Abstract Automated vehicles promise much in the way of both economic boons and increased personal safety. For better or worse, the effects of automating personal vehicles will not be felt for some time. In contrast, the effects of automated work vehicles, like semi-trucks, will be felt much sooner—within the next decade. The costs and benefits of automation will not be distributed evenly; while most of us will be positively affected by the lower prices overall, those losing their livelihoods to the automated semi-trucks and other similar work vehicles will be much worse off. This sets up a classic distributive justice problem: how do we balance the harms and benefits of automation? In this paper, the authors recommend work alternatives: policies that the government would enact in order to ensure that each person could live a decent life even if one could not work, especially for reasons like having one’s job automated. After arguing for this position, we propose some policy guidelines.

Medical error is the third-leading cause of death in the United States, but there has been little work done on the associated conceptual and normative questions. What is medical error? Is all medical error bad? The first section of this paper surveys the dominant conception of medical error-promulgated by the Institute of Medicine-and tries to understand whether error necessarily eventuates in adverse events. The second section challenges an asymmetry in the way that we think about error: For example, the received view would allow that undertesting could comprise medical error, whereas overtesting cannot. The third section considers the concept of moral luck and how it bears on our ascriptions of medical error.

Technology has an outsized impact on the modern world; it is how we have tamed our frontiers. But that role is largely ignored when it comes to the Arctic frontier. Emerging technologies, especially AI, can enable desperately needed services and infrastructure-but they can also challenge ethics, law, and policy, as they usually do. For instance, autonomous icebreaker ships pose a dual-use dilemma since they can be used for both humanitarian and military purposes. As a lesson for other frontiers, this article will broadly introduce the potential role of AI in the changing Arctic and some of the ethical concerns that deserve attention before that future arrives.

With by far the lowest population density in the United States, myriad challenges attach to healthcare delivery in Alaska. In the "Size, Population, and (In)Accessibility" section, we characterize this geographic context, including how it is exacerbated by lack of infrastructure. In the "Distributing Healthcare" section, we turn to healthcare economics and staffing, showing how these bear on delivery—and are exacerbated by geography. In the "Health Care in Rural Alaska" section, we turn to rural care, exploring in more depth what healthcare delivery looks like outside of Alaska's major cities. This discussion continues in the "Alaska's Native Villages" section, which specifically analyzes healthcare in Alaska's indigenous villages, some of the smallest and most isolated communities in the United States. Though many of the ways we could improve Alaskan health care for Alaskan residents are limited by its unique features, the "Justice and Healthcare Delivery" and "Technology and Telemedicine" sections consider ways in which certain policies and technology—including telemedicine—could mitigate the challenges developed in previous sections.

This paper surveys foundational ethical issues that attach to the Internet of Things (IoT). In Section 1, we provide an overview of the technology, indicating both current and future applications. Subsequent sections consider particular ethical issues, including: informed consent (Section 2), privacy (Section 3), information security (Section 4), physical safety (Section 5), and trust (Section 6). Section 7 emphasizes that these ethical issues do not exist in isolation, but converge and intersect in myriad ways. And that these issues are not comprehensive, but rather are foundational starting points that stand to be expanded and further elucidated through future research.

Under customary international law, the First Geneva Convention and Additional Protocol I, medical personnel are protected against intentional attack. In § 1 of this paper, we survey these legal norms and situate them within the broader international humanitarian law framework. In § 2, we explore the historical and philosophical basis of medical immunity, both of which have been underexplored in the academic literature. In § 3, we analyse these norms as applied to an attack in Afghanistan (2015) by the United States; the United States was attempting to target a Taliban command-and-control centre but inadvertently destroyed a Médecins Sans Frontières hospital instead, killing 42 people. In § 4, we consider forfeiture of medical immunity and, more sceptically, whether supreme emergency could justify infringement of non-forfeited protected status.

George Lucas’s book comprises an important contribution to the debate over the ethics of cyberwarfare. Specifically, it is the first single-authored monograph on this topic; it complements existing...

