I offer two objections to luck egalitarianism. The no-adequate-account objection takes note of the egalitarian insistence that the disvalue of inequality is only one of a plurality of values or disvalues that needs to be considered in arriving at a judgment about the ranking of alternative distributions of welfare. This turn to pluralism places a reasonable demand upon luck egalitarianism to provide an account of how the different sorts of values or disvalues that are supposed to attach to available distributions of welfare are to be aggregated or weighed against one another in that ranking procedure. I contend that the prospects for developing such an account are dim and that some salient responses to this objection misfire. The churlishness-envy objection against luck egalitarianism is that this doctrine countenances envy directed toward the faultless good fortune of others. This objection places a reasonable demand on luck egalitarians to formulate a version of their doctrine that does not underwrite envious responses toward those who gain through brute good luck. I contend that the most auspicious path toward satisfying the demand not to underwrite churlish envy advances a luck egalitarianism that asymmetrically affirms the badness of arbitrary disadvantage rather than the badness of both arbitrary disadvantage and arbitrary advantage. Since this is the strategy pursued in Shlomi Segall's Why Inequality Matters, I offer critiques of Segall's initial and revised versions of asymmetrical egalitarianism in support of my conclusion that luck egalitarianism seems unable to rebut or sidestep the churlishness-envy objection. I conclude that luck egalitarianism seems unable to satisfy either of the two reasonable demands upon it that I raise.

Libertarianism (Mack 2018) sets out to provide illuminating accounts and assessments of the philosophical arguments that have been made on behalf of libertarian conclusions. One theme of that book is that three philosophical approaches dominate these endeavors to vindicate libertarian conclusions. They are the natural rights approach, the cooperation-tomutual-advantage approach, and the indirect utilitarian approach. This essay explains the nature of these three approaches and the differences among them by tracing their development in the writings of theorists such as John Locke, David Hume, Herbert Spencer, Robert Nozick, and F. A. Hayek.

This essay contrasts two approaches to permissible self-defensive killing. The first is the forfeiture approach; the second is the elbow room for self-defense approach. The forfeiture approach comes in many versions - not all of which make prominent use of the word "forfeiture." However, all versions presume that the permissibility of X killing Y (when X must kill Y in order to prevent herself from being unjustly killed) depends entirely on there being some feature of Y in virtue of which Y has become liable to be killed, that is, in virtue of which Y has forfeited or lost or been stripped of his right not to be killed. Different versions of the forfeiture approach advance different claims about what feature of Y will render Y liable to being killed by X. I criticize versions of this approach offered by Thomson, Otsuka, and McMahan and argue that the shared deep error is the presumption that the permissibility of X's action turns entirely on some feature of Y. In focusing entirely on Y, the forfeiture approach fails to take seriously X's right of self-defense. In contrast, the elbow room for self-defense approach starts with an explication of a plausible right of self-defense and maintains that a proper explication of Y's right not to be killed must make moral elbow room from X's exercise of this right. Within the elbow room approach, Y's liability to being killed is based upon X's right of self-defense rather than the permissibility of X's killing Y being based upon Y's forfeiture.

Property, public and private refers both to (i) a normative relationship between agents and things, and (ii) the things that stand in that normative relationship to agents. In the paradigm case of property, an individual is related to some physical object by having an exclusive right to use that object as he chooses (i.e., it is the property of that agent to do with as he sees fit). In the paradigm case, the property holder's right of disposition is only subject to the constraint that he not dispose of his property in ways that violate others' rights. Many instances of property diverge in one or more respects from this basic paradigm. An agent's property need not be a physical object, but can instead be a more abstract. Distinct agents may have property in different aspects of the same thing; for example, one may have the usual land ownership rights, while another may hold the subsurface mineral rights. Distinct agents may jointly own particular things (e.g., “community” property). Is private property morally justified? The case discussed by Harold Demsetz and like narratives suggest a consequentialist vindication. But many have opposed private property regimes because they undercut communal or public life. Keywords: agent; Harold Demsetz (on property rights); consequentialism; rights

