Santos, Morales-Arilla, and Partipilo Cornielles (2026) claim that the bulk of the decline in Venezuela's income preceded the imposition of economic sanctions and that the rate at which the economy contracted did not accelerate after sanctions. Both claims are false. Even if they were true, they would support the authors' conclusions only if one were to disregard the effect of oil prices on the Venezuelan economy.

Bastos, Geloso, and Bologna Pavlik (2026) argue that the US embargo explains less than one tenth of the difference in per capita income between Cuba and a counterfactual scenario in which the country did not follow socialist economic policies. We show that their results are driven by the use of an elasticity of income to trade openness that is neither representative nor a reasonable upper bound of the values found in the literature and by their choice to attribute the effect of the interaction between the embargo and other determinants of growth solely to those other determinants. We show that, once these problems are corrected, the embargo can account for a substantial fraction, and in some cases all, of Cuba's post 1959 economic underperformance.

An article recently published in this journal claims to present statistical evidence of fraud in Bolivia’s controversial 2019 presidential election. These claims are significant not only for our understanding of a pivotal moment in Latin American politics but also because, as the authors note, their methods might inform how researchers investigate fraud in other cases. We explain why the evidence does not support the authors’ conclusions. They claim to find evidence of fraud based on: (1) a difference-in-differences, (2) a simple difference, and (3) regression discontinuity. But (1) the pre-trends are converging in the difference-indifferences, (2) there are many benign explanations for the simple difference, and (3) the regression discontinuity uses an arbitrarily chosen cutoff at which placebo outcomes are not smooth. Our objective is both to correct the record about this specific election and, more generally, to reiterate the risks of ad hoc election forensics.

This paper examines the potential impact of different US economic sanctions policies on Venezuelan migration flows. I consider three possible departures from the current status quo in which selected oil companies are permitted to conduct transactions with Venezuela's state-owned oil sector: a return to maximum pressure, characterized by intensive use of secondary sanctions, a more limited tightening that would revoke only the current Chevron license, and a complete lifting of economic sanctions. I find that sanctions significantly influence migration patterns by disrupting oil revenues, which fund imports critical to productivity in the non-oil sector. Reimposing maximum pressure sanctions would lead to an estimated one million additional Venezuelans emigrating over the next five years compared to a baseline scenario of no economic sanctions. If the US aims to address the Venezuelan migrant crisis effectively, a policy of engagement and lifting economic sanctions appears more likely to stabilize migration flows than a return to maximum pressure strategies.

ABSTRACTThe inadequacy of global liquidity provision and the unequal distribution of its benefits stem from a fundamental distortion: the exercise of market power by the two largest issuers of international currencies. The United States and Europe jointly provide the currencies used for 79% of global reserves and 91% of trade invoicing, forming a duopoly in the means of payment used by the world economy. The exercise of this market power allows them to capture the bulk of seigniorage rents associated with the provision of global liquidity, while constraining developing countries' growth and limiting the scope of global countercyclical policies. This paper proposes aligning the issuance of special drawing rights (SDRs) with the growth of global reserve demand, as mandated by Article VIII (§7) of the International Monetary Fund's Articles of Agreement. This approach offers a politically feasible path to democratize global liquidity provision and provide developing countries with access to financing currently monopolized by advanced economies.

We argue that economic collapses can result from the adoption by political actors of strategies that generate severe negative economic externalities for society. We establish the conditions for political conflict to become economically destructive and develop a diagnostics toolkit to identify when income declines are consequence of the breakdown of conflict-management arrangements. When political conflict drives a collapse in growth, we expect the onset of the contraction to coincide with the intensification of political conflict, authority to be truly contested, politically advantageous strategies to generate negative externalities, economic collapse to be driven by productivity losses, short-term biases in policies to increase with contestation of power, and the policy framework to improve once political conflict recedes. We argue that all these conditions were satisfied in two of the largest peacetime collapses in modern history: Venezuela (2012-2020) and Zimbabwe (1997-2008).

