Winnicott is often endorsed by critical theory, primarily because he offers a less rigid approach than orthodox psychoanalysis. He also displays a dialectical feature that matches the Hegelian bent that critical theory retains from its Marxist origins. However, Winnicott also entails some serious exclusions that subvert efforts to enlist him for critical theory. This can be prevalently seen in his attitude to the schizoid condition. He views that condition as both particularly ill and as socially disruptive. At the basis of the schizoid condition, as he understands it, is a sense of detachment from, and hostility towards, the social order—any social order. The schizoid flaw, in other words, resides in being antithetical. If antithesis is cast as the core illness, the Winnicott alliance with critical theory is undermined, rendering aspects of Winnicott’s theory collusive with a normalized status quo.

Introduction for the Winnicott special issue.

I compare Christopher Lasch's thought to specific features that research in political science attributes to contemporary populism. Lasch openly favoured a historical form of populism but is rarely considered when current forms of populism are discussed. The research literature characterizes populism as superficially tied to democracy while undermining it, as committed to the moral binary of people and elites, and as intellectually "thin" because it does not engage with the complex theories that ground other ideologies. These characters make populism incoherent and inimical to democracy. Lasch manifests all three characters while connecting them to a sustained worldview. Humans' awareness of death is the core feature that makes them rational, ethical and equal. Attempts to dilute that awareness are inimical to the equality at democracy's basis. Experts and professionals encourage this dilution by promising remedies and progress. Democracy depends on ordinary people who resist elites and their complex phraseologies.

In the past few decades, liberal and democratic thought has been subjected to attacks from the adherents of nationalism, populism, and social radicalism. Much of these attacks involve suspicions about liberalism's association with the contents and purveyors of structured knowledge, scientific and humanistic alike. I suggest that an examination of the history of liberal beliefs may add to our understanding of what is at stake. Such an examination may reveal how liberal thought in the twentieth century shifted away from its earlier individualist and constitutional position towards the pluralist position that grants a special place to educated knowledge, to experts and professionals, and thus invites allegations of elitism. In particular, I focus on the differences between the ideas that conventional liberal authors elaborated during early modernity and the nineteenth century, on the one hand, and the version of liberal values and the polity based on them that were tacitly adopted during the mid-twentieth century, on the other hand. The examination involves highlighting the common denominators of mid-century authors on right, left, and centre, such as Laski, Popper and Hayek, as well as asking what in their shared worldview could attract allegations of elitism from later generations.

From the late 1970s to the mid-1990s, a series of critical remarks were traded between the historian and cultural critic Christopher Lasch and the psychoanalyst and feminist philosopher Jessica Benjamin. Researchers describe that exchange as involving competing perceptions of psychoanalysis, but the debate also covered mismatching approaches to critical theory and, more widely, to the ideals befitting a free polity. Lasch's appeal to the traditions of the American past faced off against Benjamin's advocacy of a substantial social change whose fundamental step was challenging the patriarchy.1 The ideas that each of the two authors put forth are often cited for reproaching the worldview associated with the other. Supportive scholars credit Benjamin with working psychoanalysis into a feminist perspective that questions traditional gender roles and the social order based on them, an order to which Lasch seemed committed.2 On the other hand, critics of the psychoanalytic turn to which Benjamin was central echo Lasch when arguing that the resulting relational theory marginalizes personal responsibility and belittles the significance of individual conscience.3

Formulated as a common conceptual ground for all democracies, Popper's notion of the open society sprang from the mid-20th century context that demonstrated democracy's vulnerability to hijacking through its own electoral mechanisms. Popper's concept may accordingly be considered as a resource for combatting the populist appeal to majority decision and its threat of diminishing individual and minority rights. I examine the affirmative and critical aspects of such a consideration. On the affirmative side, the open-society concept allows room for both majority decision and the rights of individuals and minorities, as well as for particular group identities and class demands, showing that they may all cooperate to facilitate the growth of liberty, knowledge and the quality of life. Democratic institutions are justified from the grounds of this concept. Populism's equation of democracy with majority decision is, thus, incompatible with democracy's essence: decision by majority exists to cater to the vision that justifies that mode of decision making itself and cannot stay legitimate if it scuttles that vision. The more critical interpretation focuses on a detail of the open society's projected development. Popper tasks democracy's institutions with assuring conditions for progress through the expansion of knowledge. Popper expects the same process to modify the civic sphere's scope and content, as political bodies will be increasingly exposed to the expanding insights of scholarship and science. This anticipation involves grading the agents engaged in these two respective spheres, as well as looking forward to the ascendancy of one of them. Accordingly, the open-society concept might validate claims that, when seeking to confine the scope of majority decision through an emphasis on rights and law, constitutionalist and liberal approaches to democracy are subtly elitist.