AbstractThe main purpose of this essay is to articulate the ideas of the last powerful advocate of natural rights in nineteenth-century America. That last powerful advocate was the Massachusetts-born radical libertarian Lysander Spooner (1808-1887). Besides his powerful antebellum attacks on slavery, Spooner developed forceful arguments on behalf of a strongly individualistic conception of natural law and private property rights and against coercive moralism, coercive paternalism, and state authority and legislation. This essay focuses on the theoretical core of Spooner’s position which is his doctrine of natural rights—a doctrine that is primarily developed in Spooner’sThe Law of Intellectual Property(1855),Natural Law(1882), andA Letter to Grover Cleveland(1886). I situate Spooner within the libertarian tradition in political thought by beginning this essay with an examination of two English writers whose radical writings (for the most part) preceded Spooner’s—Thomas Hodgskin (1787-1869) and the early Herbert Spencer (1820-1903). I emphasis the strongly Lockean character of Spooner’s thought and support this contention in part by showing how much more Lockean Spooner was than either Hodgskin or the early Spencer.

AbstractThe two main theses of “The Natural Right of Property” are: (i) that persons possess an original, non-acquired right not to be precluded from making extra-personal material their own (or from exercising discretionary control over what they have made their own); and (ii) that this right can and does take the form of a right that others abide by the rules of a (justifiable) practice of property which facilitates persons making extra-personal material their own (and exercising discretionary control over what they have made their own). I articulate some of the good reasons we have to affirm persons' possession of an original, non-acquired right of self-ownership and argue that the same good reasons support the ascription to persons of a natural right of property. I contrast an “inherent feature” conception of the actions through which (initial) rights over extra-personal objects arise with a “practice” conception of (initial) entitlement-generating actions. I argue that the fact that the natural right to property can and does take the form of persons' rights that others abide by the rules of a (justifiable) practice of property explains how there are many instances of (initial) entitlement generation which are not plausibly explained by those wed to the inherent feature conception of entitlement-generating actions and why there is a strong conventional dimension in the procedures through which persons acquire (initial) property rights.

Rights-oriented libertarian theory asserts the existence of robust individual rights - including robust rights of property. If these property rights are absolute, then it seems that all taxation is theft. However, it also seems that, if an individual is (faultlessly) in dire straits, it is permissible for him to seize or trespass in order to escape from those straits. It does seem that in this sense property rights are non-absolute. This essay examines what contribution this non-absoluteness of rights makes to the justification of taxation for the sake of rescuing individuals from their dire straits. The essay investigates how dire an individual's circumstances have to be for him to have a dispensation from the normal obligation to respect property. It distinguishes among different dispensations that individuals in dire enough circumstances may have. And it emphasizes how precarious is the path from the premise that sometimes individuals possess one or another of these dispensations to the conclusion that taxation to rescue people from dire straits is justified.

I offer a defense of the moral side-constraints to which Robert Nozick appeals in Anarchy, State and Utopia but for which he fails to provide a sustained justification. I identify a line of anti-consequentialist argumentation which is present in Nozick and which, in the terminology of Samuel Scheffler, moves first to affirm a personal prerogative which allows the individual not to sacrifice herself for the sake of the best overall outcome and second moves on to affirm restrictions (i.e., moral side-constraints) which prohibit the individual from suppressing others' exercise of their personal prerogatives even if that suppression would serve the overall good. I argue that one ought to follow this line of anti-consequentialist argumentation all the way to the affirmation of restrictions by showing that the rationale for the adoption of the personal prerogative is not satisfied unless the accompanying restrictions are adopted as well.

