While the development of self-recognition in a mirror by toddlers is well documented, less is known about how the presence of a mirror affects young children’s behaviour. Here, we explored how the presence of a mirror affected 2.5- to 3.5-year-olds’ behaviour in a gift-delay task. Behaviour was assessed for a five-minute test period during which children sat in front of a gift bag that was not to be touched until an experimenter returned. Transgressive behaviour by adults is reduced in the presence of a mirror, so we hypothesized that children faced with a mirror would be less likely to touch the gift than children tested without a mirror. We found that the mirror reduced transgressions in children starting from around 3 years of age. We conclude that the presence of a mirror facilitated self-monitoring in 3-year-old children, such that deviations from a behavioural standard are noticed and corrected immediately. What is already known on the subject? What does this study add?

Young children help others in a range of situations, relatively indiscriminate of the characteristics of those they help. Recent results have suggested that young children's helping behavior extends even to humanoid robots. However, it has been unclear how characteristics of robots would influence children's helping behavior. Considering previous findings suggesting that certain robot features influence adults' perception of and their behavior toward robots, the question arises of whether young children's behavior and perception would follow the same principles. The current study investigated whether two key characteristics of a humanoid robot (animate autonomy and friendly expressiveness) would affect children's instrumental helping behavior and their perception of the robot as an animate being. Eighty-two 3-year-old children participated in one of four experimental conditions manipulating a robot's ostensible animate autonomy (high/low) and friendly expressiveness (friendly/neutral). Helping was assessed in an out-of-reach task and animacy ratings were assessed in a post-test interview. Results suggested that both children's helping behavior, as well as their perception of the robot as animate, were unaffected by the robot's characteristics. The findings indicate that young children's helping behavior extends largely indiscriminately across two important characteristics. These results increase our understanding of the development of children's altruistic behavior and animate-inanimate distinctions. Our findings also raise important ethical questions for the field of child-robot interaction.

Young children help people achieve their goals in various situations, even in the absence of verbal requests or rewards. Such help is typically described as “indiscriminate” because children's help is robust across many aspects of the recipient in need. However, as previous studies have almost entirely focused on human recipients, the question arises as to how indiscriminate children's helping behaviour really is. Here, we aimed to investigate whether young children's helping behaviour would extend to a nonhuman entity—a humanoid robot. In an experimental between-subjects design, 40 children witnessed a robot drop an object out of its reach either seemingly intentionally or unintentionally. Results showed that children typically returned the object, but only when it was dropped apparently unintentionally—indicating that children attribute goals to a robot, understand when it requires help, and are motivated to help it. Results of a post-test animacy interview were consistent with this interpretation as children attributed affective, cognitive, and physiological characteristics to the robot. We conclude that the indiscriminate nature of young children's altruistic behaviour extends to humanoid robots. This finding has important theoretical and practical implications for the future development of social robots as well as for the study of children's prosocial behaviour.

While the development of self-recognition in a mirror by toddlers is well documented, less is known about how the presence of a mirror affects young children's behaviour. Here, we explored how the presence of a mirror affected 2.5- to 3.5-year-olds' behaviour in a gift-delay task. Behaviour was assessed for a five-minute test period during which children sat in front of a gift bag that was not to be touched until an experimenter returned. Transgressive behaviour by adults is reduced in the presence of a mirror, so we hypothesized that children faced with a mirror would be less likely to touch the gift than children tested without a mirror. We found that the mirror reduced transgressions in children starting from around 3 years of age. We conclude that the presence of a mirror facilitated self-monitoring in 3-year-old children, such that deviations from a behavioural standard are noticed and corrected immediately. Statement of contribution What is already known on the subject? Children's self-recognition in a mirror has been well documented. Adults' behaviour can be affected by the presence of a mirror. There is a lack of research investigating how the presence of a mirror affects young children's behaviour. What does this study add? We show that the presence of a mirror decreases young children's likelihood to transgress in a gift-delay task. This effect appears to emerge at around three years of age. These findings raise interesting questions regarding the development of self-awareness and how it relates to other mechanisms.