This article explores a debate over the legal mechanisms by which interrogational torture could be sanctioned. Four separate proposals are considered, including: civil disobedience; torture warrants; self-defense; and necessity. Civil disobedience does not allow for legalized torture, but may allow for reduced punishments. Torture warrants contrast with self-defense and necessity in terms of offering ex ante, as opposed to ex post, authorization; arguments for and against either approach are considered. While there has been some legal scholarship in relation to torture warrants, less has been said about ex post justifications. This article ultimately defends the appropriateness of the necessity defense for torture, making both the moral and legal case for such a defense. Ticking time-bomb cases famously—or infamously—invite us to imagine a scenario wherein the torture of one guilty terrorist will lead to the acquisition of information that can be used to save the lives of many innocents. Despite the contemporary focus on such cases, they own a long tradition, dating to the early 1800s. And, throughout their history, they have appeared in various guises, from the literary to the public to the philosophical. The principal moral question suggested by these cases is whether one harm can be effected such that a worse one is not; while there is certainly dissent, most moral philosophers would answer this question in the affirmative. That said, there is substantial doubt as to whether torture would be the lesser harm or, more generally, whether ticking time-bomb cases gain any † Associate Professor, Philosophy Department, Western Michigan University, and Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, The Australian National University. Please direct correspondence to fritz.allhoff@wmich.edu. 1 For example, consider Jeremy Bentham: Suppose an occasion, to arise, in which a suspicion is entertained, as strong as that which would be received as a sufficient ground for arrest and commitment as for felony—a suspicion that at this very time a considerable number of individuals are actually suffering, by illegal violence inflictions equal in intensity to those which if inflicted by the hand of justice, would universally be spoken of under the name of torture. For the purpose of rescuing from torture these hundred innocents, should any scruple be made of applying equal or superior torture, to extract the requisite information from the mouth of one criminal, who having it in his power to make known the place where at this time the enormity was practicing or about to be practiced, should refuse to do so? To say nothing of wisdom, could any pretense be made so much as to the praise of blind and vulgar humanity, by the man who to save one criminal, should determine to abandon [one hundred] innocent persons to the same fate? Bentham MSS Box 74.b, 429 (May 27, 1804), quoted in W.L. Twining and P.E. Twining, Bentham on Torture, 24 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 307, 347 (1973). 2 See Jean Lartéguy, Les Centurions (Avon Books 1961) (Xan Fielding, trans) (originally published 1960). See also Anthony Quinton, Views, The Listener 757-758 (December 2, 1971). See also Henry Shue, Torture, 7 Philosophy and Public Affairs 124,141 (1978). See also Michael Levin, The Case for Torture, Newsweek 7 (February 7, 1982). 3 For more discussion, see Fritz Allhoff, Terrorism, Ticking Time-Bombs and Torture, especially chapter 6 (University of Chicago, forthcoming). 2 | P a g e purchase in the real world or are otherwise relegated . But even if they did, then what? In other words, even if torture can be morally justified in exceptional cases, should we authorize it? In the literature—and conceptually—there are three basic approaches to authorizing torture. The first is not to authorize it at all, which is to say that torture—even if justified—requires some sort of punishable civil disobedience (§1). Another approach is to authorize torture ex ante, such as through torture warrants. On this approach, torture remains prohibited except for when a judge grants permission for its application. Torture warrants have been defended by Alan Dershowitz, and we will evaluate that debate (§2). Finally, torture can be legitimized ex post, which is to say that torture remains illegal but can nevertheless be (legally) justified or excused; our discussion will focus on the justifications of self-defense (§3) and necessity (§4). For the sake of this argument, let us agree that torture is currently illegal, both in domestic and international law. The principal domestic law is USC §§2340-2340A; the US passed this under our obligation to the International Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT; 1975/1987). Furthermore, torture is decried in §3.1a, §17, §87, and §110 of the Third Geneva Convention (1949). Alongside these legal proscriptions are hortatory ones, including §5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the Declaration of Tokyo (1975). 