PurposeThe use of economic sanctions has grown dramatically in recent decades. Nevertheless, many arguments are presented in the public policy space regarding their effects on target populations. The author presents the first systematic analysis of the effects of sanctions on living conditions in target countries.Design/methodology/approachThis paper provides a comprehensive survey and assessment of the literature on the effects of economic sanctions on living standards in target countries. The author identifies 31 studies that apply quantitative econometric or calibration methods to cross-country and national data to assess the impact of economic sanctions on indicators of human and economic development. The author provides in-depth discussions of three sanctions episodes-Iran, Afghanistan and Venezuela-that illustrate the channels through which sanctions affect living conditions in target countries.FindingsOf the 31 studies, 30 find that sanctions have negative effects on outcomes ranging from per capita income to poverty, inequality, mortality and human rights. The author provides new results showing that 54 countries-27% of all countries and 29% of the world economy- are sanctioned today, up from only 4% of countries in the 1960s. In the three cases discussed, sanctions that restricted the access of governments to foreign exchange limited the ability of states to provide essential public goods and services and generated substantial negative spillovers on private sector and nongovernmental actors.Originality/valueThis is the first literature survey that systematically assesses the quantitative evidence on the effect of sanctions on living conditions in target countries.

Do politicians target the benefits of social programs to party loyalists or to swing voters? Traditional tests of this question are clouded by an identification problem caused by the simultaneity of politician and voter choices to participate in the exchange of assistance for votes. I use the holding of an unanticipated repeat gubernatorial election in the Venezuelan state of Barinas in 2022 as a natural experiment to identify the effects of elections on the distribution of government assistance. I estimate that the holding of the election led to an increase in the probability of voters in Barinas receiving food packages in comparison with the control group of voters in the state of Apure. I also find that moderate opposition and third-party voters received larger increases in food benefits. These results are consistent with the predictions of the spatial model of distributive politics, according to which elections lead governments to direct more benefits to swing voters instead of core supporters. The findings illustrate why investigation of cross sectional correlations is insufficient to test the implications of theories of voting if it is not accompanied by a clear identification strategy to help isolate the source of the underlying shocks.

Venezuela has suffered three economic catastrophes since independence: one each in the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first centuries. Prominent explanations for this trilogy point to the interaction of class conflict and resource dependence. We turn attention to intra-class conflict, arguing that the most destructive policy choices stemmed not from the rich defending themselves against the masses but rather from pitched battles among elites. Others posit that Venezuelan political institutions failed to sustain growth because they were insufficiently inclusive; we suggest in addition that they inadequately mediated intra-elite conflict.

This article reviews recent advances in addressing empirical identification issues in cross-country and country-level studies and their implications for the identification of the effectiveness and consequences of economic sanctions. I argue that, given the difficulties in assessing causal relationships in cross-national data, country-level case studies can serve as a useful and informative complement to cross-national regression studies. However, I also warn that case studies pose a set of additional potential empirical pitfalls which can obfuscate rather than clarify the identification of causal mechanisms at work. Therefore, the most sensible way to read case study evidence is as a complement rather than as a substitute to cross-national research.

We use the differential access to credit of oil firms in Venezue- la's Orinoco Basin to identify the economic effects of financial and oil sanctions on firm output. Using a panel of monthly firm-level oil production from 2008-2020, we provide differ- ence-in-differences estimates showing that financial and oil sanctions led to large oil production losses among firms that had access to international credit prior to sanctions. The esti-mated effects explain around half of the output drop experi- enced in those firms since the adoption of sanctions, for a total loss of around USD 6.2bn a year at current oil prices. We also argue that by impeding the government from extending spe- cial financing arrangements to other firms in the area, sanc- tions precluded the adoption of policy decisions that could have stabilized production at pre-sanctions levels.

We revisit the results of a recent paper by Equipo Anova, who claim to find evidence of an improvement in Venezuelan imports of food and medicines associated with the adoption of U.S. financial sanctions towards Venezuela in 2017. We show that their results are consequence of data coding errors and questionable methodological choices, including the use an unreasonable functional form that implies a counterfactual of negative imports in the absence of sanctions, the omission of data accounting for four-fifths of the country's food imports at the time of sanctions and incorrect application of regression discontinuity methods. Once these errors are corrected, the evidence of a significant improvement in the level and rate of change in imports of essentials disappears.

This paper argues that Venezuela’s hunger crisis was caused by the collapse of the country’s import capacity. I show evidence supporting the hypothesis that the key driver of the decrease in caloric intake was the decline of more than nine-tenths in oil revenues, which sparked an economic contraction and forced the economy to undertake massive cuts in imports of food and agricultural inputs. Econometric estimates using cross-national panel data show that Venezuela’s performance in health and nutrition indicators is in line with, and in many cases significantly better, than what we should expect given the magnitude of its contraction in per capita incomes over the past two decades.