This report proposes adaptation of the previous regulatory gap analysis in Chapter 4 (Reactor) of NUREG 0800, Standard Review Plan (SRP) for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR [Light Water Reactor] Edition. The proposed adaptation would result in a Chapter 4 review plan applicable to certain advanced reactors. This report addresses two technologies: the sodium-cooled fast reactor (SFR) and the modular high temperature gas-cooled reactor (mHTGR). SRP Chapter 4, which addresses reactor components, was selected for adaptation because of the possible significant differences in advanced non-light water reactor (non-LWR) technologies compared with the current LWR-based description in Chapter 4. SFR and mHTGR technologies were chosen for this gap analysis because of their diverse designs and the availability of significant historical design detail.

The goal of this review is to enable application of codes or software packages for safety assessment of advanced sodium-cooled fast reactor (SFR) designs. To address near-term programmatic needs, the authors have focused on two objectives. First, the authors have focused on identification of requirements for software QA that must be satisfied to enable the application of software to future safety analyses. Second, the authors have collected best practices applied by other code development teams to minimize cost and time of initial code qualification activities and to recommend a path to the stated goal.

By around 2025, thorium-based fuel cycles are likely to be deployed internationally. States such as China and India are pursuing research, development, and deployment pathways toward a number of commercial-scale thorium fuel cycles, and they are already building test reactors and the associated fuel cycle infrastructure. In the future, the potential exists for these emerging programs to sell, export, and deploy thorium fuel cycle technology in other states. Without technically adequate international safeguards protocols and measures in place, any future potential clandestine misuse of these fuel cycles could go undetected, compromising the deterrent value of these protocols and measures. The development of safeguards approaches for thorium-based fuel cycles is therefore a matter of some urgency. Yet, the focus of the international safeguards community remains mainly on safeguarding conventional U-235- and (PU)-P-239-based fuel cycles while the safeguards challenges of thorium-uranium fuel cycles remain largely uninvestigated. This raises the following question: Is the International Atomic Energy Agency and international safeguards system ready for thorium fuel cycles? Furthermore, is the safeguards technology of today sufficiently mature to meet the verification challenges posed by thorium-based fuel cycles? In defining these and other related research questions, the objectives of this paper are to identify key safeguards considerations for thorium-based fuel cycles and to call for an early dialogue between the international safeguards and the nuclear fuel cycle communities to prepare for the potential safeguards challenges associated with these fuel cycles. In this paper, it is concluded that directed research and development programs are required to meet the identified safeguards challenges and to take timely action in preparation for the international deployment of thorium fuel cycles.

Inherent in the design of modular reactors is the increased likelihood of events that initiate at a single reactor affecting another reactor. Because of the increased level of interactions between reactors, it is apparent that the Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs) for modular reactor designs need to specifically address the increased interactions and dependencies.

Fluoride salt-cooled high-temperature reactors (FHRs) are an emerging reactor class with potentially advantageous performance characteristics and fully passive safety. This paper provides an overview of a technology development pathway for expeditious commercial deployment of first-generation FHRs. The paper describes the principal remaining FHR technology challenges and the development path needed to address the challenges. First-generation FHRs do not appear to require any technology breakthroughs, but will require significant technology development and demonstration. FHRs are currently entering early phase engineering development. As such, the development roadmap is not as technically detailed or specific as would be the case for a more mature reactor class. The higher cost of fuel and coolant; the lack of an approved licensing framework; the lack of qualified, salt-compatible structural materials; and the potential for tritium release into the environment are the most obvious issues that remain to be resolved.