4 The Convention against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, available at http://www.hrweb.org/legal/cat.html (accessed February 8, 2010). CAT has a somewhat complicated legislative history, thus making it unclear how to date it. The General Assembly of the UN adopted CAT in 1975. It was then opened for ratification by signatory countries in 1985; CAT entered into force in 1987 once it was ratified by the 20th country, Canada. 1975 and 1987 are therefore both commonly listed as dates, depending on what the date is meant to represent. 5 Third Geneva Convention, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e636b/6fef854a3517b75ac125641e004a9e68 (accessed May 5, 2008). 6 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/ (accessed February 8, 2010). 7 Declaration of Tokyo, available at http://www.cirp.org/library/ethics/tokyo/ (accessed May 5, 2008). 3 | P a g e Given this corpus, critics of torture often seem dumfounded that anyone could seriously defend it. There are a couple of simple responses, though; in fact, they are so simple that the dumfoundedness is curious. First, there are completely separate questions as to whether torture is or should be illegal. There have been all sorts of bad laws: those that legalized slavery; those that denied women the right to vote; and those that denied equal rights based on sexual orientation, among others. Ultimately the interesting question is not what the laws are, but rather what they should be. And no matter how many laws oppose torture—or whether those laws are international or domestic—we can always ask whether they get it right, whether they are appropriate for our times, whether they are adequate to protect us, and so on. So, to be clear, let us grant that torture is illegal and instead wonder whether it should be, particularly given exceptional cases in which torture would be the lesser of two available evils. Whether such cases mean that we should revisit our laws is a separate issue altogether—Oliver Wendell Holmes famously argued that hard cases make bad law—but a moral case for torture gives us at least a prima facie reason to think that it should be legal. Second, even if torture should be illegal, it hardly follows that there are not cases in which people should torture. Rather, there might be reasons against having some sort of torture policy—for example, fear of abuse—while, at the same time, acknowledging that torture could be justified in individual cases. Those cases might be rare enough that we need not explicitly build them into our policies, but could rather allow for a post hoc recognition of the appropriate circumstances, as well as 8 See, for example, David Luban, The Torture Lawyers of Washington, in David Luban, ed, Legal Ethics and Human Dignity 162-205 (Cambridge 2007). See also see Marcy Strauss, Torture, 48 New York Law School Law Review 201274, esp. §II (2003/2004). 9 The full quote was actually: “Great cases, like hard cases, make bad law. For great cases are called great, not by reason of their importance in shaping the law of the future, but because of some accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distort the judgment.” Northern Securities Co v United States 193 US 197 (1904) (Holmes, dissenting), 400. 10 It bears notice that none of the proposals to be evaluated in this paper entails the wholesale legalization of torture; the proposals considered in §1 and §3 leave torture illegal, while torture warrants (§2) offer a highly circumscribed route to authorized torture. 4 | P a g e the associative legal exoneration. In §§3-4, we will discuss self-defense and necessity in greater detail, but suffice it to say that they work the same way insofar as those defense are just that: defenses against violations of the law. Whether torture can avail itself of either is a critical issue, though the present point is simply that (at least some) social policies are defeasible. The point of these previous two paragraphs is not to defend any substantive position, but rather to locate the issues within the proper dialectical space. And, to reiterate, the illegality of torture is really neither here nor there with regards to our investigation. Rather, what we care about is figuring out how to accommodate justified torture, and there are two possibilities: rework our legal frameworks or else countenance torture within them. What ultimately matters is that we allow torture when it is justified and that we disallow it when it is not. If the legal status of torture prevents a justifiable act of torture from taking place, then something has gone wrong. Maybe that wrong is tolerable given broader policy considerations, but maybe not. Alternatively, paving the way for unjustified torture is no better—and is potentially worse—than not allowing justified tort

