A bstract . The effect of intercollegiate athletics on alumni contributions to the academic endowment of an institution is analyzed empirically. Using time series data from a representative National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) Division I university, a contribution function is estimated which incorporates various measures of success in the major sports programs. After controlling for the population of alumni, student enrollment, state appropriations, and per capita income, the results indicate that contributions are positively related to the overall winning percentage of the intercollegiate sports program. Post season play is not found to be a significant determinant of donations to academics while television appearances are positively related to contributions. The results also suggest that sanctions imposed by the NCAA for rules violation may slightly reduce contributions to academics.

The effect of intercollegiate athletics on alumni contributions to the academic endowment of an institution is analyzed empirically. Using time series data from a representative National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) Division I university, a contribution function is estimated which incorporates various measures of success in the major sports programs. After controlling for the population of alumni, student enrollment, state appropriations, and per capita income, the results indicate that contributions are positively related to the overall winning percentage of the intercollegiate sports program. Post season play is not found to be a significant determinant of donations to academics while television appearances are positively related to contributions. The results also suggest that sanctions imposed by the NCAA for rules violation may slightly reduce contributions to academics.

This paper theoretically models and econometrically tests the determinants of third-degree price discrimination concerning institutional versus individual pricing by the publishers for the top 99 journals in economics. Three measures of price discrimination are employed for the basis of all statistical analyses as they pertain to subscribers in the United States for the year 1985: the existence of price discrimination, an index of monopoly power as devised by Lerner (1943), and the difference between institutional and individual subscription prices. Unstandardized and standardized coefficient estimates from probit and least-squares regression methods are derived across each measure of price discrimination. Policy recommendations are offered given empirical findings for libraries as to how to limit the negative consequences of price discrimination practiced by publishers.

This paper investigates the issue of economic performance and U.S. Senate elections analyzed by Bennett and Wiseman (1991) in a work published in this journal. Our study analyzes the electoral margins and election outcomes of U.S. Senate elections using state-level data involving only incumbents up for reelection in the 1976–1990 period (212 elections). The ordinary least squares and logit estimation results suggest that the effects of economic performance variables on incumbent senatorial elections are in general overshadowed by other factors known to be important in determining electoral margins and outcomes. In addition, the empirical results of the entire model are in general consistent with prior findings noted in the public choice and political science literature concerning the analysis of U.S. Senate elections. Therefore, we suggest that the findings raised in our study provide enough theoretical and empirical evidence to raise sufficient doubt regarding the robustness of the results suggested by Bennett and Wiseman (1991), and thus call upon other researchers to study further the relationship between economic performance and voting behavior in U.S. Senate elections.

Southeastern Political ReviewVolume 20, Issue 2 p. 201-230 GOVERNANCE AND U.S. SENATE ELECTIONS: A COMPARISON OF PRESIDENTTAL AND MIDTERM ELECTIONS Stephen D. Shaffer, Stephen D. Shaffer Mississippi State UniversitySearch for more papers by this authorGeorge A. Chressanthis, George A. Chressanthis Mississippi State UniversitySearch for more papers by this author Stephen D. Shaffer, Stephen D. Shaffer Mississippi State UniversitySearch for more papers by this authorGeorge A. Chressanthis, George A. Chressanthis Mississippi State UniversitySearch for more papers by this author First published: September 1992 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1346.1992.tb00308.xCitations: 1AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume20, Issue2September 1992Pages 201-230 RelatedInformation

This paper attempted to demonstrate that a rational voter model as derived by Barzel and Silberberg (1973) can be used (with modifications) to explain third party voting in presidential elections. The empirical findings strongly suggest that the rational voter model is applicable in explaining third party voting. This conclusion likewise suggests that people who vote for third parties do so under similar motivations as people who vote for the major parties. Thus, people do not appear to regard votes for third parties as wasted votes or engage in the voting process in an irrational fashion. Lastly, votes for third parties represent the transmission of individual preferences by people who believe that their vote is important and that in the aggregate their signal may be interpreted as a signal to alter the direction of current policies as run by the major parties. Therefore, it does not appear from the evidence presented here that we should distinguish between or treat differently voting participation for the major parties versus the minor or third parties in presidential elections.

This article theoretically develops and empirically tests the relationship between criminal homicide crime rates in the United States for the period 1965–1985 and the deterrent effect of capital punishment by utilizing a recursive system of equations method. The analysis reveals that not only does a deterrent effect of capital punishment exist but also that changes in commonly selected law enforcement, judicial, demographic, and economic control variables are significant in a manner consistent with implications from general theoretical models of criminal behavior and within frameworks specifically dealing with murder and nonnegligent manslaughter.

This paper theoretically develops and empirically tests factors that significantly affect criminal homicide arrest rate patterns in the United States for elderly criminals of the ages 65 years and older, from 1964 to 1985. The analysis reveais that changes in commonly selected economic, demographic, law enforcement, and punishment variables are significantly correlated with elderly criminal homicide arrest rates in a manner consistent with implications from general theoretical models of criminal behavior and with frameworks specifically dealing with criminal homicide.