The purpose of this document is to provide an initial, focused reference to the safety characteristics of and a licensing approach for Fluoride-Salt-Cooled High-Temperature Reactors (FHRs). The document does not contain details of particular reactor designs nor does it attempt to identify or classify either design basis or beyond design basis accidents. Further, this document is an initial attempt by a small set of subject matter experts to document the safety and licensing characteristics of FHRs for a larger audience. The document is intended to help in setting the safety and licensing research, development, and demonstration path forward. Input from a wider audience, further technical developments, and additional study will be required to develop a consensus position on the safety and licensing characteristics of FHRs. This document begins with a brief overview of the attributes of FHRs and then a general description of their anticipated safety performance. Following this, an overview of the US nuclear power plant approval process is provided that includes both test and power reactors, as well as the role of safety standards in the approval process. The document next describes a General Design Criteria (GDC)–based approach to licensing an FHR and provides an initial draft set of FHR GDCs. The document concludes with a description of a path forward toward developing an FHR safety standard that can support both a test and power reactor licensing process.

A study on the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station spent-fuel pool (SFP) at Unit 4 (SFP4) is presented in this paper. We discuss the design characteristics of SFP4 and its decay heat load in detail and provide a model that we developed to estimate the SFP evaporation rate based on the SFP temperature. The SFP level of SFP4 following the March 11, 2011, accident is predicted based on the fundamental conservation laws of mass and energy. Our predicted SFP level and temperatures are in good agreement with measured data and are consistent with Tokyo Electric Power Company evaluation results.

This Resource Letter is intended to summarize the status of nuclear power in the world today, prospects of significant expansion of nuclear power over the next several decades, the planning of and forecasts for the addition of new power reactors, and issues surrounding the addition of these new reactors. Owing to the breadth of this subject, the list of references includes journal articles, web pages, and reports to guide the reader on the subject. The subject of nuclear power and its related issues are dynamic, so the most current information is likely to be found on reputable websites.

A hydrodynamics model has been developed to study extreme deformation of the space reactor system impacting on the ground with a high velocity. Two-dimensional geometry models for a monolithic core and a pinned core reactor have been developed with dynamic material models, including the material constitutive models and the equation-of-state models. Calculations have been performed for the reactor impacting onto dry sand at 230 and 150 m/s. A pinned core has a much larger fraction of gas volume in the reactor core and thus collapses faster than a monolithic core. The 150 m/s impact velocity case reveals that the gas coolant channels survive in a monolithic core even though the reactor is massively deformed. In a pinned core, however, most of the gas coolant region collapses with intact or partially collapsed fission product gas cores that are protected by solid UO(2) fuel. The sand density varies as it is being compressed. Generally, sand beneath the impacting reactor has a higher density as it is compressed. In addition to consideration of global criticality, it is necessary to investigate local criticality. Because of nonuniform distribution of the gas coolant channels in a deformed monolithic core for the 230 m/s impact velocity case, it may be possible to induce criticality locally in those regions where collapse is more severe. It is not straightforward to make an engineering judgment based solely on impact analysis regarding which core concept is more susceptible to criticality events. The current impact study reveals that a pinned core reactor collapses faster than a monolithic core reactor. A reactor that collapses faster is thought to be more susceptible to producing a criticality. However, a monolithic core reactor with much higher mass and kinetic energy develops much higher compaction in the dry sand beneath the reactor. This means that it is expected to better reflect fast neutrons from the bottom boundary where the sand density for a monolithic core impact becomes much higher than for a pinned core impact. It is strongly recommended that neutronics calculations be performed to determine the susceptibility of criticality for the massively deformed nuclear reactors including appropriate reflecting boundary conditions.

This report provides guidance on the component testing necessary during the next phase of fluoride salt-cooled high temperature reactor (FHR) development. In particular, the report identifies and describes the reactor component performance and reliability requirements, provides an overview of what information is necessary to provide assurance that components will adequately achieve the requirements, and then provides guidance on how the required performance information can efficiently be obtained. The report includes a system description of a representative test scale FHR reactor. The reactor parameters presented in this report should only be considered as placeholder values until an FHR test scale reactor design is completed. The report focus is bounded at the interface between and the reactor primary coolant salt and the fuel and the gas supply and return to the Brayton cycle power conversion system. The analysis is limited to component level testing and does not address system level testing issues. Further, the report is oriented as a bottom-up testing requirements analysis as opposed to a having a top-down facility description focus.