In 1979, a group of military officers with a particular interest in professional ethics convened at the Hastings Center in New York, just across the Hudson River from the United States Military Aca...

Philosophical and ethical discussions of warfare are often tied to emerging technologies and techniques. Today we are presented with what many believe is a radical shift in the nature of war-the realization of conflict in the cyber-realm, the so-called \"fifth domain\" of warfare. Does an aggressive act in the cyber-realm constitute an act of war? If so, what rules should govern such warfare? Are the standard theories of just war capable of analyzing and assessing this mode of conflict? These changing circumstances present us with a series of questions demanding serious attention. Is there such a thing as cyberwarfare? How do the existing rules of engagement and theories from the just war tradition apply to cyberwarfare? How should we assess a cyber-attack conducted by a state agency against private enterprise and vice versa? Furthermore, how should actors behave in the cyber-realm? Are there ethical norms that can be applied to the cyber-realm? Are the classic just war constraints of non-combatant immunity and proportionality possible in this realm? Especially given the idea that events that are constrained within the cyber-realm do not directly physically harm anyone, what do traditional ethics of war conventions say about this new space? These questions strike at the very center of contemporary intellectual discussion over the ethics of war. In twelve original essays, plus a foreword from John Arquilla and an introduction, Binary Bullets: The Ethics of Cyberwarfare, engages these questions head on with contributions from the top scholars working in this field today.

This conclusion presents some closing thoughts on the key concepts discussed in the preceding chapter of this book. The book discuses the role responsibilities of military officers and begins with, officers must consistently reinforce what the military organization as a whole should be teaching, namely, the centrality to military identity of adherence to the received rules of war. The book maintained that officers are not professionally responsible for ensuring that their subordinates fight only in justified wars. That, rather, is a responsibility, directly, of our political leaders and, indirectly, of all of us, especially in a democracy. It sails against the tide of recent philosophical work on the ethics of war, which is largely non-consequentialist in character. It has succeeded in advancing plausible and perhaps compelling answers to the basic ethical questions of war; this will redound to the credit of utilitarianism, enhancing its claim to …

This paper reports on our work developing a set of modular courses to intended to help foster Ethical, Social, Environmental, Health, and Safety Awareness in Tomorrow's Engineers and Technologists. We focus on emerging technologies, and especially nanotechnology. In the last decade nanotechnology has made myriad inroads into mainstream society. It is merely one of many exciting new ways that science and technology are changing how we live and think. Along with these developments in science and technology come new industries, and new challenges. This requires heightened awareness of health and safety risks, ethical and social considerations, and environmental implications of their work. This need is not limited to nanotechnologies, nor revolutionary technologies, but should be an integral part of all engineering work.Our NSF-funded project is developing and introducing introductory and advanced curricula for online and face-to-face course modules taught as full courses or infused into existing courses. The courses and modules are being developed and piloted with the guidance of an advisory council made up of nanotechnology leaders from academia and industry. One important goal of the project is to recruit, engage, prepare, and encourage students from traditionally underrepresented groups to careers in Science and Engineering, with a focus on Nanotechnology.In this paper we explain the origin of the project and how we developed the course modules, review the first semesters teaching from these modules, and examine our initial results and evaluations.

Those who support torture in ticking-time-bomb cases are often criticized as failing to consider empirical objections to torture; however, torture's critics often wield this charge uncritically, doing little more than throwing out platitudes without considering the role of those platitudes in the dialectic. I agree with the critics that more empirical engagement is owed than is typically on offer, but deny that such engagement vindicates their position. This article therefore considers various stock objections to the actual use of torture, while ultimately arguing that those objections fail to undermine the use of torture in exceptional cases. In particular, we will consider the efficacy and reliability of torture, the institutional requirements for torture, the nefarious spread of torture, and whether there are better alternatives to torture. In each of these discussions, let us frame them against the associated contentions made by critics regarding the inapplicability of ticking-time-bomb cases to the real world. The last two sections of the article consider where the burden of proof falls in this debate and, in particular, whether the proponent of torture needs real-world ticking-time-bomb cases to defend exceptional torture, as well as what such cases might be.

