately all the contribution to inequality dynamics from estimated firm-specific factors, throughout the employee wage distribution, disappears after accounting for the changing occupational content of wages.

Using employer-employee panel data, we provide novel facts on how real wages and working hours within jobs responded to the UK’s Great Recession. In contrast to previous studies, our data enables us to address the cyclical composition of jobs. We show that firms were able to respond to the Great Recession with substantial real wage cuts and by recruiting more part-time workers. A one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate led to an average decline in real hourly wages of 2.8 per cent for new hires and 2.6 per cent for job stayers. Hours of new hires in entry-level jobs were also substantially procyclical, while job-stayer hours were nearly constant. Our findings suggest that models assuming rigid labour costs of new hires are not helpful for understanding the behaviour of unemployment over the business cycle.

We apply well-known results of the econometric learning literature to the MortensenPissarides real business cycle model. Agents can always learn the unique rational expectations equilibrium (REE), for all possible well-defined sets of parameter values, by using the minimum-state-variable solution to the model and decreasing gain learning. From this perspective the assumption of rational expectations in the model could be seen as reasonable. But using a parametrisation with UK data, simulations show that the speed of convergence to the REE is slow. This type of learning dampens the cyclical response of unemployment to small structural shocks.

Using a linked employer-employee dataset of mostly very large firms, we study the dynamics of British wage inequality over the past two decades. Contrary to other studies, we find little evidence that recent increases in inequality have been driven by differences in the average wages paid by firms. Instead greater dispersion within firms can account for the majority of changes to the wage distribution. After controlling for the changing occupational content of employee wages, the role of firm-specific wage differences is approximately zero; the modestly increasing trend in observable between-firm wage inequality is explained by a combination of changes in between-occupation inequality and the occupational specialisation of firms. It is possible that previous studies, which assign some of the importance of changes in the between-firm component to industry, have misrepresented a significant role for occupations. These results are robust across measures of hourly, weekly and annual wages.