Part I of this essay supports the anti-egalitarian conclusion that individuals may readily become entitled to substantially unequal extra-personal holdings by criticizing end-state and pattern theories of distributive justice and defending the historical entitlement doctrine of justice in holdings. Part II of this essay focuses on a second route to the anti-egalitarian conclusion. This route combines the self-ownership thesis with a contention that is especially advanced by G.A. Cohen. This is the contention that the anti-egalitarian conclusion can be inferred from the self-ownership thesis without the aid of additional controversial premises. Cohen advances this contention, not because he wants to support the anti-egalitarian conclusion, but rather because he wants to emphasize the need for one to reject the self-ownership thesis if one is to reject the anti-egalitarian conclusion. In Part II of this essay, I support this second route to the anti-egalitarian conclusion by reinforcing Cohen's special contention while rejecting his challenges to the self-ownership thesis. Cohen's special contention is reinforced by way of an explanation of why the redistributive state must trench upon some people's self-ownership rights. One important challenge to the self-ownership thesis is answered through the articulation of a new and improved Lockean proviso. Another challenge offered by Cohen is answered by arguing that the philosophical costs of denying the self-ownership thesis are as great as the self-ownership libertarian maintains. Thus, I defend both of the key elements of self-ownership libertarianism, the self-ownership thesis and the anti-egalitarian conclusion.

Do differences in income or wealth matter, morally speaking? This essay addresses a broader issue than this question seems to pose. But this broader issue is, I believe, the salient philosophical issue which this question actually poses. Let me explain. Narrowly read, the question at hand is concerned only with inequality of income or wealth. It asks us to consider whether inequality of income or wealth as such is morally problematic. On this construal, the question invites us to consider whether the bare fact that Joshua has a greater income or net worth than Rebekah is a morally defective social state of affairs. Is there at least a significant moral presumption on behalf of equality of income or wealth such that, if an inequality of income or wealth obtains vis-à-vis Joshua and Rebekah, that inequality ought to be nullified unless some impressive positive justification for the inequality can be provided? On this narrow reading, the salient issue is whether there exists in particular an egalitarian presumption with respect to income or wealth. But I believe that the genuinely salient issue here is whether there exists in general an egalitarian presumption with respect to whatever factual condition of individuals one is supposed to attend to when assessing social states of affairs. The crucial question is not whether income or wealth or utility or well-being is the condition the unequal distribution of which is as such morally problematic.

This two-part article offers a defense of a libertarian doctrine that centers on two propositions. The first is the self-ownership thesis according to which each individual possesses original moral rights over her own body, faculties, talents, and energies. The second is the anti-egalitarian conclusion that, through the exercise of these rights of self-ownership, individuals may readily become entitled to substantially unequal extra-personal holdings. The self-ownership thesis remains in the background during Part I of this essay, while the anti-egalitarian conclusion is supported in two ways. First, I offer a reconstruction of Robert Nozick's well-known `How Liberty Upsets Patterns' argument against all end-state and pattern theories of distributive justice; and I defend this reconstructed stance against what might (otherwise) seem to be telling criticisms. Second, I defend the two key principles of Nozickian historical entitlement theory (the principle of just transfer and the principle of just initial acquisition) against criticisms offered by G.A. Cohen. Part II will center on Cohen's contention that the crucial basis for the anti-egalitarian conclusion is the self-ownership thesis. There I argue that Cohen is correct to hold that he must reject the self-ownership thesis if he is to avoid the anti-egalitarian conclusion; but he is wrong to think that he has an adequate basis for rejecting this thesis. Thus, both elements in the libertarianism under consideration are vindicated. And, the self-ownership thesis plays a surprisingly direct role in vindicating the anti-egalitarian conclusion.

This essay critically examines three theories of moral rights, theBenefit, the Interest, and the Choice theories. The Interest andChoice theories attempt to explain how rights can be more robustthan seems possible on the Benefit theory. In particular, moralrights are supposed to be resistant to trade-offs to supportprincipled anti-paternalism, to constitute a distinct dimensionof morality, and to provide right holders with a range ofdiscretionary choice. I argue that these and other featuresare better yet provided by a fourth theory of moral rights, theJurisdiction theory.