This Nanotechnology Undergraduate Education (NUE) in Engineering program entitled, "NUE: NanoTRA-Texas Regional Alliance to foster 'Nanotechnology Environment, Health, and Safety Awareness' in tomorrow's Engineering and Technology Leaders", at Texas State University-San Marcos (Texas State) is a collaborative project with the University of Texas (UT) at Tyler to develop introductory and advanced curricula that address the 'nanotechnology safety issues' that include social, ethical, environmental, health, and safety issues of nanotechnology. The curricula will be modular in nature, suitable for use either as two full semester courses that will be taught online at the UT at Tyler or for insertion as separate modules into undergraduate engineering, engineering technology, and industrial technology courses at Texas State.

Nation-states are struggling to formulate cyberpolicy, especially against foreign-based intrusions and attacks on domestic computer systems. These incidents are often framed in the context of cyberwarfare, which naturally implies that military organizations should respond to these incidents. This chapter will discuss why cyberwarfare is ethically difficult and why, until responsible cyberpolicy is developed, we may plausibly reframe the problem not as warfare but as private defense, i.e., self-defense by private parties, especially commercial companies, as distinct from a nation-state's right to self-defense. The distinction between private defense and national defense is relevant, since victims of cyberattacks have been primarily industry targets and not so much government targets, at least with respect to measurable harm. And we focus on foreign-based cyberattacks since, unlike domestic-based attacks that are usually considered to be mere crimes and therefore a matter for domestic law enforcement, foreign-based attacks tend to raise special alarms and panic about more sinister motives. More than a mere criminal act, a foreign cyberattack is often perceived as an aggression so serious that it may plausibly count as an act of war, or casus belli, and so we are quick to invoke national security. But insofar as the state is currently not protecting industry from such cyberattacks-in part because it is difficult to arrive at a sound cyberpolicy-we should consider interim solutions outside the military framework.

Introduction Fritz Allhoff and Mark A. Hall Unit 1: Context and History 1. NFIB v. Sebelius: Five Takes Glenn H. Reynolds and Brannon P. Denning 2. Popular Constitutionalism and the Affordable Care Act Josh Blackman 3. Metaphysical Philosophers and the 'Practical Statesmanship' of Supreme Court Justices in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius Brian E. Butler 4. By Any Means Necessary? Constitutionalisation of Healthcare in the United States of America, United Kingdom, and Brazil Jane Marriot and Jamie Fletcher Unit 2: Analyzing the Opinions 5. Fractured Group Speech Acts and the Holding of NFIB v. Sebelius Caleb Mason 6. A Strategy of Increasing Judicial Power in NFIB v. Sebelius Tonja Jacobi 7. Health Insurance Mandate Really is a Tax, and That's a Good Thing Too Paul Gowder 8. Activity, Inactivity, and Production: Roberts' Commerce Clause Argument Nathan Stout Unit 3: Individual Liberty 9. Autonomy and the ACA Individual Mandate JB Coleman 10. Employers' Rights and the ACA Jessica Flanigan 11. Moral Pluralism and Federal Authority Jacob Affolter 12. ACA and Religious Liberty: Principles of Adjudication R. Mary Lemmons Unit 4: Medicaid 13. Fiscal Objections to Expanded Health Coverage: A Case Study of the ACA Alex Rajczi 14. In Defence of the ACA's Medicaid Expansion Ishani Maitra and Brian Weatherson 15. Coercion, Political Accountability, and Voter Ignorance: Mistaken Medicaid Expansion Ruling in NFIB v. Sebelius Alexander A. Guerrero 16. Was the Medicaid Expansion Coercive? I. Glenn Cohen Unit 5: Future Implications 17. Conditional Spending and the Conditional Offer Puzzle Mitchell N. Berman 18. Health of the Commerce Clause: Sebelius Decision and the Future of Federal Power Marcus Schulzke and Amanda Cortney Carroll 19. Reflections on the Rule of Law After NFIB v. Sebelius Christopher Boom 20. The Alien Exclusion: ACA and the Oblique Rights of Those on the Margins Jill Hernandez