The mid-century object relations approach saw the category of schizoids as crucial to its own formation. Rooted in a developmental phase where the perception of the mother as a whole and real person had not yet been secured, the schizoid constitution impeded relationships and forced schizoids to communicate through a compliant persona while the kernel self remained isolated. Fairbairn, Winnicott, and Guntrip thought that schizoid features underlay many other pathologies that earlier, Freudian psychoanalysis had misidentified. To correct this, a move to the attachment-oriented theory was necessary, triggering the development of the object relations perspective as a distinct and independent approach. While playing this role in the development of object relations theory, the schizoid category also attracted a note of disapproval. Fairbairn, Winnicott, and Guntrip described schizoids as harmful to society through their everyday actions and through the ideas they propagated. This judgemental nuance highlights an aspect of the alliance between object relations theory and the contemporary welfare state ideology. Culminating in the Beveridge plan, that ideology framed citizenship as comprehensive engagement with society on multiple levels. Citizenship was not just a political activity but also a personally rewarding one, as it allowed expression to each person’s wishes in ways that benefited others. Inability to engage and be rewarded in this way marked obstinate classes and produced rigid and conservative ideologies that opposed the welfare state. Object relations theory described the schizoid condition along similar lines and castigated its consequences for similar reasons.

Karl Popper characterizes the open society as a civilization that allows egalitarian conversation, distinguishes the facts of nature from normative values, eschews a foretold historical trajectory, avoids a binary contrast of wholly right to wholly wrong, and in consequence, shores up a constitutional and democratic polity. Critics have pointed that Popper himself occasionally endorses a moralistic view of nature, a foretold historical plot, a binary form of presentation, and a constrained view of democracy. I argue that these apparent anomalies in Popper's outlook are interlinked in the same way that Popper expects them to be in the closed society and are presented in the binary fashion he ascribes to the closed society. The open society derives its perception of politics from a structured understanding of nature and history and divides the field into two opposing camps that are simultaneously political, moral and ideological, disallowing third options, such as political realism.

While aligned with John Neville Figgis’ pluralism and Marxist socialism, Harold Laski endorsed liberal and democratic values. However, he synthesised several elements from older liberal theories in a way that diluted the division to which these theories had adhered, namely that between the private and the political spheres. The resulting combination preserves privacy’s status as the realm where individuals are free to pursue their separate ends, but enables essentially private activities based in voluntary social spaces to infuse the space of politics. From this emerged a vision of liberal democracy, in which freedom plays out in multiple private spaces that do not require an autonomous civic arena to complement them. The combination was reached within the contexts of mid-century thinking about the welfare state and a broader project of reformulating democracy by reducing its equation with representation.

Following the work of prominent object relations theorists, such as Fairbairn, Suttie and Winnicott, Gal Gerson explores the correlation between analytical theory and intellectual environment in two ways. He notes the impact that the British object relations school had on both psychology and wider culture, and suggests that the school's outlook involved more than a clinical choice. Gerson first interprets the object relations model as a political theory that completes a certain internal development within liberalism. He later outlines the relationship between the analytical theory and the historical setting in which it formed and took root. By engaging with these questions, Gerson demonstrates the deeper structure and implications of object relation theory for social philosophy. This allows him to answer questions such as: 'What kind of social arrangements do we endorse when we accept object relations theory as a fair description of mind?'; 'What beliefs about power, individuality, and household structure do we take in? What do we give up when doing so?'; and, lastly, 'What does it say about contemporary advanced societies that they have taken in much of the theory's content?' Proposing a novel rethinking of human nature, Individuality and Ideology in British Object Relations Theory provides much-needed insight into how this school of psychoanalytic theory has impacted contemporary social and political life.

I describe Winnicott’s attitude to the delimitation of sheltered privacy and domesticity from politics as a feature of his alliance with a liberal, welfare-oriented perception of democracy. While retaining the special character of politics as an arena for decision, enforcement, and the management of violence, Winnicott also sees the private sphere of family and home as both self-regulating and dynamic. When sufficient, the maternal holding at the heart of the private sphere provides the sense of movement and creativity that Winnicott equates with personal liberty. As it is the locus of freedom, privacy merits protection and seclusion from publicity and politics. But, as play is self-regulating and dynamic, it trains participants in bargaining and competition within the boundaries of impersonal procedure, thus instilling the norms that underlie civic and political activity. As play mutates into further engagements, its self-structuring quality expands to mitigate the chaotic and decisional features of politics. While never transcended, politics is circumvented and tamed by a culture made of plural activities based on play and enabling the expression of inputs from free individuals.