We analyze the process of democratization in a polity with groups that are divided along ethnic as well as economic lines. We show that: (i) the presence of ethnic minorities, in general, makes peaceful democratic transitions less likely; (ii) minorities suffer from discriminatory policies less in democracies with intermediate levels of income inequality; and (iii) in new democracies with low levels of income inequality, politics is divided along ethnic lines, and at greater levels of inequality economic cleavages predominate.

Examining onsets of political instability in countries worldwide from 1955 to 2003, we develop a model that distinguishes countries that experienced instability from those that remained stable with a two-year lead time and over 80% accuracy. Intriguingly, the model uses few variables and a simple specification. The model is accurate in forecasting the onsets of both violent civil wars and nonviolent democratic reversals, suggesting common factors in both types of change. Whereas regime type is typically measured using linear or binary indicators of democracy/autocracy derived from the 21-point Polity scale, the model uses a nonlinear five-category measure of regime type based on the Polity components. This new measure of regime type emerges as the most powerful predictor of instability onsets, leading us to conclude that political institutions, properly specified, and not economic conditions, demography, or geography, are the most important predictors of the onset of political instability.

What determines the extent and structure of financial regulation? This question matters for two reasons. First, it matters because, as North and Shirley (2008, 287) note: “A country’s financial institutions significantly determine the extent of new investment and firm entry, and through them, the rate of economic growth, disparity of income distribution, and incidence of poverty.” Second, it matters because the recent financial crisis has fueled unprecedented government involvement in the economy. Industries including autos, mortgages, and the nation’s largest financial institutions are, to varying extents, now publicly owned and directed. Even if some of these entanglements prove to be short-lived, it seems likely that the 21st century will usher in a fundamental change in the role of government in markets. This paper seeks to understand the determinants of financial market regulation in the United States since 1950. Toward this end, we first build a formal model of the ∗Paper prepared for presentation at the First APE-X Meeting on The Rise and Fall of Democracy, Brussels, Belgium, August 20–21, 2009. Preliminary draft; comments welcome.

This essay investigates the role of WTO Member States' political institutions in their decision to comply with adverse rulings. In the end, implementation of these rulings is a political act that Member States must undertake on their own. The decision to comply will thus be affected by domestic political pressures and institutions, including who wins and who loses if the decision is implemented, the locus of decision-making necessary to comply, and the overall structure of government. In this chapter, we explore the impact that domestic partisan preferences have on compliance rates among OECD countries. We construct a formal model of WTO implementation, predicting that when left-leaning parties, those who tend to favor protection for domestic labor and markets, control government, compliance rates should tend to fall. In contrast, right-leaning governments, those who weigh highly market access and returns to capital, should be more willing to comply with adverse WTO rulings. We test these hypotheses using data from WTO trade disputes involving twenty-five advanced industrialized countries and the European Union from 1970 to 2000, and find consistent support for our theory.

