In the economic literature, the increase in the de mand for high-skilled labour that results from both globalisation and technical chang e is often seen as generating an inequality-unemployment trade-off (IUT) within adva nced countries (the North). However, empirical evidence suggests that this trade-off is likely to significantly differ across countries. To explain this, we make a distinction between two types of Northern countries, i.e., those that were egalitarian and those that were inequality-ori ented on the eve of both the ICT technological change and globalisation (early eight ies). Estimations implemented for a panel of thirteen OECD countries over the period 1981-200 3 suggest that: (i) globalisation and technical change generate an IUT that is uneven acr oss countries, and (ii) globalisation results in a trade-off that is more intense for the countries that were initially egalitarian whereas the trade-off induced by technological chan ge is more severe in the countries that were inequality-oriented.

In this paper, we assess the impact of international trade on union bargaining power in five EU countries, using a two-step estimation procedure. In the first step, we use firm-level data to estimate union bargaining power at sector level within a production function framework. We simultaneously test for the bargaining regime and estimate, rather than impose, union preferences. We find that a labour-hoarding regime is clearly favoured over an efficient bargaining or a right-to-manage framework. Overall, unions appear to be wage-oriented. In the second step, the bargaining power estimates are regressed on variables reflecting the level of foreign competitiveness of OECD countries and Newly Industrialized Countries (NIC), as well as on a number of other potential determinants of union power. We find a significant negative impact of internationalization on union bargaining power that is comparable in NIC and OECD countries.

Feenstra and Hanson [NBER Working Paper No. 6052 (1997)] propose a procedure to correct the standard errors in a two-stage regression with generated dependent variables. Their method has subsequently been used in two-stage mandated wage models [Feenstra and Hanson, Quarterly Journal of Economics (1999) Vol. 114, pp. 907-940; Haskel and Slaughter, The Economic Journal (200 1) Vol. I 11, pp. 163-187; Review of International Economics (2003) Vol. 11, pp. 630-650] and for the estimation of the sector bias of skill-biased technological change [Haskel and Slaughter, European Economic Review (2002) Vol. 46, pp. 1757-1783]. Unfortunately, the proposed correction is negatively biased (sometimes even resulting in negative estimated variances) and therefore leads to overestimation of the inferred significance. We present an unbiased correction procedure and apply it to the models reported by Feenstra and Hanson (1999) and Haskel and Slaughter (2002).

Consumers’ buying behavior is not consistent with their positive attitude toward ethical products. In a survey of 808 Belgian respondents, the actual willingness to pay for fair‐trade coffee was measured. It was found that the average price premium that the consumers were willing to pay for a fair‐trade label was 10%. Ten percent of the sample was prepared to pay the current price premium of 27% in Belgium. Fair‐trade lovers (11%) were more idealistic, aged between 31 and 44 years and less “conventional.” Fair‐trade likers (40%) were more idealistic but sociodemographically not significantly different from the average consumer.

This model enables the planning and assessment of export promotion activities. The model consists of four consecutive filters that are constructed using and applying a set of selection and decision rules. Information related to country and product category is brought together, and realistic export opportunities for Belgian are finally filtered out.