There is an increasing interest in social robotics. However, there is a paucity of methods for understanding successful human-robot interactions and identifying the factors that influence success. This paper describes the planning and running of a pilot study conducted to inform the research design for an empirical study on helpfulness in children. The research question was whether and how children would help an inanimate robot recipient as they are known to help a human being. The multidisciplinary research team discussed before the pilot study and after each pilot session whether the research design would enable them to investigate this research question from a psychological point of view while taking into account the capabilities of the robot. The planning process shows that when conducting a study to systematically investigate the effect of robots on human beings many detailed considerations need to take place. As well, there is often not enough detail in studies published to set up a sufficiently detailed research design. This research is relevant for Human-Computer Interaction researchers as well as psychologists in order to better understand the effects of introducing robots into people's lives, and the implications when technology takes on a human role.

Hamlin (2015) argued that the human capacity for social evaluation begins to emerge just a few months after birth. This claim derives from studies using unfulfilled goal scenarios, with infants as young as 3 months of age (see Hamlin, 2013). In a typical “manual choice” experiment, infants are habituated to multiple helping and hindering events. For example, a protagonist may first fail to achieve a goal such as climbing a hill. Then, another character pushes the protagonist either up the hill (the “Helper”) or back down the hill (the “Hinderer”). Following habituation, infants are presented with the Helper and Hinderer. By 4.5 months of age, infants more often choose to reach for the Helper than the Hinderer. These results are interpreted as evidence for an early developing sense of morality (Hamlin, 2013, 2014; c.f. Cowell and Decety, 2015; Salvadori et al., 2015; Scola et al., 2015).One potential issue with Hamlin et al.u0027s (2007) study, proposed by Scarf et al. (2012), is that the Helper events were confounded with an act of bouncing when the protagonist reached the hilltop. The current paper, however, showed that this was not the case, and that the direction of the protagonistu0027s eye-gaze was the important factor. In this case, children chose the Helper over the Hinderer more often when the protagonist gazed at the hilltop. Hamlin argued that eye-gaze shows intent and that infantsu0027 understanding of intent allows them to correctly represent the behavior of the character as helping or hindering.Regardless of whether eye-gaze served as a cue to intention, it is not surprising that gaze could have profound effects on infantsu0027 preferences. Eye contact and following othersu0027 gaze is a crucial part of our daily interactions. This sensitivity to eyes appears to be highly adaptive (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Langten et al., 2000). Even at birth when infants have poor visual acuity and ocular control, they have a preference for open over closed eyes (Batki et al., 2000) and direct over averted gaze (Farroni et al., 2002, 2006). At 6 months of age, an important milestone occurs as infants begin to follow othersu0027 eye gaze to targets inside their current field of view (Du0027Entremont et al., 1997; Gredeback et al., 2008). The sensitivity to eye-gaze is assumed to have its roots in the evolution of the morphology of the human eye—which has an unusually high contrast between iris, sclera, and surrounding skin, enabling the detection of gaze direction from a great distance (Kobayashi and Kohshima, 1997, 2001; Tomasello et al., 2007).Although, the eye-gaze is clearly important in the task of Hamlin, it is not entirely clear why. One possibility is that eye-gaze helps the understanding of intentions. Such an explanation has been proposed by Baron-Cohen (1994, 1995) who suggested that humans have an eye-direction detector that detects eye-like stimuli and computes gaze direction. This mechanism in conjunction with an Intentionality Detector and Shared Attention Mechanism trigger the development of the Theory-of-Mind-Mechanism (ToMM), which allows mental states, such as peopleu0027s intentions, to be inferred. The actual age at which intentions can be understood, however, is debated with both Carpenter et al. (1998) and Tomasello et al. (1993, 2005) suggesting that such a skill does not emerge until the age of one, which is older than the children in Hamlinu0027s (2015) study.An alternative possibility is that infants prefer an event where someone “alive” is helped. In this case, infants may be responding to consistent animate action, regardless of any understanding of intentions (Tomasello et al., 2005). In particular, gaze may have been a cue for animacy in Hamlinu0027s (2015) study when the climberu0027s gaze was fixed on the hilltop (see Looser and Wheatley, 2010; Opfer and Gelman, 2010). Thus, infants may have preferred the Helper over the Hinderer in the “animate” condition, as only the Helper facilitated movements that were consistent with the previous event of ascending the first incline. If this is correct, then one would not need to assume infants of 6–11 months must understand the intentions of the puppet to do the task.Whether infantsu0027 preference for Helpers is based on an innate morality remains an open question. Nevertheless, Hamlinu0027s (2015) experiments provided novel insights showing the importance of eye gaze for infantsu0027 choices. Because one has to understand the otheru0027s intention in order to act prosocially, future research addressing the question of whether young infants are truly able to infer from the Protagonistu0027s gaze to its goals or if infantsu0027 choices are solely based on their predictions of future animate action would be of interest.

