From the beginning of the Troubles, groups in Northern Ireland deliberately sought and made use of transnational allies to further their political goals and gain strategic advantages vis-à-vis their opponents. Organizations on both sides of the conflict turned to external allies, including diaspora groups, like-minded movements, and groups with ideological affinities for accessing resources, expanding and practicing their tactical repertoires, and strengthening their claims to legitimacy. While the existence of this transnational dimension of the Troubles is well documented, the differences among cross-border networks—how they were structured, how they functioned, and their impact on the dynamics of the conflict—are less well understood. Drawing on social movement theory, particularly work on transnational advocacy networks, coalition formation, and diffusion, this chapter compares the structure and function of two types of cross-border networks that resulted: licit ties that publicly connected two or more groups, and illicit ties that allowed groups to forge secretive connections with potential allies.

In this study, the author examines major tensions and tradeoffs in Northern Ireland, focusing on how ethnic minority communities—including Chinese, Indian, and Polish populations—navigate the decision to take a more active role in political life as well as the capacity of the native Protestant and Catholic populations to adjust to these new entrants. Based on interviews with minority populations and political elites, the author argues that despite institutional obstacles and a historical context that has traditionally deterred ethnic minority communities from broad political and civil participation, there is evidence of robust participation in public life, both in political and civil society. The paper ultimately argues that Northern Ireland’s ethnic minorities have the potential to catalyze some change in the existing ethno-nationalist cleavage structure, but this potential is limited and largely outside of the conventional electoral arena.

This article examines how incremental outcomes—gains and losses that stop short of decisive victory or defeat—influence movement organizations, particularly in terms of the public financial support they enjoy and the amount of money they subsequently allocate to programmatic expenses. Drawing on data from the US anti-death penalty movement, I find that small gains and losses significantly influence support and spending patterns. Movement success initially increases both financial contributions and programmatic spending, but over time, decreases both. Moreover, the particular effect is mediated by the type of venue in which the outcome takes place: formal institutions produce different rates of increase and decline than informal ones. These differences have important implications for movement organizations' choice of venue in which they make their claims while emphasizing the importance of considering incremental outcomes not only as end products of contention, but as inputs that are consequential for future movement development.

Research on transnational protest activity in Europe typically focuses on cases in which the European Union (EU) is the source and target of social movements that take issues with either specific policies at the European level or the project of integration itself. This paper expands this narrow view of transnational contention in Europe by examining how the EU can redefine and affect the relationship between movements and states by interacting with transnational movements in varied ways ranging from patron to adversary. Taking transnational nationalist movements as my central example, I argue that the EU regularly interposes itself in the contentious relationship between movements and states through five key mechanisms: brokerage, certification, de-certification, resource transfer, and displacement. These mechanisms vary in terms of their intentionality. In some cases, the EU, through its institutions and officials, makes deliberate choices that alter the ability of movements to form alliances and to pursue their goals. In other cases, the EU emerges as a more inadvertent participant, although even in such circumstances, it can have a lasting effect on a movement's ability to operate. I find that through these five mechanisms, the EU can alter the terms on which movements and states meet, although the result is not always positive for transnational movements seeking aid and allies against more powerful state actors. Ultimately, the EU's impact on the balance of power can have both positive and negative consequences for movements that choose to take advantage of the expanded political space of the EU by organizing transnationally.

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How do governments respond to the demands of different social movement organizations? They respond selectively, embracing some movement groups as acceptable bargaining partners, while sidelining or repressing others. Thus, they create uneven political opportunity structures that prompt organizations to pursue divergent protest strategies. Selective engagement is a double-edged sword. Groups that forge a closer relationship with state actors can benefit from increased access, but they also face shorter time horizons to deliver change and risk alienating their members. Over time, these side effects can minimize the worth of "desirable" groups to governments, while making it possible for organizations previously left out of the process to increase their clout and demand entry.

Conferences are an integral part of academic life. They generate focal points for intellectual exchange and encourage professional socialization. They help scholars working on similar issues to identify others who might be part of their specialist community while also creating opportunities to learn about research that colleagues are doing in different areas of the discipline. In other words, conferences provide an opportunity for scholars to present their work in progress, to see what others are working on, and to network with their peers.The authors would like to thank PS's anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions.