This article utilises the experiences of Italy and Ireland to highlight how political failures to combat intergenerational housing inequalities have contributed to the rapid disaffection of huge segments of the population. In this context, this article identifies three inconvenient truths that Europe’s centrist political parties need to face before real progress can occur. First, all property markets are national and are driven by a complex set of historical, social and economic norms. The EU cannot directly impact these domestic markets. Second, home ownership can only succeed in a diversified-tenure model. To protect home ownership as a viable pathway for middle-class families, Europe’s centre–right must also deliver on social and affordable housing. Third, widening the tax base (and reducing the burden of income taxes on working people) should be a core centre–right principle. The centre–right has to confront its most inconvenient truth—the fact that its most important voter group (older and retired people, who mostly live mortgage free) needs to contribute towards ensuring a more sustainable economic model for their children.

Initial assessments suggest an increase in European defence spending of about 250 billion euros annually (to around 3.5 percent of GDP) is warranted in the short term. However, most of this additional expenditure will be implemented at a national level for national needs. This paper highlights that Europe remains a wealthy continent characterised by greater cash reserves, higher household savings and a significantly higher rate of mortgage free homeowners than the United States. Europe possesses ample financial resources to support higher levels of defence spending. Italian households alone save approximately 400 billion euros annually, with the majority of these savings resting in low yielding bank deposit accounts or insurance policies. Across Europe, trillions of euros of household savings remain underutilised. In this context, this paper highlights that European households should be better incentivised to participate in national level investment accounts that offer additional tax and financial benefits. These accounts can be specifically constructed to channel household savings into long term security and defence investments. Europe’s capital markets must be built at the national level before grander European plans become politically achievable. The UK ISA model in identified as a template in this regard.

This article identifies the shortage of affordable, secure housing as a key driver of political alienation, particularly among young people. The social consequences of this trend for this group include, but are not limited to, delayed independent living and family formation, declining mental health and diminishing belief in their ability to match the living standards of their parents. Increasingly vulnerable and insecure, many young people now link the issue of housing with inward migration. Left unresolved, this issue will further polarise (and radicalise) the political choices of younger generations in the years ahead. In response, this article proposes three immediate actions. First, a dramatic expansion of construction for all types of housing where excess demand exists. Second, the use of public money to ensure that housing options exist for people of all ages, social classes and income levels. Public money should not be utilised for schemes which ultimately inflate house prices further. Third, to tackle widening intergenerational inequalities, existing housing wealth must be taxed fairly.

The EU has a plethora of investment needs. However, the scale of the required investments will not be reached if the EU’s financial stability is called into question. This article calls for a set of pragmatic policies which can generate significant economic growth and raise living standards. This growth will be a key ingredient in increasing employment, improving competitiveness and strengthening budgetary sustainability. The associated fiscal space will also contribute significantly to narrowing the investment gap in the next decade and beyond. The article sets out three pillars—stability and governance, growth and fairness, and budgetary accountability—as the key drivers in building a pragmatic economic programme which bridges the gap between fiscal conservatism and future expenditure. It further identifies the need to refocus on the single market as a key economic driver. It also calls for any discussion on further joint EU borrowing programmes to be postponed until funding sources for the existing Recovery Fund are agreed and its overall economic effectiveness can be analysed.

Digital finance is now part of the financial mainstream. This paper provides recommen-dations aimed at making the EU a stronger global player in digital finance and digital currencies. It also seeks to place the centre–right as the key driver of this change within the European political framework. First, we argue that a carefully deliberated EU legal framework for crypto assets is both welcome and required. This framework should be based on protecting financial stability while encouraging innovation. Ensuring the ability of European citizens to have access to these digital tools and to invest based on their personal preferences is an important principle of open democracies. Second, Europe must be at the heart of the digital currency revolution, and the European Central Bank should expedite the development of a ‘digital euro’ as a comple-ment to traditional euro notes. This is the optimum solution to providing a secure and universally accepted digital currency. Public money must remain the linchpin of digital finance. Moreover, the framework for crypto assets should be based on key principles of the centre–right: it must be regulated, secure and credible. The centre–right should actively support the proposed Markets in Crypto-Assets (MiCA) regulation and work, across the EU institutions, towards its speedy finalisation and adoption. The principle of ‘same activity, same risk, same rules’ should remain the bedrock of the regulatory approach to crypto and digital asset classes, and to stablecoins in particular. Lastly, the regulation of crypto assets should be part of the wider effort to reduce the fragmentation of the policy landscape within the EU. Financial technology (FinTech)

In June 2016, Britain, a member of the EU since 1973 and one of its largest economies, voted to leave the formal institutions of the European integration process. Notwithstanding the importance of that event, Brexit remains completely absent in current debates regarding the EU’s future. This absence reflects both a political desire in Brussels “to move past Brexit” and a reordering of European priorities given the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic in early 2020. This paper identifies that the EU’s approach to British relations since 2016 has been defined by two characteristics. First, a stable and persisting unity on all major issues. Second, a disciplined focus on the technical details of Brexit. However, this approach is not without serious risk. It has caused the EU to overlook how the EU’s strategic choices evolved, shaped and influenced Britain’s position in Europe since the 1980s. It has also caused Brussels to underestimate the strategic importance of Britain and to undervalue the wider benefits it accrues from its close relationship with the United States. The implications of those “lost” lessons are relevant to the future development path of the EU. They will also pose a challenge to several Central and Eastern European members of the EU in the years ahead.

Joseph Brennan, as secretary of the Irish Department of Finance (1923–7) and chair of the Irish Currency Commission (1927–43), was a pivotal influence on Irish banking and currency affairs. Yet, within the existing literature, his adherence to conservative British norms is seen as providing a ‘bleak prescription’ for the Irish economy. However, such a view ignores the fact that Brennan was far from dogmatic on banking and currency issues and underplays his incrementalist, and often internationalist, approach to the development of Irish monetary institutions. Brennan's actions up to the early 1940s were based on the realities of Ireland's slowly receding economic and intellectual dependency on Britain, a ‘dependency’ often misrepresented in the existing literature as a more primitive, pre-Keynesian, conservative approach. However, rather than acting as a restraining influence on Irish economic development, the policies Brennan advocated enabled Ireland to avoid the instability associated with many smaller, emerging nation states in the 1920s and 1930s. The focus on continuity – which guaranteed currency and banking stability – represented the realities of Ireland's reliance on the sluggish British economy in the decades after independence. Brennan's achievement, in helping to sustain banking and currency stability notwithstanding economic uncertainty, a fragile political environment (and suspicious banking interests), deserves wider acknowledgement.

The economic and financial crises evident since 2007 have refocused the debate as to the future structure of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). This article looks at the issue from the perspective of economic history and identifies that current proposals for fiscal union are based on an over-reliance on Optimum Currency Area theory and are not realistic in the current political environment. In addition, European fiscal rules have become over-complicated, inefficient and open to widespread manipulation. In the medium term, rather than risk the lessening of political commitment to the EMU through divisive fiscal union proposals, the EU should focus on developing unique governance mechanisms that better reflect the current characteristics of the EMU. In this context, this article proposes four actions to complement existing initiatives such as the Banking Union: (1) simplified EU budgetary rules, (2) the creation of an independent European Fiscal Board to assess and enforce national compliance, (3) a commitment to retaining core national fiscal autonomy with a strict ‘no bailout’ rule, and (4) increased levels of investment through an expanded European Fund for Strategic Investments. Only following the successful completion of these measures should fiscal deepening be discussed at a political level.

Professor Timothy Aloysius (T.A.) Smiddy was economic advisor to Taoiseach (Prime Minister) Eamon de Valera between 1932 and 1945. Notwithstanding a distinguished public service career, Smiddy's role as the first independent economic advisor to an Irish political leader post-1922 has escaped examination in the existing literature. This research identifies that Smiddy had a real and prolonged influence on the banking and monetary policies pursued by de Valera during the 1932-45 period. Ultimately, however, the often progressive nature of his proposals was circumscribed by de Valera's reluctance to supersede the more traditional views of the Department of Finance and the Currency Commission. This paper also identifies that de Valera took a keener interest in economic matters than has been generally assumed. However, such an interest did not result in a coherent, or consistent, Fianna Fail banking and currency policy in the 1930s and early 1940s.

ABSTRACTThe Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 provided monetary independence to the newly established Irish Free State. The existing historiography views Irish monetary and banking policy post-independence as following British precedent in terms of the structure and design of state monetary institutions. However, this article considers how Professor Henry Parker-Willis's experience of establishing the United States (US) Federal Reserve system in 1913 had a direct impact on his work as chair of the Irish banking commission in 1926. This research highlights that Parker-Willis played a significantly more important role in formulating the Irish Currency Act 1927 than is currently recognized. It further identifies that Parker-Willis's design for a wholly independent, non-political Irish currency commission was primarily based on his disillusionment with the political interference then evident in the management of the Federal Reserve system. This article, therefore, challenges the dominant view that Irish monetary institution building in the 1920s automatically followed British precedent, but rather identifies the direct influence of US monetary structures on the development of Irish institutions. This is an internationalist dimension not recognized in the existing historiography.

The creation of jobs across the Europe remains a key economic and social challenge for the EU. Given the negative impact of the crisis on European citizens, the EU’s ability to promote effective job creation policies will be viewed as amajor success of the wider integration process. In this context, a new approach is required to provide a growth-based strategy for creating unemployment across Europe. What is required is an achievable strategy based on the realities of modern EU labour markets. This research, based on an analysis of six member states, provides a set of recommendations designed to reflect the current characteristics of national employment markets.

The debate surrounding a potential BrEXiT has largely focused on the costs and disadvantages for Britain of making such a move. However, Britain leaving the Eu would also alter the strengths and profile of the European union. Britain is the Eu’s second largest economy, a significant net contributor to the Eu budget, hosts Europe’s only global financial centre and is an important driver of single market reform on the European stage.

The granting of a £7,000m bilateral loan by the British government to the Republic of Ireland in October 2010 highlights the banking co-dependence of modern Anglo-Irish relations. This article provides a Bank-of-England-centred perspective on the development of Irish monetary institutions from the granting of Irish monetary independence in December 1921 to the establishment of the Central Bank of Ireland in 1943. Irrespective of unresolved Anglo-Irish political issues, the Bank of England's Irish policy during this period was based on a strict adherence to Montagu Norman's key central banking principles of co-operation, exclusiveness and political autonomy. This article identifies that the application of these principles survived both the coming to power of Fianna Fáil (Soldiers of Destiny) in Southern Ireland in 1932 and the outbreak of war in 1939. This article also argues that Norman's adherence to a wider internationalist view of monetary relations played an important role in forcing the overwhelmingly Protestant and pro-union Irish commercial banks, headed by the Bank of Ireland, to come to terms with the reality of Irish monetary independence. In this context, Norman's approach to Southern Ireland parallels the transition from Empire to Commonwealth, which began to emerge in the interwar period.