This essay is about natural rights over one’s person, one’s life, and one’s liberty.’ The possession of such basic moral rights has profound implications for one’s legitimate freedom with regard to medical treatment and procedures, and may have similarly profound implications for one’s responsibilities with regard to medical treatment. Yet what the precise implications of these rights are crucially depend upon how these natural rights are understood. Perhaps the key interpretative issue here is whether these rights are to be understood as inalienable. A right is alienable if and only if the bearer of that right can, by his choice, waive or transfer that right.² If the moral rights of each person over himself, his life and his liberty are alienable and are not otherwise compromised by significant countervailing moral considerations, then these rights vindicate a sweeping doctrine of informed consent and mutually voluntary interaction in the biomedical sphere. Suicide and the assistance of suicide, the donation and the sale of bodily parts, surrogate childbearing, and broad freedoms of self-medication are only the most obvious libertarian implications of such a conception of natural rights. On one level, the question of whether natural rights are alienable has, I believe, an easy and obvious answer, viz., yes. This is to say, if natural rights are understood as defining for each person a basic sphere of moral jurisdiction within which each rightholder may do as he sees fit, then it seems obvious that no feature or aspect of a person’srights can block the moral permissibility of chosen actions within his protected domain. However, this argument may rely too much, or at least too readily, upon assuming this particular domain of choice conception of natural rights. For there may be alternative conceptions of basic moral rights according to which some or all of these rights cannot be waived or transferred. Under such an alternative conception of rights, the bearers of these rights do not have the moral power to choose not to be protected by them. They cannot, by their choice, open themselves to forms of treatment, e.g., to being euthanized or to having bodily parts removed to be transplanted in others, which absent their consent would profoundly wrong them. In this essay the key issue of the alienability of basic moral rights is cast as an exercise in interpreting John Locke’sviews on natural rights.

This paper offers a programmatic philosophical articulation of moral and political individualism. This individualism consists of two main components: value individualism and rights individualism. The former is the view that, for each individual, the end which is of ultimate value is his own well-being. Each individual's well-being has ultimate agent-relative value and the only ultimate values are these agent-relative values. The latter view is that individuals possess moral jurisdiction over themselves, i.e., rights of self-ownership. These rights (along with other rights individuals may come to possess) constrain the manner in which agents may pursue value. For this reason, the articulated individualism is an constrained individualism. Sketches of arguments are offered for both value and rights individualism. And it is argued that the sole legitimate function of legal/political institutions is to further delineate and protect the rights of individuals. However, the paper is also concerned to indicate why this radical moral and political individualism does not have many of the features or implications that are commonly ascribed to it. In this connection, I seek to show how this social doctrine accords with individuals' having concern for the well-being of others, with the emergence of relationships among individuals that have both instrumental and non-instrumental value, with a degree of responsibility for self and others that is often thought to be antithetical to individualism and, in general, with a flourishing of civil order.

Previous articleNext article No AccessBook ReviewsNaked Racial Preference: The Case Against Affirmative Action. Carl Cohen Eric MackEric Mack Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Ethics Volume 107, Number 2Jan., 1997 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/233737 Views: 4Total views on this site Copyright 1997 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

In this essay I propose to explicate and defend a new and improved version of a Lockean proviso—the self-ownership proviso (SOP). I shall presume here that individuals possess robust rights of self-ownership. I shall take it that each individual has strong moral claims over the elements which constitute her person, e.g., her body parts, her talents, and her energies. However, in the course of the essay, I shall be challenging what I take to be the standard conception of self-ownership and proposing an enrichment of that conception. The SOP is presented and in part justified as an implication of the right of self-ownership as it is more richly conceived—hence its designation as the self-ownership proviso. As an implication of the right of self-ownership which is also compatible, in theory and practice, with extensive and robust private property rights, the SOP is offered as an integral element of classical-liberal political theory.

Journal Article Personal Integrity, Practical Recognition, and Rights Get access Eric Mack Eric Mack Tulane University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic PubMed Google Scholar The Monist, Volume 76, Issue 1, 1 January 1993, Pages 101–118, https://doi.org/10.5840/monist199376112 Published: 09 December 2014