Hamlin (2015) argued that the human capacity for social evaluation begins to emerge just a few months after birth. This claim derives from studies using unfulfilled goal scenarios, with infants as young as 3 months of age (see Hamlin, 2013). In a typical “manual choice” experiment, infants are habituated to multiple helping and hindering events. For example, a protagonist may first fail to achieve a goal such as climbing a hill. Then, another character pushes the protagonist either up the hill (the “Helper”) or back down the hill (the “Hinderer”). Following habituation, infants are presented with the Helper and Hinderer. By 4.5 months of age, infants more often choose to reach for the Helper than the Hinderer. These results are interpreted as evidence for an early developing sense of morality (Hamlin, 2013, 2014; c.f. Cowell and Decety, 2015; Salvadori et al., 2015; Scola et al., 2015). One potential issue with Hamlin et al.'s (2007) study, proposed by Scarf et al. (2012), is that the Helper events were confounded with an act of bouncing when the protagonist reached the hilltop. The current paper, however, showed that this was not the case, and that the direction of the protagonist's eye-gaze was the important factor. In this case, children chose the Helper over the Hinderer more often when the protagonist gazed at the hilltop. Hamlin argued that eye-gaze shows intent and that infants' understanding of intent allows them to correctly represent the behavior of the character as helping or hindering. Regardless of whether eye-gaze served as a cue to intention, it is not surprising that gaze could have profound effects on infants' preferences. Eye contact and following others' gaze is a crucial part of our daily interactions. This sensitivity to eyes appears to be highly adaptive (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Langten et al., 2000). Even at birth when infants have poor visual acuity and ocular control, they have a preference for open over closed eyes (Batki et al., 2000) and direct over averted gaze (Farroni et al., 2002, 2006). At 6 months of age, an important milestone occurs as infants begin to follow others' eye gaze to targets inside their current field of view (D'Entremont et al., 1997; Gredeback et al., 2008). The sensitivity to eye-gaze is assumed to have its roots in the evolution of the morphology of the human eye—which has an unusually high contrast between iris, sclera, and surrounding skin, enabling the detection of gaze direction from a great distance (Kobayashi and Kohshima, 1997, 2001; Tomasello et al., 2007). Although, the eye-gaze is clearly important in the task of Hamlin, it is not entirely clear why. One possibility is that eye-gaze helps the understanding of intentions. Such an explanation has been proposed by Baron-Cohen (1994, 1995) who suggested that humans have an eye-direction detector that detects eye-like stimuli and computes gaze direction. This mechanism in conjunction with an Intentionality Detector and Shared Attention Mechanism trigger the development of the Theory-of-Mind-Mechanism (ToMM), which allows mental states, such as people's intentions, to be inferred. The actual age at which intentions can be understood, however, is debated with both Carpenter et al. (1998) and Tomasello et al. (1993, 2005) suggesting that such a skill does not emerge until the age of one, which is older than the children in Hamlin's (2015) study. An alternative possibility is that infants prefer an event where someone “alive” is helped. In this case, infants may be responding to consistent animate action, regardless of any understanding of intentions (Tomasello et al., 2005). In particular, gaze may have been a cue for animacy in Hamlin's (2015) study when the climber's gaze was fixed on the hilltop (see Looser and Wheatley, 2010; Opfer and Gelman, 2010). Thus, infants may have preferred the Helper over the Hinderer in the “animate” condition, as only the Helper facilitated movements that were consistent with the previous event of ascending the first incline. If this is correct, then one would not need to assume infants of 6–11 months must understand the intentions of the puppet to do the task. Whether infants' preference for Helpers is based on an innate morality remains an open question. Nevertheless, Hamlin's (2015) experiments provided novel insights showing the importance of eye gaze for infants' choices. Because one has to understand the other's intention in order to act prosocially, future research addressing the question of whether young infants are truly able to infer from the Protagonist's gaze to its goals or if infants' choices are solely based on their predictions of future animate action would be of interest.