I INTRODUCTION Established in 1945, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) is a specialized agency of the United Nations established to "contribute to peace and security by promoting international collaboration through education, science, and culture." (1) After a peaceful beginning, UNESCO became embroiled in controversy with the 1980 publication of the MacBride Report, which called for the democratization of communication and strengthening of national media. (2) The United States and the United Kingdom denounced the report as an attack on freedom of the press and criticized the organization in general as a platform for communist and Third World countries to attack the West. (3) The United States withdrew its funding for and membership in UNESCO in 1984, followed by the United Kingdom the next year. (4) In the ensuing decade, UNESCO toned down its rhetoric and reorganized itself to be less top-heavy. The United Kingdom eventually rejoined UNESCO in 1997, (5) and the United States rejoined in 2003. (6) How can we explain the exit and reentry of these two crucial countries? Why were they willing to be associated with UNESCO for one period of time but not another, and how did their behavior affect the organization's policies? The UNESCO case highlights a key feature of delegation relationships within international organizations (IOs)--namely, that membership in such organizations is voluntary. What sets IOs apart from countries' internal delegation regimes is the fact that if a country is not satisfied with the results it is obtaining via membership in the organization, it can simply exit, as the United States and the United Kingdom did from UNESCO, or simply decline to join the organization in the first place. (7) This stands in contrast to, for instance, interbranch delegation; if Congress is unhappy with the executive's use of delegated authority, it cannot simply leave and declare itself to be the national legislature of Bolivia instead. More to the point, any change in the delegation regime would itself be subject to a presidential veto, so each Congress is to some degree locked into the delegation arrangements inherited from previous Congresses. If IO membership is voluntary, why would countries delegate in the first place? We argue that international organizations are held together by network externalities, such as free trade, safety via nuclear nonproliferation, and so on. Specifically, a defining feature of international organizations is that the more countries that belong to them, the more benefits accrue to all members. In this sense, IOs display increasing returns to scale, similar to many social or Internet-based resources. Conversely, the departure of key countries can do significant harm to an international organization, sometimes triggering a wave of defections. (8) This article provides a theory of delegation to IOs that incorporates free exit and network externalities into the standard delegation-modeling framework. What issues should such a theory to be able to address? 1. It should predict an IN's membership, including states' decisions to enter and exit. 2. It should predict the policy goals pursued by the IN; moreover, these policy goals should themselves affect membership. Formal models of IOs to date take either the policy choices or the member states as given, but the UNESCO example above makes clear that changes in policy can lead to changes in membership as well. 3. It should allow for differences among states; in particular, some states might be in a position to confer more benefits on their fellow member states than others, such as large countries offering access to their markets by lowering trade barriers. These differences are, in turn, the source of differential power among member countries within the IN. 4. Consistent with the themes of this symposium, it should logically define and incorporate the notions of delegation and sovereignty costs. …

We study a multi-district competition between two candidates when the winner is determined by the majority of total delegates obtained in the various States. The assignment of delegates in each State is proportional to the percentage of votes obtained by the two candidates, like in the Democratic party in the US, and each state can hold a high-cost election (a caucus) or a low-cost election (a primary). We examine the impact of higher variance of intensity of support on a candidate’s spending patterns and electoral success in such a system and show that the theoretical predictions match patterns of votes received by Clinton and Obama in the 2008 Democratic primaries.

This article applies modern Bayesian roll call analysis to estimate legislators' support for minority-favored policies, and to determine the likely impact of competing redistricting plans on the substantive representation of minority interests. We first provide a theory of districting and policy outcomes that points to the importance of coalition building in advancing minority policy concerns and motivates our estimation techniques. We then apply this methodology to the redistricting of the South Carolina State Senate following the 1990 census. We show that this redistricting led to more minorities being elected to office but less substantive representation.

Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi (2000) challenge the key hypothesis in modernization theory: political regimes do not transition to democracy as per capita incomes rise, they argue. Rather, democratic transitions occur randomly, but once there, countries with higher levels of GDP per capita remain democratic. We retest the modernization hypothesis using new data, new techniques, and a three-way rather than dichotomous classification of regimes. Contrary to Przeworski et. al. (2000) we find that the modernization hypothesis stands up well. We also find that partial democracies emerge as among the most important and least understood regime types.

Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and PolicyVol. 5, No. 3 Original ArticlesA Strategic Dominance Argument for Retaining Section 5 of the VRADavid Epstein and Sharyn O'halloranDavid EpsteinSearch for more papers by this author and Sharyn O'halloranSearch for more papers by this authorPublished Online:25 Jul 2006https://doi.org/10.1089/elj.2006.5.283AboutSectionsPDF/EPUB Permissions & CitationsPermissionsDownload CitationsTrack CitationsAdd to favorites Back To Publication ShareShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmail FiguresReferencesRelatedDetails Volume 5Issue 3Sep 2006 InformationCopyright 2006, Mary Ann Liebert, Inc.To cite this article:David Epstein and Sharyn O'halloran.A Strategic Dominance Argument for Retaining Section 5 of the VRA.Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy.Sep 2006.283-292.http://doi.org/10.1089/elj.2006.5.283Published in Volume: 5 Issue 3: July 25, 2006PDF download

Works that measure the substantive representation of minority interests based solely on roll call data have been criticized for ignoring more behind-the-scenes activities that legislators might perform on behalf of their constituents. We thus focus in this paper on cosponsorship as a proxy for the degree to which members maneuver to create coalitions that will advance the substantive policy goals of the minority community. We find, consistent with previous work, that minority legislators tend to provide more of these types of activities than do other types of legislators, but maximizing cosponsorship benefits for bills that pass Congress involves creating districts of about 45% black voting age population.